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


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
LIFE AND WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN

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(PRINCETON)

IN TEN VOLUMES: VOLUME II





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LINCOLN AS PRESIDENT

LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT

(MARCH 4, 1861 TO MAY 3, 1865)

BY

HENRY C. WHITNEY

Author of "LIFE ON THE CIRCUIT WITH LINCOLN"

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LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT



LINCOLN THE PRESIDENT

CHAPTER I

THE CABINET

NEXT morning (March 5, 1861) the President began his official career. The heads of the departments, and Senators and Congressmen, and zealous and interested friends came in great numbers, and were received, so far as time would allow. At 11:30 A.M. Mr. John G. Nicolay started to the Capitol with the first official communication to the Senate: it contained the Presidential nominees for the Cabinet. These were: William H. Seward, of New York, Secretary of State; Salmon P. Chase, of Ohio, Secretary of the Treasury; Simon Cameron, of Pennsylvania, Secretary of War; Gideon Welles, of Connecticut, Secretary of the Navy; Caleb B. Smith, of Indiana, Secretary of the Interior; Montgomery Blair, of Maryland, Postmaster-General; and Edward Bates, of Missouri, Attorney-General. These nominations were promptly confirmed by the Senate, and the appointees entered at once upon their duties.

Mr. Lincoln was not only the most consummate statesman of his time, but he was also and equally the most astute and sagacious politician; he well knew and realized that legitimate politics was based on system and constancy—that utility was

its motor, and good faith its balance wheel; that political tergiversation and ingratitude would handicap its success, in exact relation to the extent of the turpitude and flagitious cause at issue.

Now Lincoln had been elected by a composite vote, and he realized that political expediency, good faith, propriety and justice all demanded that he should make an equitable division of the offices between the two political factors, which, united, had secured his election. As soon as his election had been assured, he resolved upon the various members of his Cabinet, so far as his personal wish was concerned, the Administration representing the old parties equally, thus:

<i>Whigs</i>		<i>Democrats</i>	
Illinois	Lincoln	Ohio	Chase
New York	Seward	Connecticut	Welles
Missouri	Bates	Maryland	Blair
New Jersey	Dayton	Illinois	Judd

And in point of fact, he desired Judd personally, more than any of the others; I confess I see no reason why. But there were circumstances which militated against the carrying out of this policy. Judd came from the same State as the President; his appointment would have been extremely obnoxious to all of Lincoln's old Whig friends, as Davis, Swett, Logan, Dickey, Brown- ing, Williams, Washburne, Yates, and Norton.

Lincoln's friends, including Judd, had without authority promised the friends of Cameron and of Smith places for these in the Cabinet. Judd therefore could not displace either of them. Lincoln must have Chase, Seward, a man from New

England, and two Southern men, and Judd and Dayton were necessarily thus ruled out. His chief competitors for the nomination had been Seward, Chase, Bates, and Cameron. He reasoned that these men were representative with himself of the strength of the Republican party. Cameron he omitted in his personal desire, by reason of his malodorous political record; the others he was resolved upon, and must have at all hazards.

From the time the convention of 1860 adjourned, it was palpable that, if Lincoln was elected, Seward must be Secretary of State; to have omitted this, would have been worse than a crime, for it would have been a gross political blunder. Seward, more than any other man, had built up the Republican party; of the non-merchantable part of the convention, he was the choice. Lincoln became the nominee only by virtue of political dickers, unauthorized, it is true, but nevertheless made in his behalf. That Seward would be part of the Administration was everywhere conceded; and he and his coterie expected that he would be *the* Administration itself. Seward took the stump accordingly, and made a series of speeches which for classical style, comprehensiveness of detail, and political erudition have never been excelled. Therein lay his *forte*; he was the Burke and Fox combined of American politics,—but not the Pitt, for he was the most unsafe of statesmen.

Seward took no pains to refute the assumption, which was general, that he was to be the *vis inertiae* of the coming Administration. After a short time for reflection, for looks' sake, on the 28th of December he accepted the high honor

offered him, and cast a wary and critical eye on the political field to ascertain the true policy for the political future of William Henry Seward. For he was nothing if not a politician, and an optimistic one at that, and his hopeful fancy penetrated through the angry and threatening clouds of secession and civil war, and reveled in the tranquil and serene azure of reconciliation and peace. Inasmuch as he had been an actor in the stirring era of 1850 when secession was threatened, but was averted, he hoped for a similar result now.

Seward's geniality, talents, and high political position made him hosts of personal friends even among his political enemies, and he was looked to as the political oracle of the times, the more especially as the conventional head of the Administration, with wisdom and propriety, was mute. That a statesman of Seward's great ability should make so gross a mistake as to assume that he was to *run* the Administration of a President about whose characteristics he knew nothing, and, on this assumption, to act in advance, is strange, but it is nevertheless true. From the time that Lincoln solicited his acceptance of a Cabinet office, Seward assumed that he was to be the "power behind the throne."

On Saturday, March 2, Mr. Seward had written to the President-elect asking leave to withdraw his consent to accept the office of Secretary of State. Mr. Lincoln thought over the situation until Monday, when he came to the conclusion that Mr. Seward wished to dominate it by having his resignation accepted and then either resuming his place in the Senate of which he would be the leader, or gracefully yielding to the public

outcry, which he felt sure would follow, thus re-entering the council of the President as the master-spirit of the Administration. This position the President determined to maintain for himself. Remarking "I can't afford to let Seward take the first trick," he handed the following letter to Mr. Nicolay, his private secretary, for him to copy and transmit to Mr. Seward:

Your note . . . is the subject of the most painful solicitude with me; and I feel constrained to beg that you will countermand the withdrawal. The public interest, I think, demands that you should; and my personal feelings are deeply enlisted in the same direction. Please consider and answer by 9 o'clock A.M. to-morrow.

On March 5 Mr. Seward withdrew his letter in season for the original "slate" to be presented to the Senate. However, not at once did he give up the game. Indeed, he spread his entire hand on the table, assured that Lincoln would recognize its strength and throw up his own. Instead, Lincoln held him to the rules of the game, which required the Secretary to follow the President's lead, and he bade him take up his hand again. To Seward's credit it must be recorded that he did so.

On April 1 Secretary Seward submitted to Mr. Lincoln a paper entitled: "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration." In this he outlined the course needful to be pursued, first impudently premising that no policy had as yet been adopted. This document sounds very much like pleasantry on the part of the Secretary, but it was on too serious a matter, and at too serious a time for this, and was delivered in expectation

that the President would abdicate his high powers and confer them on his ambitious and meddling subordinate. The programme suggested was thus: Change the question before the public from one about slavery for a question about union or disunion. Demand categorically and at once explanations from Spain and France. Seek explanations from Great Britain and Russia, and send agents into Canada, Mexico, and Central America to rouse a vigorous spirit of independence on this continent against European intervention. And if satisfactory explanations are not received from Spain and France, convene Congress and declare war against them. But whatsoever be the policy adopted, there must be an energetic prosecution of it. For this purpose it must be somebody's business to pursue and direct it incessantly. Either the President must do it himself and be all the while active in it, or he should let it devolve on some member of his Cabinet. Once adopted, debate on it must end, and all agree and abide. "It is not my especial province, but I neither seek to evade nor assume responsibility." And yet the author of this idiotic performance came very near to being in the position of dread responsibility held by the sage Lincoln. The President did not need any time for consideration of so senseless yet mischievous a document. Indeed, had its existence been made public, it would have made the Administration as ridiculous as its hosts of enemies could desire.

Before William Henry Seward closed his eyes in sleep that night he was "a sadder and wiser man," for he had read a note from his master both in position and in intellect which was

entirely free from ambiguity, and which, disdainingly to reply to the bellicose matter broached, gave the premier to understand that the trust which the people had invested the President with should be sacredly enforced by him without the interference of any subordinate. It was respectful and dignified in tone and diction, but it was as sharp and trenchant as a Dasmascus blade. It ended thus:

Upon your closing proposition [the adoption of a fixed policy and its energetic prosecution either by the President or one specially chosen member of the Cabinet] I remark that if this must be done, I must do it. When a general line of policy is adopted, I apprehend there is no danger of its being changed without good reason, or continuing to be a subject of unnecessary debate; still, upon points arising in its progress, I wish, and suppose I am entitled to have, the advice of all the Cabinet.

Throughout the dark winter of 1860-61, Seward had clearly seen the masked designs of the Southern leaders, and kept the President fully advised of the true trend of affairs. He wrote that it was the fell design of the Southern leaders to break up the Union, by reason of their loss of political power, and he added that the President (Buchanan) didn't know which way to turn, or what to do—that Union men were alarmed, and the situation was chaotic. Being thus convinced of the animus of the Southern leaders, and of the imbecility of the Administration, he deemed it of supreme importance that the principle of inertia should rule until after March 4, fearing that a *coup d'état* of some sort might be attempted to prevent Mr. Lincoln from gaining possession of the Government. He accordingly

affected a *nonchalance* he did not feel, stated his opinions insincerely in optimistic language for the ears of the Southern leaders, and predicted that in "ninety days" (which would reach into Lincoln's term) there would be political harmony.

That Seward compromised himself by these utterances, which were not the substance of things hoped for by him, is clear; the Southern leaders interpreted it to mean that there would be no coercion, but that they would be allowed to secede in peace. Seward afterward claimed that he promulgated these views in order to keep the *status quo* intact till Lincoln could take hold. This insincerity, if it were so, was not difficult for Seward, for his political practices were Machiavellian, and, like Talleyrand, he could use language to conceal his thoughts. But whether sincere or insincere, he did the one thing needful at the time, and bound himself to a line of policy which, if submitted to the people, in my judgment and in that of men much more astute than I, would never have been indorsed by them.

Seward's early policy was to yield to the secession menace, back squarely down, and play the coward, and then retrieve the resulting disaster in some chance, haphazard way. Whether he adopted this belief from timidity or expediency is not clear; it was probably the latter, but the weak men in the Cabinet and General Scott shared his views, thus giving to the Administration an appearance of irresolution which was finally terminated by the President following Blair's advice, and determining to attempt to relieve Fort Sumter. Meanwhile Seward's course was very perplexing to the Administration and

to the conspirators at Charleston and Montgomery as well. Taking counsel of his hopes, the Secretary had no hesitation in giving definite assurances to the friends and emissaries of the secession cause that Sumter *would* be evacuated. Martin J. Crawford, a Rebel commissioner, notified his government on March 6 that Seward and Cameron were resolved on a peace policy, which they could enforce on the President. And Seward definitely assured Mr. Justice Campbell that Sumter would be evacuated at once. Finally, when it was apparent that Sumter was to be relieved, the entire administration was accused of duplicity, and Campbell was discredited by his own people. This arose from the lack of harmony between Seward's optimistic hopes and Lincoln's constancy and heroism.

One James E. Harvey became an attaché of the State department. On April 6, 1861, this Harvey telegraphed to Judge McGrath at Charleston: "Positively determined not to withdraw Anderson. Supplies go immediately, supported by naval force under Stringham, if their landing be resisted. A Friend." The Rebel commissioner Caldwell indorsed it, "The above is by a reliable man." But the telegraph office insisted upon knowing the name of the sender, and it was then given. Two days later Harvey sent this dispatch: "Orders issued for withdrawal of Anderson's command. Scott declares it military necessity. This is private." This dispatch was immediately followed by another to the effect that efforts were making to consider the withdrawal, but it would be in vain, and still another from the same source, stating that the final order had not yet been made, and that in the Cabinet

six were for withdrawal and one against it. It will be seen that his information was as accurate as he could have got had he been present in the Executive Chamber throughout all the Cabinet proceedings. And Seward afterward appointed this spy and informer Minister to Portugal.

Secretary Seward was a very sagacious and subtle politician, and his ambition was not limited by time or propriety, but reached out into the illimitable regions of the hereafter and unknown, the goal of his aspirations being immortality. While out riding one day with a friend, toward the close of his life, they passed through Union Square in New York, and as they came opposite the Lincoln statue in that park, Seward said bitterly, "Death has cheated *me* of immortality," his idea being that history would have garnered into his fame the honors of Lincoln's administration, had not premature death placed the great President in an elevation too lofty to be shared with another.

Indeed Seward's friends claimed that he really administered the government in Lincoln's name; and so astute and generally accurate a critic as Charles Francis Adams made this bold claim after the eminent subjects were both dead. That this claim has no basis at all is attested by events considered both as a whole and in every detail. Seward perhaps at first exercised more authority than any other Cabinet minister, but when the administration got worn to its bearings, he was no more potent than Chase or Stanton. Seward's famous dispatch to Minister Adams was radically changed by the President, and that document was the *chef d'œuvre* of the Seward diplomacy.

Mr. Lincoln attempted to provision Sumter, released Mason and Slidell, and retained McClellan, all against Seward's policy. In point of fact, everything shows that Lincoln paid no more attention to Seward than he did to even Welles, and the only basis for the claim of Seward's predominance lies in the fact that the Secretary of State arrogated more to himself, and took more liberties than the others did. Seward is an interesting character; one can but admire the cleverness of his methods while condemning them. His political aims were preservative and heroic, but his course was replete with "ways that were dark and tricks that were vain."

As an illustration of his devious and mysterious methods the following facts may be cited: Although he was a Protestant (an Episcopalian), yet during his whole political life he was in close touch with Bishop Hughes, who was then the most influential Catholic in America. The most prominent of the founders of the Republican party, he was on terms of extreme intimacy with Stephen A. Douglas, even during this Senator's flagitious fight to repeal the Missouri Compromise. Seward's intimacy with Weed, the Mephistopheles and Fouché combined of politics, was openly proclaimed by himself. Seward said one day, after the name of Weed had come up just before, in a Cabinet meeting, "Weed and Seward are one; what I say, he concurs in; what he does, I approve; we are one." "I am very sorry to hear that remark," said Secretary Chase; "I would strain a point to oblige Governor Seward, but I would not do anything for the especial benefit of Mr. Weed; they never can be one to me." But Weed remained

the right bower of the administration of the State department, as he had been the right bower of the Secretary for years before. At the close of Lincoln's term Weed retired from the political world a man of great wealth.

Seward's dignity of character was rather the result of intellectual force than of moral convictions. The political morality of Albany was alike in all its graduates. "To the victors belong the spoils," said Marcy from the Democratic ring; "Weed and I are one," echoed Seward from the Whig contingent.

Chase was different: he was not even a politician; he had no *claque*, no mentor, no devious ways. He relied for success solely upon manhood, individuality, statesmanship. Not only would rivalry keep Chase and Seward apart, but their characteristics alone would do so, unaided. They were civil and mechanically polite to each other when they first met in Lincoln's Cabinet; they were no more nor less so, the last time.

A serious difficulty lay in harmonizing the "Seward" and "Chase" factions. Seward expected and designed to "run" the administration, that is, to administer the government in Lincoln's name; and he did not intend to "brook a rival near the throne." Chase feared this dominating influence of Seward, and felt no assurance of amity or concord in such companionship, and their several friends were even more bitter in their opposition than the principals themselves.

The radical majority of Congress in 1862 was more in sympathy with the principles represented by Secretary Chase in the national council than with those of the President. This was clearly indicated by the favor with which the financial

propositions of the message of that year were received, and by the lack of consideration paid to the President's pet measure of compensated emancipation. As early as September 12, 1862, Secretary Chase recorded in his diary an impression of the President that prevailed among the radicals:

I think that the President, with the most honest intentions in the world, and a naturally clear judgment and a true, unselfish patriotism, has yielded so much to border-State and negrophobic counsels that he now finds it difficult to arrest his own descent towards the most fatal concessions. He has already separated himself from the great body of the party which elected him; distrusts most those who represent its spirit, and waits—for what?

The radicals in Congress considered the President a weak man, too greatly swayed by certain of his counselors, chiefly Secretary Seward, who had incurred the enmity of the anti-slavery men by the statement in a letter to Minister Adams on July 5, 1862, that by demanding an edict of universal emancipation they were acting in concert with the secessionists to precipitate a servile war. The Republican Senators went so far as to hold a caucus which adopted a resolution requesting the President to reconstruct his Cabinet. Hearing of this action, Secretary Seward offered his resignation to the President.

The committee appointed to present the resolution of the caucus waited on the President on December 19. As the President afterwards reported to the Cabinet, in language wherein humorous candor triumphed over personal humiliation: "While they seemed to believe in my honesty, they also appeared to think that, when I

had in me any good purpose or intention, Seward contrived to suck it out of me unperceived."

Lincoln asked the committee to call again that evening, at which time he also convened the Cabinet, with the exception of Seward. He informed neither the Senators nor the Ministers that the other party would be present. The committee presented its charges against the Cabinet in general and the Secretary of State in particular, and the President and the Cabinet, even Secretary Chase, who had in private endorsed the opinions of the Senators, defended themselves, and either implicitly or explicitly their absent colleague. The Secretary of the Treasury, however, protested that the President had placed him in a false position by not notifying the Cabinet that the committee would be present at the meeting, in which case he would not have come. As the committee were departing, defeated by the unanimity of the Cabinet, which Chase had told them was in discord, Senator Trumbull, of Illinois, informed the President with some heat of the two-faced attitude of the Secretary of the Treasury that had led the Senators into such a humiliating situation.

At the Cabinet meeting next day Secretary Chase tendered his written resignation. This was what the President, ever since the resignation of Secretary Seward, had been playing for. He promptly received the paper, and closed discussion by dismissing the meeting. Then he sent the following note to both Seward and Chase:

You have respectively tendered me your resignations as Secretary of State and Secretary of the Treasury of the United States. I am apprised of the circumstances

which may render this course personally desirable to each of you; but after most anxious consideration my deliberate judgment is that the public interest does not admit of it. I therefore have to request that you will resume the duties of your Departments respectively.

As neither Secretary by insisting on resigning would permit his rival to obtain the victory, each decided to remain in the Cabinet. Seward, from the day that Lincoln rejected his "Some Thoughts for the President's Consideration," had recognized him as master. Chase now had learned the same lesson. Thereafter Lincoln had a harmonious Cabinet of balanced opinion, advisory but subordinate to his own. As he quaintly remarked to a friendly Senator (Ira Harris, of New York): "Now I can ride; I've got a pumpkin in each end of my bag."

In the formation of the Cabinet David Davis made it very disagreeable for the President-elect, by constantly causing it to be represented that his cousin, H. Winter Davis, ought to receive a Cabinet appointment. Of course this was impossible, and David Davis probably knew it, as any such appointment as that would alienate the whole Blair family: Francis P. Blair, Sr., Francis P. Blair, Jr., Montgomery Blair, B. Gratz Brown, and the rest. This would amount to surrendering the political allegiance of Maryland and Missouri, and possibly Kentucky. No! that never would do. I suppose the Judge shrewdly thought that the President-elect might placate him by appointing him instead of Winter Davis.

However, it was more than an annoyance. Lincoln found considerable difficulty in ignoring Winter Davis and his pretensions, and Winter

Davis kept up a "fire in the rear" on the Administration ever afterward, though nothing serious came of it.

Really, the most difficult matter was the cases of Smith and Cameron. Without the aid of Indiana and Cameron's Pennsylvania contingent in the convention, the nomination would have gone to Seward, and those factors would have been traded off to Seward had not the "Lincoln" coterie acquired them beforehand. Smith and Cameron were after the "spoils," and these were promised them as emphatically as David Davis, Swett, Logan, and Judd could do it. Lincoln was bound in fealty to his friends and supporters, and it would savor strongly of ingratitude, if not of dishonor, to repudiate their bargains. In case of Smith there was no serious difficulty. He had never been in a position to show his quality. The murky condition of the "Smith" horizon was caused by his followers, their demands, and their too plainly apparent greed. All danger from that source might be forestalled, and perhaps counteracted—at all events, that appointment would not evoke violent criticism. The great strain came to Lincoln in being obliged to discard Judd in order to pay Indiana for its vote in the convention. Yet Judd could not complain, since he had made the bargain. The case of Cameron was different; he had a national reputation for tergiversation, and, while Swett, Davis, and Logan were compelled to demand his appointment, party leaders from all quarters violently protested against it. The very best Republican leaders in Pennsylvania, such as Governor Andrew G. Curtin, were also opposed to it, and Lincoln came to a pretty firm resolve not to make the appoint-

ment. He said to Swett one day: "You know I am called 'Honest old Abe;' how will it appear to the world for me to appoint Cameron as one of my political family, and thus indorse him and his record—especially as leading men all over the nation, and particularly in Pennsylvania, vehemently oppose it? I can't do it." And he informed Cameron that he could not. But the political sagacity of Cameron was superior to Lincoln's determination. He insisted on the consideration for his votes in the convention; the Pennsylvania opponents would not prefer written charges, and Lincoln, with extreme reluctance, gave Cameron the War Department, which he, of course, at once proceeded to run in the "Cameronian" way, and very soon "ran it into the ground."

Secretary Cameron was a man of shrewd political ability, but with no talent for executive administration. Thoroughly loyal to his chief, he nevertheless placed him in a most delicate position by inserting in the annual report of the Secretary of War, which was printed on December 1, 1861, an unauthorized dictum in regard to the arming of slaves by the Federal Government, saying:

It is as clearly a right of the Government to arm slaves, when it may become necessary, as it is to use gunpowder taken from the enemy. Whether it is expedient to do so is purely a military question. . . . If it shall be found that the men who have been held by the Rebels as slaves are capable of bearing arms and performing efficient military service, it is the right, and may become the duty, of the Government to arm and equip them, and employ their services against the Rebels, under proper military regulation, discipline, and command.

While this was also the President's secret belief and intention, he was not ready to announce it, and had indeed censured General Frémont for his unauthorized proclamation of military emancipation of slaves coming within his lines. Accordingly he suppressed the first edition of the Secretary's report containing this pronouncement. This suppression was the only rebuke that the President administered, yet the offending Secretary realized that his tenure of office was a slight one. His position became irksome, and he was greatly relieved accordingly by his transfer on January 11, 1862, to the congenial post of a foreign minister, going to represent our country at the friendly court of St. Petersburg.

On April 30, 1862, the House of Representatives passed a resolution censuring Mr. Cameron for entrusting, while Secretary of War, large sums of money to an irresponsible and unbonded agent for the purchase of military supplies, and for dealing with illegitimate contractors of such supplies. On the 27th of May, 1862, the President sent a special message to Congress on the subject, showing in detail that he and the heads of the Government department had authorized the acts complained of, and justifying them as necessary to save the Government in the crisis that then existed. "Congress," he said, "will see that I should be wanting in candor or in justice if I should leave the censure . . . to rest exclusively or chiefly upon Mr. Cameron."

Lincoln's worst fears were realized in the appointments of Smith and Cameron. And he got rid of both as soon as he could. He didn't improve matters much in case of Smith, for he replaced him with a man (John T. Usher) of

the same political school and tendencies. But in Stanton, who replaced Cameron, he secured the right man in the right place—the *bête noire* of skulkers, plunderers, and incompetents; a man who never tired, and who followed his duties and the courage of his convictions to a premature grave.

The appointment of Edwin M. Stanton to the most important position in the Cabinet was thoroughly characteristic of Mr. Lincoln. Of all the lawyers with whom Lincoln had come in contact in his professional career, Stanton was the only one who had inflicted a slight upon him which continued to rankle in his sensitive nature. In a celebrated patent suit, the McCormick-Manney reaping-machine case, tried at Cincinnati in 1859, Lincoln and Stanton were associated with George Harding, a patent lawyer, as associate counsel. Only one lawyer besides Harding was permitted to speak, and the choice fell on Stanton. Stanton completely ignored Lincoln, who was present and ready to offer suggestions. Lincoln was cut to the heart by his treatment, and thought of returning home. His sense of duty toward his client, however, kept him as an auditor in the courtroom. As he listened to Stanton's masterly conduct of the case, his sense of personal injury was lost for the moment in professional admiration of the "college-bred" attorney from Washington, and he returned to Illinois with the resolution, as a "corn-field lawyer," to prepare himself to cope with the educated class of his professional rivals that was "working out toward the West."

Again, in the trying months succeeding his inauguration, President Lincoln was cognizant of

Stanton's contemptuous criticism of his character and acts, privately expressed, it is true, to public men whose opposition to the President could and did work him much injury. Indeed, for a time General McClellan and Stanton colloqued together, being drawn to one another by a common contempt for the "imbecile" at the head of the nation. Nevertheless, the President recalled that, as Attorney-General in Buchanan's Cabinet, Stanton had, under the most trying and critical circumstances, acted the part of a patriot, and with supreme genius secretly forestalled the machinations of the secessionist conspirators among his fellow Presidential advisers.

Laying personal feeling aside, and considering only the interest of the nation, President Lincoln chose as his War Minister the man whom he believed to be best qualified for the position—Edwin M. Stanton. From a moral point of view, this, and not the Emancipation Proclamation, was "the greatest act of the Administration."

And so the Cabinet was made up of somewhat combustible material, but, with four former Democrats and three former Whigs, the President made a perfect equipoise by counting himself as a Whig. Later in his administration, however, there were times when he outweighed the entire Cabinet. Immediately after the second disaster at Bull Run, and while the demoralized troops were crowding into the defenses of Washington, a Cabinet meeting was called, and, before the President came in, a rumor was rife that McClellan had been reinstated in command of the Army of the Potomac. This rumor Lincoln confirmed when he entered. Stanton showed fight at once. "No such order has come through the

War Department," he said. "No," said the President, "I did it of my own independent motion, under my sense of responsibility to the country;" and he proceeded to explain his reasons kindly but firmly to the angry Cabinet, and to show them that it was as bitter a dose for him personally as it possibly could be to them. Had it not been for the President's soothing manner, Stanton, Chase, and Blair would probably have resigned.

Lincoln's action regarding the Emancipation Proclamation was similar to this. He said to his Cabinet: "About the main object, that of issuing a proclamation, I have fully made up my mind, but upon minor and formal matters, I will receive advice in connection with it."

And Chase was the only member of his Cabinet who ever left on account of dissatisfaction with the President, and his dissatisfaction arose from the fact that he had a very big head in a double sense, and thought he ought to sit at the head of the council board, instead of at one side thereof. Two or three Congressmen had a measure appurtenant to the War Department, in behalf of which they sought the aid of the President; and he made the order on the department. This, however, Stanton utterly ignored. "I shan't obey it," said he, "and the President is a d—d fool to make such an order." "What remark was that?" said the Congressman. "I said the President was a d—d fool to make such an order," repeated Stanton. Back to the President the Congressman went in high dudgeon, and reported what Stanton said. "Did he say that?" queried Lincoln carelessly. "Yes, he did," said the indignant Congressman. "Well,

then, I reckon it must be so if Stanton said it, for he is generally right," was the reply. However, the President saw Stanton soon after, and the order was enforced.

Assistant-Adjutant-General Long narrates a similar incident. Some outsiders had persuaded Lincoln to adopt a certain line of policy which apparently was impolitic, and Stanton refused to carry out the order. The President called on the great War Secretary, who substantially demonstrated to him that he was wrong, and repeated that he shouldn't carry out the order. Lincoln sat carelessly on a lounge nursing his left leg, and said: "I reckon it'll have to be done, Mr. Secretary." "Well, I shan't do it," said Stanton. It was getting unpleasant for the Adjutant-General, and he started to go. As he passed through the door, he heard the President say good-humorably, "I reckon you'll have to do it, Mr. Secretary." In a half-hour the order came over, signed by Stanton.

At the Presidential election of 1864, as the War Department had the best facilities for getting dispatches, the President would go there after dinner to get the news. Once, stretching himself out on a lounge, he took a book of jokes he had with him out of his pocket and commenced to read aloud, chuckling with laughter, in which the three or four public men who were present likewise joined. Returns soon began to come in, and he read the dispatches languidly and resumed his reading and laughter where he left off. After this had gone on for a while, Stanton got very angry, and, beckoning one of those present into an adjoining room, he almost exploded with suppressed rage. "See that d—d fool there, act-

ing like a monkey while the country is on the brink of hell!" he muttered. But Lincoln paid no attention to Stanton, and stuck to his stories till the news indicated no doubt of the result. Then he put his book in his pocket, got up, stretched his arms and legs, yawned, and went home.

When Chase resigned the President said, "Chase is all right, but he's got the Presidential itch and that'll spoil anyone. He's the very kind of timber for a good Chief Justice."

Governor Tod, of Ohio, whom Lincoln had appointed as Chase's successor, declined the office, and Lincoln went to bed greatly worried, for the appointment was a most critical one. Next morning he selected William Pitt Fessenden for the place. He had dreamed that name, or, more properly, had balanced all suitable candidates during the silent watches of the night, and Fessenden's was the name that tipped the scale. Lincoln then wrote a note to Fessenden telling him what he had done, and sent for the Register of the Treasury; then forwarded the appointment to the Senate. Soon Fessenden came in pale with excitement, exclaiming: "I can't take it; my health won't stand it; you must not insist on it!" The President came forward, and, putting his arms affectionately about his neck, said, "Fessenden, we've got to put down this war, and you're one of the instruments to do it, and you've no right to decline. I would like to be set free myself, but I can't, neither can you; your name is now at the Senate; it will be confirmed forthwith, and you must be at the Treasury, signing warrants, by two o'clock." And Fessenden was.

When the President desired to enforce any-

thing he did it, but he greatly disliked to come in collision with his Secretaries. The old story is worn threadbare, that he sent someone to Stanton for some action and the party returned saying that the Secretary wouldn't do it. "Then I can't help you," said Lincoln, "for I have very little influence with this Administration." And another story is also told of the President waiting to complete some action till Stanton had temporarily left the capital, and then putting it through under the *imprimatur* of the Assistant Secretary of War.

In the routine work of the departments the great President disliked to interfere and rarely did so; anything he did do was not in the shape of an *order* but of a request or suggestion. I once was with him when an applicant for some place in the Baltimore Customhouse was present. The President wrote on a card on his knee, being seated at the south window: "Mr. Chase: The bearer, Mr. —, wants to be — in the Customhouse at Baltimore; if his recommendations are satisfactory, and I recollect them to have been so, the fact that he is a Methodist should not be against him, as they complain of us some." And Dennis Hanks relates that Lincoln once wrote a note to Stanton in behalf of a very pretty woman, who wanted some favor: "This woman, dear Stanton, is smarter than she seems." And, as a rule, Chase and Stanton did just as *they* pleased with his recommendations.

It was currently understood during Lincoln's administration that there was no regularity nor system about Cabinet meetings, and that unless there was a summons they did not pretend to meet regularly. The President preferred to have

one of them drop in as Seward did in my presence, if he wanted anything badly enough to come for it. Sitting at the window with a spy-glass in his hand, he would talk in a free-and-easy manner, with whomsoever came—write a note on a card on his knee with a lead pencil, look through the spy-glass at the distant Virginia hills and down the vista of the Potomac. I recollect once seeing a vessel as far down as we could see near to Alexandria, with its masts leaning toward the Virginia shore. Lincoln was puzzled about it; he looked long and earnestly at it. "I wonder what that *can* mean," he said half a dozen times. He liked to go from one thing to another in his office; he would sit and sign commissions for a while—then take a document out of his drawer or off the table and read it—possibly sign it—reflect on it a while, and then put it back for further consideration. Then he would gaze out of the window—then a thought would strike him, and he would go to his table or desk, and write vigorously for a while, then lapse into thought. Sometimes he would sit and write for an hour at a time, and of course when people came in he would attend to them in a purely informal way.

The painting of the "Reading of the Emancipation Proclamation," by F. B. Carpenter, is merely a fancy sketch. Everything is idealized, since the artist was posing his subjects for posterity. In fact, the idea of the painting was *ex post facto*. Lincoln and his Cabinet never presented a classical tableau except on canvas. Exactly how the group appeared at the supreme moment the Proclamation was read, we are not advised, but just before it the spectacle might

have been witnessed of the President reading a joke of Artemus Ward or Petroleum Nasby, with laughter sandwiched in, in which all joined perfunctorily except Chase and Stanton, the former of whom was dignified and shocked—the latter of whom was black and *mad*. Were this propensity to be jocular a mere device to aggrandize himself or to amuse others, I should call it a blemish; as it was, however, a device to banish dull care and to enable him to “plow around” people (as he termed it), it was, in his case, like other utilities, a meritorious quality.

Other matters which confronted Mr. Lincoln at the outset of his administration, and which caused him extreme annoyance, were the presence of so many disloyal persons in all official positions and the importunity of office-seekers.

That new and loyal officers should replace the disloyal incumbents was sufficiently obvious, but the mad rush and unexampled persistency with which the Administration was assailed, usurping the necessary time demanded for the consideration of even grave matters, was where and how the moral outrage was exhibited. Office-seeking lust and venality were never so ungraciously exhibited as then; men formerly of high character and influence, even some who were surplused servants of the Most High, prostituted their characters by office-broking and huckstering. Political influence was an acknowledged subject of purchase in many quarters. One case was reported to me on conclusive authority of a man of influence, afterwards a Cabinet minister, who offered his influence to procure an office for one hundred dollars. Of these importunate and persistent devices, Mr. Lincoln complained most bit-

terly, frequently using as an illustration this figure: "I am like a man who has a large tenement house to let, but one end is on fire; and, while it needs all his efforts to extinguish that, tenants are importuning him to rent them apartments at the other end." He complained to me most bitterly of Judge Davis's importunities for his friends, evidently with the view that I should repeat the complaint to Davis (which I did not), and he also informed me that the most annoying matters he had encountered, of a minor and petty nature, were two quarrels about post-offices in places of less than 10,000 inhabitants, one of them being Davis's own town of Bloomington, Ill.

To this generation it would appear that Mr. Lincoln's entire administration was invested with the glamour of lustrous deeds and great renown. Such was not the fact by any means; on the contrary, in the beginning of his term of office, he was considered as a President of "shreds and patches," with a warring and uncomfortable Cabinet, and no adequate political or moral support; it was thought that he had no proper ability for his high position, and no substantial policy or adequate comprehension of its duties. He was a minority President and entirely untried in the problems of statesmanship. Seward accepted the premiership only on the assumption that he would be the controlling and dominant spirit of the Administration. Had he supposed that he would be compelled merely to play second fiddle to the "rail-splitter," he never would have accepted the place, but would have preferred his old leadership in the Senate. As it was, even after he had accepted the position, he again de-

clined it, and only re-accepted on the urgent opportunity of Mr. Lincoln. Chase went into the Cabinet with great reluctance, and only from an abiding sense of duty. The truth was, that Mr. Lincoln's administration in its incipiency was decidedly "below par," even had it not been confronted by a rebellion; and it was an object of almost undisguised contempt in the view of the cultured political classes of the nation.

The reason of this was to be found in the previous obscurity of its head; in the marked prejudice against the negro, whose ally this Administration was supposed to be; in the extreme modesty of the President's pretensions, the aggressiveness of the secessionists' government at Montgomery, and in the intrenched position in society of those in sympathy with it.

Mr. Lincoln had to hew his way to eternal fame from the primeval forest of obscurity, through the deep-tangled wildwood of unmerited popularity, obloquy, and disdain. He patiently endured rebuffs, insults, and insolence which he would have resented in unequivocal terms had he occupied a private station. He yielded ease, comfort, happiness; he abnegated self entirely for the public need; the ends he aimed at were his "country's, God's, and truth's."

It was the solemn sense of his responsibility that caused him to fight for the supreme place in the government. It was not until later, when his predominance was assured in all important policies, that he could afford to joke about "having very little influence with the administration."

CHAPTER II

FORT SUMTER AND THE VIRGINIA CONVENTION

AT this time there was, in form, another government at Montgomery, Ala., which professed to hold sway over the seven so-called Cotton States of the Union; and which also affected to believe that the establishment of their so-called government would be acquiesced in; proper accounts taken; division of public property made, and a treaty of peace entered into between the two governments.

South Carolina had seceded December 20, 1860; Mississippi, January 9, 1861; Florida, January 10; Alabama, January 11; Georgia, January 19; Louisiana, January 26; Texas, February 1. The secession conventions of these States had appointed delegates equal in number to their former representation in the Federal Congress, to meet in convention to form a Southern Confederacy. These assembled on February 4 at Montgomery, Ala. On February 8 the seven States represented were organized into "The Confederate States of America," and Jefferson Davis, of Mississippi, and Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia, were elected President and Vice-President respectively of the Confederacy.

The secessionists had their agents and emissaries everywhere. Washington and the departments were full of their spies, and men in high

official station were constantly giving aid and comfort to the Confederate government at Montgomery.

Just after Mr. Lincoln was inaugurated, John W. Drinkard, chief clerk of the War Department, and Samuel Cooper, Adjutant-General of the Army, resigned their positions and at once accepted similar positions in the Confederate government, which they held through the war. Louis T. Wigfall, lately Senator from Texas and a native of Charleston, S. C., set up a Confederate recruiting office in Baltimore, opening a bank account for its financial support with Walters & Co., 68 Exchange Place. On March 23, sixty-four volunteers reached Castle Pinckney from that station, passing right by the Capitol at Washington *en route*.

Prior to the inauguration of Mr. Lincoln the Montgomery government had selected three citizens of facile and suave manners to act as commissioners in adjusting the "differences" which existed between the two governments. They were Martin J. Crawford, a former Democratic Member of Congress from Georgia; John Forsyth, editor of a Democratic paper at Mobile, Ala., and Andrew B. Roman, a former Governor of Louisiana, and a Whig who had used all his influence to prevent disunion.

The first named reached Washington on March 3, when all was bustle and confusion at the White House, owing to the removal of the retiring President's baggage to a private house whither Mr. Buchanan was going to be domiciled that and the succeeding day and night. Crawford went to work promptly; guessed his way to a conclusion, and wrote to his government that he

was "fully satisfied that it would not be wise to approach Mr. Buchanan with any hope of his doing anything which would result advantageously to our government. Buchanan's fears for his personal safety, his apprehensions for security to his property, together with the cares of state and his advanced age, render him wholly disqualified for his present position. He is as incapable now as a child." Crawford further wrote that Buchanan had played fast and loose with the Confederacy, agreeing to treat with it to-day, and recanting to-morrow; and that whatever he might agree to his Cabinet would countermand so soon as it came to their notice. His views were substantially correct.

Crawford also reported that Mr. Lincoln was under the control of a mob which rendered his opinion vacillating and unreliable; that Chase and Blair of the incoming Administration would be for war, and Seward and the rest for peace; that John Bell, of Tennessee, had the ear of the President-elect, and was sedulous in his monitions that he let the Gulf States alone; that Bell had assured Mr. Lincoln that, while a majority of the Southerners were for the Union, they were so sensitive on the subject of force that every slave State would secede on its first application; that Bell advised Mr. Lincoln to let the seceded States do as they chose, and to pay no attention to them, saying that they would grow restless without the affiliation of the border States, and by reason of increased taxation of the new government, and so would soon make overtures for a reconciliation with the Federal Government. On the 6th of March, the commissioner reported to "J. Davis" at Montgomery, that Seward and

Cameron were determined to maintain a pacific course at all hazards, and that they probably could enforce it; and he recommended an adhesion to that policy by the Confederate Government for the present.

Mr. Forsyth joined Mr. Crawford on March 8, and concurred upon investigation with his colleague that Seward was in favor of a policy of peace. The two visited R. M. T. Hunter, Senator for Virginia, and urged his mediation. The latter accepted the office and put himself in communication with the new Secretary of State, who, full of the opinion that he was expressing the vital tone of the Administration, as well as of the party behind it, thus defined his position to Senator Hunter:

I have built up the Republican party; I have brought it to triumph, but its advent to power is accompanied by great difficulties and perils. I must save the party, and save the Government in its hands. To do this, war must be averted, the negro question must be dropped, the irrepressible conflict ignored, and an Union party to embrace the border slave States inaugurated. I have already whipped Mason and Hunter in their own State. I must crush out Davis, Toombs, and their colleagues in sedition in their respective States. Saving the border States to the Union by moderation and justice, the people of the cotton States, unwillingly led into secession, will rebel against their leaders, and reconstruction will follow.—Crawford's *Genesis of the Civil War*, page 232.

The Confederate Government had instructed its commissioners to play with Seward for delay until they could get ready for war, and they pursued that policy; but what they desired was an unequivocal pledge that the military status would be preserved for twenty days, during

which they would not press the object of their mission, which Seward averred he was not empowered to consider, and so urged that matters be allowed to drift along as they were. This the Confederate commissioners declined to do, and on the 13th of March they sent a diplomatic dispatch to the Federal State Department informing the Federal Government that they had been appointed by the Confederate authorities as commissioners empowered to open negotiations for the settlement of all controverted questions between the two governments, and to conclude treaties of peace between "the two nations."

To this note no reply was returned, but Secretary Seward made out a memorandum and filed it with the document, simply stating that the Government could not recognize the authority under which the alleged commissioners acted, nor reply to them. The memorandum stated that "it could not be admitted that the States referred to had, in law or fact, withdrawn from the Federal Union, or that they could do so in any other manner than with their consent, and the consent of the people of the United States, to be given through a national convention to be assembled in conformity with the provisions of the Constitution of the United States."

This memorandum was withheld until April 8, when it was at once telegraphed both to Montgomery and Charleston, where it created great excitement.

In the meanwhile, Chief Justice Taney and Associate Justices Campbell and Nelson had of their own volition, as good citizens, examined the legal question of the right of the President to coerce a State, and had concluded that there was no con-

stitutional right so to do; and they gratuitously advised the several members of the Cabinet of the conclusions to which they had come, and recommended that terms of conciliation be proposed to the Confederate Government through the commissioners. At this time Judge Nelson, of New York, was the ablest jurist on the bench. He had been appointed by President Tyler, and had concurred in the Dred Scott decision. Justice Campbell was from Mobile, Ala. He had manumitted his slaves when he was a young man, and, though a Southern man, was strictly upright, and earnestly desired to avert war and restore the Union, if possible; if not, to let the South peaceably secede. The animus of both of these eminent jurists was as disinterested as could be expected, consonant with their political opinions; and their pacificatory efforts were highly commendable. Secretary Seward was in favor of evacuating Fort Sumter and was anxious it should be done, and he informed Judge Campbell, who was acting as mediator, that it would be evacuated; and Campbell so informed the Confederate commissioners, who in turn informed their government. But the fort was not evacuated, and Judge Nelson retired from any further action in the premises and went home. Campbell remained, however, hoping that Sumter would be evacuated, and receiving constant assurances from Seward that it would be done. Mr. Lincoln was taking ample time to deliberate what to do, being uncertain as to the best policy. He was hopeful that Virginia would not secede, and that the Virginia convention, which was deliberating upon the question, would adjourn and so cease to be a menace to him. He dared not

attempt to supply Sumter, and thus invite an attack, fearing its effects upon the Virginia convention. He dared not remove the garrison from Sumter, fearing the effect upon public opinion at the North, and in point of fact, had he done so, he would have been much more unmercifully attacked than ever Buchanan was.

On the 9th of April the Confederate commissioners sent a letter to the Secretary of State in which they proffered as their ultimatum of negotiation the evacuation of Sumter. With this letter the State Department filed a memorandum as follows:

Messrs. Forsythe, Crawford and Roman having been apprised by a memorandum which has been delivered to them, that the Secretary of State is not at liberty to hold official intercourse with them, will, it is presumed, expect no notice from him of the new communication which they have addressed to him under the date of the 9th inst., beyond the simple acknowledgment of the receipt thereof, which he hereby very cheerfully gives.

Department of State, Washington, April 10, 1861.

—Crawford's *Genesis of the Civil War*, page 343.

Of this action the Confederate authorities were duly apprised, and the commissioners left Washington on April 11, and returned to Montgomery.

The two critical questions which animated political councils both in Washington and Montgomery, as well as at Charleston, were, "Will Fort Sumter be abandoned?" "Will Virginia secede?" and these questions assumed the logical relation of antecedent and consequent, or cause and effect. While the secessionists desired the evacuation of Fort Sumter, they yet believed that its reduction by force would result in the seces-

sion of Virginia; the latter was a consummation they devoutly wished, but they desired "peaceable secession." If Sumter was evacuated, they reasoned that that was the sign and promise that no further attempt at coercion would be made, but that secession would be thus accomplished *ipso facto*, and all that would be further needed was a division of property and a treaty. On the other hand, they reasoned that if Sumter was assaulted and carried, it would force Virginia into seceding and entering the Confederacy; Kentucky and Maryland would follow Virginia's example; and Maryland's secession would involve the possession of Washington, the Federal capital,* and with the material and moral strength thus acquired, a recognition by England and France would be inevitable. These fond hopes were enhanced by the concurrence of a popular sentiment at the North as well as at the South, more extensive than was known at the time or will be credited by posterity. According to this sentiment Mr. Lincoln was a *parvenu*; what little personal following he had was of obscure persons and with no cohesion; his party was raw and undisciplined; its nucleus was the Abolition coterie, which was a pariah among parties; so far as the Republican party had aggressive strength beyond the Abolitionists, it marched under the personal banners of Seward, Chase,

*Senator Iverson, of Georgia, said: "I see no reason why Washington City should not be continued the capital of the Southern Confederacy." The *Richmond Examiner* said: "Our people can take Washington, and they will. Scott, the arch-traitor [General Scott was a native of Virginia] and Lincoln, the beast, combined cannot prevent it. The Illinois Ape must retrace his journey back home quicker than he came."

Cameron, Jim Lane, of Kansas, and Henry Winter Davis, of Maryland, and not under a cohesive party flag. Abraham Lincoln is now a name to conjure with, but in those dark days he was regarded by the nation either as a disagreeable accident or as a moral usurper.

When Mr. Lincoln returned to his office in the afternoon of March 4, he found a communication from Secretary Holt of the War Department, conveying Major Anderson's estimate that the force required to reënforce Fort Sumter would be at least 20,000 disciplined men.

On reading Anderson's statement and Secretary Holt's comment that it "takes the department by surprise, as his previous correspondence contained no such intimation," the President at once sent for the Secretary of War and taking him aside and looking at him earnestly, said, "Mr. Holt, I have been looking at Major Anderson's statement, which surprises me somewhat, and I want to know if there is any doubt at all about his loyalty to the Government?" The Secretary replied promptly that he had never had any reason at all to doubt Major Anderson's perfect loyalty. The President replied that he himself had seen no reason to doubt it; but, as he was new in his office, he asked out of a superabundant caution, as much might depend upon Major Anderson's loyalty in the days to come.

The public interest was centered on Fort Sumter and Charleston. The secessionists closely beleaguered the little garrison, preventing it from securing any supplies of any sort, and they opened and read the private correspondence of its members after it had been committed to the mail. The public mind at the North was in a

state of exasperation over the bold actions of the secessionists in erecting powerful batteries upon every spot which would command Fort Sumter, and mounting upon them cannon which belonged to the United States, as well as in denying the garrison the common necessities of life, and intercourse by means of the mail with their friends and families. A demand was made by the Northern press that, before our forces should leave Fort Sumter, it should be ruined so as to insure its destruction. The *Commercial Advertiser*, of New York, published the following editorial:

Shall Fort Sumter be Destroyed? If, therefore, Major Anderson must abandon it, let him employ the few remaining days his provisions still hold out in undermining inside the entire foundations, then let him make his preparations to leave, apply the fuse, and, at a safe distance, watch its being leveled to the ground. This would be a gloomy, but nevertheless a more worthy ending of the sad history, than to leave it a stronghold in the possession of a foreign foe. If Sumter must be abandoned to the enemy, let it be a shapeless mass of ruins.

At this time Lieutenant-General Winfield Scott, hero of the two preceding wars of the nation, was general-in-chief of the army.

Winfield Scott was born at Petersburg, Va., in 1786, and in 1841 he became general-in-chief of our armies. To this illustrious and patriotic soldier the nation owes a debt of gratitude of great magnitude for his share in the preservation of its autonomy and establishment in the dark days of 1860-61. His wisdom in the crisis may be challenged—his firmness and patriotism, not at all.

Scott's headquarters were at New York; but

on December 12, 1860, he came on to Washington, took lodgings in an old-fashioned house, where Owen Lovejoy also lodged, at the northwest corner of 6th and D Streets, and put himself in communication with the Administration.

Mr. Lincoln had supported Scott for the Presidency in 1852, and had a high opinion both of his patriotism and his moral and physical courage, and relied very much on him to keep the ship of state afloat till the time should come when he should secure the helm. In January, 1861, Thomas S. Mather, of Springfield, Adjutant-General of Illinois, was going to Washington, and Lincoln wrote a letter introducing him to General Scott, and stating that he (Lincoln) was in receipt of sundry letters which indicated that an attempt might be made upon his life prior to, or during the inauguration, and asking his opinion on the subject and as to his proper course of action. The old hero was confined to his bed at his lodgings by gout, but Mather sent up the letter, and in a few minutes was himself invited up. He found the old veteran quite enfeebled in body, but vigorous in mind and courage. As soon as Mather was shown into the room the old warrior, sitting uneasily, drew himself up with evident pain, and exclaimed nervously: "General, give my compliments to Mr. Lincoln, and tell him to come to Washington whenever he pleases. These Maryland and Virginia rangers I'll look after myself. I'll put cannon at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue, and if they make the first signs of mischief I'll blow them to hell!" The martial spirit and lofty patriotism of Winfield Scott were the bulwark of defense for the cause of the Union, and of established government,

throughout the dreary and portentous fall and winter of 1860-61, and the docility of the secessionists who abounded in Washington on inauguration day was assured by the appearance of that stately and impressive heroic figure on horseback, who had ridden in triumph through the capital of the Montezumas, and for a half century had carried two English bullets in his body from the little graveyard at Lundy's Lane.

The only available military forces of the government, in addition to the feeble garrisons in part of the Southern forts, were five companies respectively at Fort Warren, Boston; Fort Hamilton, New York; Pittsburg, Pa.; Augusta, Ga., and Baton Rouge, La.

The maximum of the army was 18,000 men, and these were all required for the protection of the frontier. As early as 1857, General Scott had tried to secure an addition of five regiments to the regular army, but his request had never been acted on.

To General Scott Mr. Lincoln at once submitted Major Anderson's report. That same evening (March 5) Scott returned it with the discouraging reply: "Evacuation seems almost inevitable and in this view our chief engineer (Brigadier Totten) concurs—if indeed the worn-out garrison be not assaulted and carried in the present week."

On March 9, the President wrote to General Scott, making the following interrogatories:

(1) To what point of time can Major Anderson maintain his position at Fort Sumter, without fresh supplies or reinforcements?

(2) Can you, with all the means now in your con-

trol, supply or reinforce Fort Sumter within that time?

(3) If not, what amount of means, and of what description, in addition to that already at your control, would enable you to supply and reinforce that fortress within the time?

That night the first Cabinet meeting was held. The Attorney-General, Edward Bates, has left in his diary a report of the deliberations, which were wholly concerned with the question of Fort Sumter. He wrote.

The army officers and navy officers differ widely about the degree of danger to rapid-moving vessels passing under the fire of land batteries. The army officers think destruction almost inevitable, where the navy officers think the danger but slight. The one believe that Sumter cannot be relieved—not even provisioned—without an army of twenty thousand men and a bloody battle. The other (the naval) believe that with light, rapid vessels they can cross the bar at high tide of a dark night, run the enemy's forts (Moultrie and Cummings Point), and reach Sumter with little risk. They say that the greatest danger will be in landing at Sumter, upon which point there may be a concentrated fire. They do not doubt that the place can be and ought to be relieved. Mr. Fox is anxious to risk his life in leading the relief, and Commodore Stringham seems equally confident of success.

On March 11 and 12, General Scott replied to the President's questions of the 9th inst., saying that, while the garrison could hold out for about forty days longer with its present provisions, the enemy could wear it out by a succession of pretended night attacks, so that it could be easily taken by a culminating real assault. To supply and reënforce the fort would require a fleet and transports which would be at least four months in collecting, and 5,000 regulars and 20,000 vol-

unteers, the use and enlistment of which could be authorized only by new acts of Congress, after which it would take from six to eight months to prepare the troops for action. Scott therefore gave it as his opinion, "that Major Anderson be instructed to evacuate the fort so long gallantly held by him and his companions, immediately on procuring suitable water transportation, and that he embark with his command for New York."

As Lincoln observed in his message to Congress of July 4, 1861: "In a purely military point of view this reduced the duty of the Administration in the case to the mere matter of getting the garrison safely out of the fort. Accordingly, on March 15, the President sent to each member of his Cabinet the inquiry: "Assuming it to be possible to now provision Fort Sumter, under all the circumstances is it wise to attempt it?"

All answered in the negative except Secretaries Chase and Blair. Mr. Francis P. Blair, Sr., at this juncture, earnestly urged the President not to abandon Sumter, and even assured him that he thought he would be impeached if he did so.

The President next sent Captain Fox to Sumter to obtain actual information as to the state of the fort. Upon his return and report, which expressed the feasibility of the plan, Mr. Lincoln determined to supply it with provisions. On March 29, after consultation with his Cabinet, he ordered Secretary Cameron of the War Department to coöperate with Secretary Welles of the Navy Department in preparing an expedition to sail with provisions for Fort Sumter as early as April 6.

Owing to a gale only the *Baltic* of the fleet arrived in time to be of service to Major Anderson, and that only to bear away the surrendered garrison. The Confederate Government heard of the coming of the provisioning expedition, and, considering the capture of the fort necessary to the life of the rebellion, ordered General P. G. T. Beauregard, who was in charge of the investment, to procure its surrender, or, failing in this, to bombard it. On the 11th Beauregard sent to Major Anderson a summons to surrender, offering to him, in case of compliance, facilities to remove the troops, and to the garrison the privilege of saluting their flag. To this Anderson replied that he would surrender the fort on the 15th if supplies did not reach him by that time, or if he did not before then receive orders to the contrary from his government.

These conditions did not suit the Confederates, and on Friday, April 12, at 3 A. M., they gave Anderson notice that their batteries would open on the fort in an hour. At 4.30 the bombardment began, and continued throughout that day and into the next. At nine o'clock on Saturday morning the fort took fire, and Major Anderson felt compelled to throw all but five barrels of powder into the sea to prevent an explosion. The flag-staff was shot through at 1 P. M., and the Confederates, observing the fall of the flag, sent messengers to receive the surrender of the fort. The first of these to arrive was Senator Wigfall, who was a colonel on Beauregard's staff.

Anderson accepted the conditions of surrender offered upon the 11th, and Wigfall agreed to the capitulation. Although Wigfall had not been au-

thorized to take this action, Beauregard ratified the arrangement. By 8 P. M. the capitulation was arranged, and on the following day, Sunday, April 14, the garrison sailed northward in the *Baltic*.

The extreme caution displayed by Mr. Lincoln in this affair of Fort Sumter, the most important matter which confronted his Administration, cannot be too highly commended. That this provisioning of the fort would inaugurate a war was certain; it was in the highest degree salutary to avoid the initiative altogether if possible, or, if it must needs come, to have it charged up to the enemy. In a war such as was inevitable the moral aspect was of primary importance; and the President displayed great talent and adroitness in doing no act which could properly be considered a *casus belli*.

Nor can this war be charged to haste or want of proper deliberation, or considered as inaugurated in passion or by an accident of any sort. On the contrary, it was a cold-blooded affair, begun after the most profound and painstaking deliberation and warning. The good offices of Justice Campbell, of the Russian Minister, of James L. Pettigru, of Charleston, of ex-Governor William Aiken, and others were exerted to the utmost in favor of pacification, but no marplots or conspirators were any more fatally bent on mischief and ruin than were the Montgomery and Charleston secessionists. The people of South Carolina were nearly unanimous in their wishes; but the representatives at Montgomery were betraying their constituents, who had acquiesced reluctantly in secession on the assurance from all the politicians that it would be peaceably ac-

complished. Had they suspected that they were to achieve their independence through the arbitrament of war, and that blood would bedew the "sacred soil" of every Southern State, not a single State except South Carolina would have seceded.

Poor old Virginia, the mother of States and statesmen, was slaughtered at last in the house of her friends. Since February 13 the State had been holding a convention to consider its policy in the crisis. The Union delegates were in a majority. An ordinance of secession was voted down on March 17 by a majority of ninety to forty-five; and a similar proposition was defeated on April 4, but still the convention declined to adjourn. Mr. Lincoln therefore caused a letter to be sent to George W. Summers, of Charleston, Va., the most talented of the Union men in his State, requesting that he come to Washington for conference. Summers, who died during the war of softening of the brain, induced by the mental anxiety which the war aroused, was kept by timidity from accepting the President's invitation; but he sent John B. Baldwin in his place.

The interview was held on the morning of April 4. Baldwin returned to the convention reporting that his conference with the President was inconclusive; that Mr. Lincoln had characterized the convention as a "standing menace which embarrassed him very much," and therefore he desired that it adjourn *sine die*, but that he had given no promise of what return he would make to it for compliance with his wishes. John Minor Botts, another member of the convention, called on the President two days afterwards, and

held a conversation in which Mr. Lincoln gave an account of the interview with Baldwin which, as remembered by Mr. Botts, differed materially from Baldwin's report. The President, said Botts, spoke of the fleet in New York harbor preparing to sail that afternoon to provision Fort Sumter. "Now," said Mr. Lincoln, "your convention in Richmond has been sitting for nearly two months, and all it has done has been to shake the rod over my head [threatening to secede if coercion should be used to bring back South Carolina into the Union]. If the Union majority in the Virginia convention will adjourn it without its passing an ordinance of secession, this fleet shall be kept from sailing, and instead, Fort Sumter shall be evacuated. I think it is a good swap to give a fort for a State any time."

As a result of Baldwin's report, the Virginia convention remained in session, and on April 8 appointed another delegation, consisting of William Ballard Preston, Alexander H. H. Stuart, and George W. Randolph, to wait on President Lincoln, and ask him to communicate to the convention "the policy which the Federal executive intends to pursue in regard to the Federal States."

The committee had an audience with the President at Washington on April 13, the day after Fort Sumter had been fired upon by the South Carolinian secessionists. He referred the convention to the policy expressed in his inaugural address:

As I then and therein said, I now repeat: "The power confided to me will be used to hold, occupy, and possess the property and places belonging to the Government, and to collect the duties and imposts; but

beyond what is necessary for these objects, there will be no invasion, no using of force against or among the people anywhere." . . . In case it proves true that Fort Sumter has been assaulted, as is reported, I shall perhaps cause the United States mails to be withdrawn from all the States which claim to have seceded, believing that the commencement of actual war against the Government justifies and possibly demands this. . . .

Whatever else I may do for the purpose, I shall not attempt to collect the duties and imposts by any armed invasion of any part of the country; not meaning by this, however, that I may not land a force deemed necessary to relieve a fort upon a border of the country.

Baldwin was nominally a Union man, and had voted against secession, but for some reason he had fallen into the toils of the secessionists; accordingly he reported that his mission was a failure, and that the President would make no promise whatever about Sumter. The reason for this reprehensible conduct, which led to the dismantlement, invasion, and ruin of Virginia, was probably that Baldwin was in favor of secession, but feared to vote openly for it by reason of the certain wrath of his constituents, and therefore endeavored to accomplish secession in an indirect and covert way.

The report of this committee, followed as it was by the President's call of April 15 for 75,000 militia to suppress the rebellion and to be raised by the several States of the Union, which included Virginia, caused the convention, on April 17, to pass an ordinance of secession. This was followed by a similar ordinance in Arkansas on May 6, a military league with the Confederacy in Tennessee on May 7, and an ordinance of secession in North Carolina on May 20.

No doubt can exist that if the first delegate, Baldwin, had correctly reported the President, the convention would promptly have adjourned; Sumter would have been evacuated; the cotton States' cabal would have had no support of any kind from the border States; North Carolina, Arkansas, and Tennessee would have refused to go with them; the people of the Gulf States would have grown restless at their anomalous position, and under the lead of Stephens, Hill, Sam Houston, Bouligny, Hamilton, and other Union men would have effected a counter-revolution which would have disintegrated the Confederacy.

The Confederate Government established its capital at Richmond on the 21st of May; and North Carolina, being surrounded by secession territory, seceded the same day. So the most conspicuous battlefield was transferred of necessity to the territory about and between the capitals; and to the most ordinary apprehension it was palpable that nothing but ruin, temporarily at least, was in store for that proud State which had furnished the Union seven sovereign States and seven Presidents.

CHAPTER III

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

THERE is an ancient story, which was a favorite with Lincoln, of a hunter who at a critical juncture in a fight with a bear prayed: "O Lord, be on my side if you will, but if you won't, don't help the bear!"

At the same time that the President was endeavoring to win Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri to the Union cause, and, failing in this, to prevent their joining the Confederacy, he was exerting every available influence of his Administration to maintain cordial relations with European governments and to block the strenuous efforts which the Confederacy was making to secure from them recognition as a nation.

He chose most admirable men for his foreign ministers. For the two most important countries, Great Britain and France, his choice was particularly happy. Charles Francis Adams, of Massachusetts, who was accredited to the Court of St. James, was the grandson of one President, and the son of another, both brave and brilliant men, and he had inherited their qualities. William L. Dayton, of New Jersey, who went to the French court, was a man whom Lincoln revered for his high character, and whom he had been anxious to honor from the day when his

own elevation to dignity and power was assured.

That the illegitimate, but then powerful government of Louis Napoleon, and likewise the aristocracy or ruling power of Great Britain, would deeply sympathize with, and aid any movement to enfeeble, humiliate, or destroy our Government was nowise in doubt. And it also was assumed that England must, at all hazards, secure the cotton crops of the South, and to this end would accede to any reasonable commercial treaty which would enforce the autonomy of a government composed chiefly of the Cotton States. In fact, had it not been for this belief, the South would never have rebelled.

The corollary was inevitable that, in the event of recognition of the Southern Confederacy by England and France, the United States would declare war against these nations, the certain outcome of which would be the defeat of the United States, and the establishment of the Confederate States as a nation.

In view of the anomalous character of our national affairs, it was deemed politic and necessary by the Administration to issue a more elaborate letter of instructions, primarily and ostensibly for the guidance of all our ambassadors in Europe, but even more emphatically designed as an official declaration by the Government itself of its purposes with reference to the domestic insurrection within its borders, and of its expectations and its desires in reference to the attitude and the conduct of the powers of the world in that crisis.

This important document was drawn with great skill and care by the Secretary, and then

submitted to the President for his approval. The President was equal to the dignity and importance of the occasion, and this was his first experience in the important rôle of diplomacy. He took the document and amended it in many particulars, which relieved it of an objectionable style, while preserving its firmness of attitude and dignity of character. It was a wonderful performance, and when known, as it was not till after the death of the performer, gained him the plaudits of publicists everywhere. No jeweler's scale ever weighed diamond dust with more equal poise than Fate weighed the contingency of war with England in 1861. The British nation had an earnest desire to take the first step thereto, by recognizing the insurgents as a nation *de facto*; and simply waited a chance to do so. An ill-mannered phrase—a hint of defiance—a gleam of superciliousness would be sufficient, and so matters stood when the President signed the letter.

By this letter Adams was instructed to acknowledge on behalf of the President the expression of the British Government's good-will to the United States, but was advised not to rely on any mere national courtesies, nor to let fall any "admissions of weakness in our constitution, or of apprehension on the part of the Government," but on the contrary, to claim by comparison with other countries that our "constitution and government are really the strongest and surest which have ever been erected for the safety of any people." Any suggestion of foreign intervention on behalf of the seceding States, with a view to compromise, was to be sternly discountenanced, and war was to be threatened in case of recogni-

tion of the Confederate Government. The minister was further advised to be discreet.

You will not consent to draw into debate before the British Government any opposing moral principles which may be supposed to lie at the foundation of the controversy between those States and the Federal Union. You will indulge in no expressions of harshness or disrespect, or even impatience concerning the seceding States, their agents, or their people. But you will, on the contrary, all the while remember that those States are now, as they always heretofore have been, and, notwithstanding their temporary self-delusion, they must always continue to be, equal and honored members of this Federal Union, and that their citizens, throughout all political misunderstandings and alienations, still are and always must be our kindred and countrymen. In short, all your arguments must belong to one of three classes, namely: First. Arguments drawn from the principles of public law and natural justice, which regulate the intercourse of equal States. Secondly. Arguments which concern equally the honor, welfare, and happiness of the discontented States, and the honor, welfare, and happiness of the whole Union. Thirdly. Arguments which are equally conservative of the rights and interests, and even sentiments of the United States, and just in their bearing upon the rights, interests, and sentiments of Great Britain and all other nations.

Before the arrival of Mr. Adams in London with the letter, however, the British and French governments, acting with indecent haste, had concluded to intervene in our affairs to the extent of recognizing the bastard government at Montgomery as a *belligerent*, which was a step in the direction of recognizing it as a nation on an equality with the United States. Against this unjust and impertinent interference in our affairs our Government protested with emphasis, and when on June 15 succeeding, the English and French ministers, acting in concert, desired dip-

lomatically to present sundry instructions which had been received from their respective governments, the President, who had been unofficially advised of its contents, declined to receive the document, though our Government did take sufficient note of the memorandum to notify Ministers Adams and Dayton of the attitude of the United States toward it. This paper (wrote Secretary Seward to Minister Adams) purports to contain a decision of the British Government that this country is divided into two belligerent parties toward which Great Britain assumes the attitude of a neutral. Against this view the Secretary protested. The United States, he said, are the sole sovereign power in the country, fulfilling all national obligations to other countries, and until this sovereignty was impaired to the detriment of foreign nations, none of them had a right to intervene, or to cast off its obligations to the United States. "Any other principle," he observed, "would be to resolve government everywhere into a thing of accident and caprice, and ultimately all human society into an estate of war."

Upon receiving this dispatch Minister Adams called upon Lord John Russell, the British Foreign Secretary, and told him that a continuation of the apparent relation of the British Government with the Rebel commissioners, then in London, "could scarcely fail to be viewed by us as hostile in spirit, and to require some corresponding action accordingly." Lord John Russell replied that he "had no expectation" of seeing the Rebel commissioners again.

Nevertheless our complaints and protests produced no change in the unofficial attitude of those powerful governments toward the rebellion; these

still remained as earnest sympathizers and encouragers of a faction whose aim and intent was to establish a government upon the corner stone of an institution which England and France had been zealous and enthusiastic in declaring as piracy. Their antipathy to the Government of the United States was equally pronounced; the leading statesmen and newspapers treated our Government with disparagement and contempt; their chief comic paper used our honored and devoted President as its chief butt of ridicule. While Mr. Lincoln was winning the esteem of publicists and disinterested statesmen in Germany, Russia, Switzerland, and Italy, for his masterly and philanthropic conduct of affairs in an era of the sternest difficulty, the leading political exponents of England lost no opportunity to belittle and disparage our efforts, intentions, and deeds. In every way that sympathy could be accorded, or material help afforded to the Rebels without cause for an open rupture, it was done in England. Union adherents in England were vilified and insulted, and Rebels correspondingly honored; the Rebel navy and blockade-runners were products of British shipyards, and, but for them, there would not have been a decent vessel afloat adorned with the Confederate flag. It is reasonably safe to say that had England maintained its obligations of truth, humanity, and national honor, the war would have been crushed out two years earlier than it was, and had it not been for preliminary assurances of support from England, France, and the "Copperheads" of the Northern States it never would have been initiated.

The firm, just, and unyielding attitude of the

Administration compelled the governments of England and France to delay their recognition of the Confederacy as a nation, but an event occurred in the fall which caused the secessionists the greatest delight and induced a belief that the long-wished-for time had at length arrived, and that not only would the South be recognized as a nation, but that war would also be declared by England against the United States.

The Rebel Government decided to dispatch agents or ambassadors to England and France, in order to bring about a consummation of their hopes, and James M. Mason, of Virginia, and John Slidell, of Louisiana, were selected. On October 12, 1861, accompanied with their families, they sailed from Charleston for Cuba in the blockade-runner *Theodora*, and left Havana for St. Thomas *en route* to Europe in the British mail steamer *Trent*, on which vessel on November 8 they were captured by Captain Wilkes of our navy, and taken on board his frigate *San Jacinto*, and carried to Fort Warren in Boston Harbor, where they were held as prisoners of war. This action was approved by Congress, by the Cabinet, and by the public. The report of the Secretary of the Navy of December 2 said:

The prompt and decisive action of Captain Wilkes on this occasion merited and received the emphatic approval of the department; and if a too generous forbearance was exhibited by him in not capturing the vessel which had these Rebel enemies on board, it may, in view of the special circumstances, and of its patriotic motives, be excused; but it must, by no means, be permitted to constitute a precedent hereafter, for the treatment of any case of similar infraction of neutral obligations by foreign vessels engaged in commerce or the carrying trade.

However, Lincoln's logical instincts engendered in his mind the opinions that Wilkes' action was technically unauthorized, and would be seized upon by England as a pretext to involve the nation in a war. He therefore conferred with Hon. Thomas Ewing, a retired statesman of the preceding generation, who assured him that Captain Wilkes had been wrong by the law of nations. Accordingly, on November 30 a dispatch was sent to our minister recounting the facts, disavowing any complicity in Captain Wilkes' act, and expressing a desire to treat with England on the subject. On the same day the British minister for foreign affairs sent a note to Lord Lyons, the British minister at Washington, expressing the desire of the British Cabinet that our nation would disavow any authority in the affair, would yield up the prisoners, and make an apology; all of which were impressed with the force and authority of an *ultimatum*. On December 26 Secretary Seward handed Lord Lyons a dispatch in which he claimed a right and duty on the part of Captain Wilkes to do precisely as he did, but admitted that Wilkes erred in not bringing the prisoners into a prize court for adjudication, hence that the nation could not technically hold them, and therefore he ordered their discharge. This dispatch contained a very ingenious device for getting out of a serious dilemma. If we were right, we *must* maintain our position even at the expense and hazard of a war with England. We could not display cowardice; it would ruin our nation abroad and destroy its prestige at home; our soldiers would have retired from the war, and our resistance to

the rebellion would have ended. On the other hand, if we were wrong, we were equally bound to make reparation, but no sophistical case of being wrong would answer; the whole array of nations stood as an impenetrable phalanx of critics—the secessionists in the South, and their aiders and abettors in Congress and elsewhere, were ready to seize any pretext to humiliate and condemn the Administration. Captain Wilkes stood high in a conventional and moral sense, and his act, done in good faith and for the honor of the nation, had been applauded by the Navy Department, by Congress, and by universal acclaim of the people; hence now to sacrifice him would be deemed an act of cowardice and certainly unjust. The dilemma was to appease England without losing caste with our people and with the world. Our enemies did not see the possibility of escape from this dilemma, and a war with England was deemed certain and inevitable. The “Copperhead” contingent in Congress did their “level best” to foment it, while it was declared in the London newspapers that “the war will be terrible; it will commence with a recognition of Southern independence, their alliance and sure independence.”

Mr. Seward's dispatch dispelled these florid and flagitious hopes. The Vallandighams and Pendletons raged in Congress over their discomfiture, and in Dixie feelings of chagrin were almost too full for utterance, although one of the Southern paragraphers did venture to advise us that “the surrender was an exhibition of meanness and cowardice unparalleled in the political history of the civilized world.”

These Confederate commissioners were given

over to the custody of a British vessel by which they were transported to London; upon which they dropped completely out of sight. They made no political impression, and remained abroad until they died, expatriated.

It may be stated that the hopes of foreign intervention attained their acme on the day that news of the *Trent* affair reached London, but that they lapsed into nothingness immediately after the surrender of Mason and Slidell.

That the English Government desired a war, with an excusing cause behind it, is clear; and that our Administration was as zealous (or at least that its head was) to avoid it is equally so. To any suggestions, of which there were many, made to the Executive, tending to stimulate and enliven his warlike spirit, his terse answer, embodying his policy, was, "one war at a time." The *Trent* affair was really beneficial to our relations with England, for it assured England that our Cabinet was ruled and animated by knowledge, justice, firmness, and moderation, rather than by enthusiasm and popular clamor; and a spirit of respect for it was observed ever afterwards, in Great Britain and France. On February 18, 1862, our minister complained to the British Admiralty that a gunboat was being built at Liverpool for the Rebel service. The Foreign Secretary evaded the protest on a flimsy pretext, which proved fallacious, and she turned up at Nassau as a Rebel privateer immediately thereafter. In June succeeding the attention of the British Cabinet was drawn to the fact that another war steamer was being built for the Rebels. The Cabinet temporized till the vessel got away, sailed to the Azores, and took on an armament. First

as "290," and afterward as the *Alabama* she preyed upon our shipping till June 19, 1864, when she was sunk off the French port of Cherbourg by the *Kearsarge*.

Louis Napoleon, himself an usurper, conceived likewise an ardent affection for this bastard government, and, after trying to secure the coöperation of England and Russia in a mediation in our affairs, resolved to make the attempt single-handed. Accordingly, on January 9, 1863, the French Government sent to its minister a proposal for mediation, in which it suggested a meeting of the Government with the Rebels. To this the President instructed his Secretary to make a reply whose vigor and stern independence will doubtless be appreciated by all patriotic hearts. It said in part:

This Government has not the least thought of relinquishing the trust which has been confided to it by the nation under the most solemn of all political sanctions; and if it had any such thought, it would still have abundant reason to know that peace proposed at the cost of dissolution would be immediately, unreservedly, and indignantly rejected by the American people. It is a great mistake that European statesmen make, if they suppose this people are demoralized. Whatever, in the case of an insurrection, the people of France, or of Great Britain, or of Switzerland, or of the Netherlands would do to save their national existence, no matter how the strife might be regarded by or might affect foreign nations, just so much, and certainly no less, the people of the United States will do, if necessary to save for the common benefit the region which is bounded by the Pacific and the Atlantic coasts, and by the shores of the Gulfs of St. Lawrence and Mexico, together with the free and common navigation of the Rio Grande, Missouri, Arkansas, Mississippi, Ohio, St. Lawrence, Hudson, Delaware, Potomac, and other natural high-

ways by which this land, which to them is at once a land of inheritance and a land of promise, is opened and watered. Even if the agents of the American people now exercising their power should, through fear or faction, fall below this height of the national virtue, they would be speedily, yet constitutionally, replaced by others of sterner character and patriotism.

The question of foreign intervention was forever put to rest by this dispatch. Foreign nations admired the dignity and spirit with which the Administration bore itself in its era of misfortune, and respected it accordingly. In the vigor of its management of foreign relations it compared favorably with any preceding Administration. The unostentatious dignity, unyielding firmness, and delicate tact displayed secured the approval of nations, and commanded the respect of the civilized world.

In 1863 Rebel rams destined for the Rebel navy (so-called) were being built in England, and our minister, unwearied and assiduous amidst discouragements, made energetic protests which finally, after much diplomacy, took effect, and at last, on September 8, he had the satisfaction of receiving assurances from the Cabinet that the rams would not be suffered to depart.

But the British Cabinet and the British admiralty alike strained every point in favor of the Rebels, and in a case which found its way into the Admiralty Court the doctrine was adjudged that gave license, or at least excuse, for the Rebels to fit out their war vessels in British ports. Our Government informed the British Cabinet in diplomatic language that, if that policy was persisted in, those vessels would be deemed pirates, and they would be pursued into any port.

One of the most remarkable occurrences, diplomatic and other, occurred in connection with the building of two Rebel rams by the Messrs. Laird of Birkenhead. Minister Adams had a detective watching progress and securing information, and as the vessels approached completion he notified the British ministry, which attempted to evade the scrutiny and investigation, and succeeded well for a time until the proofs were forced so clearly on the Government that it expressed its willingness to detain the vessels, but required a deposit of one million pounds in gold coin as security for any damage that might accrue should the detention prove wrongful.

There was very little time to obtain and make the deposit, even if our Government had the gold, which it did not at that time. At this juncture an unknown American visited Mr. Adams and offered to furnish the gold required, but suggested that the Government had better approve the act and secure the amount to him. Mr. Adams suggested that he would ask the Government to deposit \$10,000,000 of 5-20 bonds as collateral in refunding the \$5,000,000 so to be advanced.

The news reached the Department on a Friday morning, and the bonds must be on shipboard by noon of next Monday. Of blank bonds there were on hand \$7,500,000 in denomination of \$1,000 only; the remaining \$2,500,000 must be made up from those of the denomination of \$500. And all of these bonds to be valid must be signed by the Register of the Treasury in person. Twelve thousand five hundred signatures to be made in sixty-four hours, including the time indispensable to eat and sleep! It was not thought

possible for one man to accomplish it, so the plan proposed was for Mr. Chittenden, the Register, to sign as long as he could endure it, and then to resign his office and have a new Register appointed who should sign the rest. Mr. Chittenden summoned his physician, had his diet prescribed and brought to the office, and his lodging provided, and at noon of Friday set about his long task. The physician watched his pulse, administered stimulants and nervines as required, and indicated small intervals of repose: but no extended delay could be allowed, as his arm and fingers would become unserviceable by rest for any length of time. Mr. Chittenden was a sincere patriot and a great man, and was very ambitious to complete the task himself, as it would not appear legitimate to have two different Registers' names on the bonds, and there were other reasons. So he kept at work. His fingers contracted and swelled, became very painful so he could hardly hold the pen; his arm and whole right side sympathized; his brain and spinal cord partook of the nervous derangement; but he accomplished his task alone—then took to his bed. He suffered more or less all his later life from the reflex consequences of this terribly severe task.

The assertion of the Monroe Doctrine in regard to Mexico was thus stated in our instructions to the American minister at Paris:

The United States have neither the right nor the disposition to intervene by force on either side in the lamentable war which is going on between France and Mexico. On the contrary, they practice in regard to Mexico, in every phase of that war, the non-intervention which they require all foreign powers to observe

in regard to the United States. But notwithstanding this self-restraint this Government knows full well that the inherent normal opinion of Mexico favors a government there republican in form and domestic in its organization, in preference to any monarchical institutions to be imposed from abroad. This Government knows also that this normal opinion of the people of Mexico resulted largely from the influence of popular opinion in this country, and is continually invigorated by it. The President believes, moreover, that this popular opinion of the United States is just in itself and eminently essential to the progress of civilization on the American continent, which civilization, it believes, can and will, if left free from European resistance, work harmoniously together with advancing refinement on the other continents. This Government believes that foreign resistance, or attempts to control American civilization, must and will fail before the ceaseless and ever-increasing activity of material, moral, and political forces, which peculiarly belong to the American continent. Nor do the United States deny that, in their opinion, their own safety and the cheerful destiny to which they aspire are intimately dependent on the continuance of free republican institutions throughout America. . . . Nor is it necessary to practice reserve upon the point that if France should, upon due consideration, determine to adopt a policy in Mexico adverse to the American opinion and sentiments which I have described, that policy would probably scatter seeds which would be fruitful of jealousies which might ultimately ripen into collision between France and the United States and other American republics.

Although the House of Representatives passed a resolution to the effect that this nation ought not to view with complacency the attempt to set up a monarchy in Mexico, yet the Senate did not concur in it. But the triumph of Benito Juarez and the execution of Maximilian solved the problem in our favor.

In 1863 one Arguelles, a colonel in the Spanish army and Lieutenant-Governor in Colon, Cuba,

had captured a large number of slaves that had been imported from Africa within his district, and turned them over to the Government, receiving \$15,000 as prize money therefor. He then came to New York City and embarked in the publishing business. The Spanish Government thereafter ascertained that he had sold 140 of the negroes into slavery, representing officially that they had died, and so it stated to our Government that his presence was needed in Cuba to secure the liberty of the slaves. The matter was secretly arranged; the Government decided that to furnish an asylum for a wretch charged by his own government with the awful crime of enslaving 140 human beings was not in keeping with the spirit of our institutions, and that he should be surrendered to his own country, and it was done. The whole Copperhead and Rebel press were venomous in their denunciations of the Administration for its action.

Secretary Seward, on the whole, was an admirable and adroit minister. His personal popularity and magnetism were very great. His cheerfulness and magnetism were needed adjuncts; and his dexterity and *insouciance* were valuable agents in aid of a correct performance of his difficult rôle. Secretary Seward was a remarkable man. His varied talents were always at the front; he was a statesman of infinite resources; he had a facile adaptation of political morality of great use to a diplomatist. His conscience did not prevent him from using language to dissemble and also to conceal his thoughts. A constitutionally candid man would make a poor diplomatist. Seward was not troubled on that account.

CHAPTER IV

THE CONTEST FOR THE BORDER STATES

WHEN the somber shadow of sectional strife darkened our political horizon Mr. Lincoln recognized that the thunderbolt of war then being forged could mean no other than a popular war, both in essence and in name. In his first official utterance, his Inaugural Address, Lincoln avowed his intention to execute the laws in all the States, unless his "rightful masters, the American people, should withhold the requisite means or in some authoritative manner direct the contrary."

Now an autocratic war has elements of strength, and also those of weakness; it has unity, secrecy, and constancy of aim; it may lack spirit, enthusiasm, and *esprit du corps*. A popular war has the strength and spirit of enthusiasm; but lacks constancy, secrecy, and discipline. Politics become, necessarily, in practice, interwoven with arms. Mr. Lincoln was obliged to make generals of several blatant politicians to keep them from fighting against the war with their mouths in Congress. These spent their time in witnessing battles and in glorifying their own prowess to their Northern constituencies at the end of each campaign or oftener.

The Administration was obliged to storm the citadels of popular opinion wherein it was in-

trenched; it was as needful to capture the *New York Herald* as it was New Orleans; it was as imperative to keep Horace Greeley quiet as to prevent the invasion of Ohio; it was no less an object to put Democratic Congressmen in good humor than to take Richmond.

Men possessing social or political or financial power were sedulously and systematically cultivated, and their adhesion ostentatiously proclaimed. The Administration was to make the war technically and actually popular.

To James Gordon Bennett was tendered the mission of France because of the power of his great paper. No other war was ever so thoroughly superimposed upon popular opinion. Not only was popular opinion at home catered to and cajoled, but likewise that of foreign nations. Archbishop Hughes and Henry Ward Beecher were sent by the Government to England on a mission of diplomatic politics, and Mr. Lincoln took especial pains to cultivate the English laboring classes in his addresses to the workingmen of Manchester and London.

The War of the Rebellion on the side of the South was unpopular in its incipency, but became popular upon the North's invasion of Southern soil. The war was waged on one side to maintain the supremacy of the Government; and on the other, as was confidently believed by the combatants, to maintain the inviolability of their homes. It was therefore, in the main, a popular war on both sides, although a strong party in Georgia and North Carolina resented the use of their citizens in arms beyond the State lines. Towards the last the mainstay and vital principle was the imperious will of Davis; and,

although the Federal Administration had to cater and truckle to the popular will in many ways to keep the armies intact, its trump card at last proved to be that most radical of measures, the Emancipation Proclamation.

At the beginning of the war Mr. Lincoln was hindered rather than helped by the fact that in each and every State there were citizens zealous in the behalf of the Union, and demanding the rights of American citizenship. In Texas there were Sam Houston and Andrew J. Hamilton; in Louisiana there was John E. Bouligny; in North Carolina there were John A. Gilmer and his adherents; in South Carolina there was James L. Pettigru, probably the best lawyer in the State. In Tennessee, a third part of the State (East Tennessee), and a majority of the people in the States of Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Kentucky, and Missouri, were in favor of the Union.

If it was lawful and competent for General Scott, in a moment of panic, to advise that the "wayward sisters" might "go in peace," and for Horace Greeley to echo that sentiment, a moment's reflection will disclose that the door to the utterance of such sentiments was barred and bolted to the President. Scott, Greeley, *et id genus omne* could indulge in their political fancies; the President was bound by an oath to maintain the Union inviolate.

Thus understanding that a conflict was inevitable, the President in his inaugural made plain to all unprejudiced men the political situation, his duty in the then approaching crisis, and the responsibility which rested on the people. Much discretion rested in him; he could have instructed the District-Attorney of Alabama to swear out a

complaint against the Confederate conspirators at the first overt act of treason, and in like manner he could have instructed the District-Attorney of South Carolina to cause the arrest of Beauregard and his army after the assault on Sumter. Either would have been a *brutem fulmen* under the circumstances, but would have been within the strict line of Presidential duty. Mr. Lincoln, however, was as practical a statesman as he had been a lawyer, and he attempted nothing for show. As the South was raising armies, he deemed it to be his indispensable duty also to raise an army of resistance to act in any needed emergency; this he did, and then referred the entire political anomaly to the people's representatives.

On April 15, the day after the surrender of Fort Sumter to the armed force of the Confederacy, the President issued a proclamation calling forth the militia of the several States of the Union to the aggregate number of 75,000 to suppress combinations which existed in the seceding States for the purpose of opposing and obstructing the enforcement of Federal laws, and which were "too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by law." The concluding paragraph of the proclamation convened Congress to meet on July 4 "to consider and determine such measures as, in their wisdom, the public safety and interest might seem to demand."

The fall of Fort Sumter is the most momentous event in political history. It changed at once in a great nation the question of union or secession from an intellectual proposition to an

emotional issue. No matter how differently the people in each section had thought before, they now felt as one. It is true that there still remained many Unionists in the South, and still more persons in the North who were in sympathy with the Southern cause, but these were comprised respectively in the terms "North" and "South," which became thereafter psychological rather than geographical divisions of the country.

The passion of nationality unified both the Union and the Confederacy, and, though in each section the beloved object was different, the emotions were identical in kind. Political and moral philosophy had and continued to have opposing basic principles in the divisions. Government was a matter of equal and constituted rights of States to the chief party in the South, and of equal national rights of men to the chief party in the North. Southern ethics demanded the recognition of rights to property vested in its possessors, and Northern ethics the establishment of rights to property inherent in its producers. But patriotism superseded all intellectual and moral considerations and impulses, and used these for its own ends, overriding or exaggerating them as necessity required. This led to striking contradictions and paradoxes in action. Jefferson Davis became even more of an autocrat than the "tyrant" Lincoln—as the secessionists were wont to style the constitutionally elected commander-in-chief of the armies and navies of the republic. Robert E. Lee would have used national power to deprive citizens of their property by freeing the slaves in order to save the Confederacy. Abraham Lincoln was ready to abandon Federal property, and leave to

the indefinite future the establishment of human rights, in order to preserve the political integrity of the Union. And Stephen A. Douglas who had made a fetich of "popular sovereignty," and stripped himself of the bright endowments of intellectual consistency and moral independence to cast them before its shrine, came forward the very first of all citizens of the republic to offer to his old and triumphant antagonist his services for the preservation of the country.

The call for troops was really signed on Sunday, April 14, though dated April 15. On the evening of the 14th Senator Douglas called upon President Lincoln and was closeted with him for two hours. He went forth from the conference to publish by telegraph to the country the declaration that he was "prepared to sustain the President in the exercise of all his constitutional functions to preserve the Union, and maintain the Government, and defend the Federal capital." On April 25, before the Illinois Legislature, he made, in behalf of the Union, the most eloquent speech of his life. Unfortunately for the cause which had become the paramount passion of his soul, he died a little more than a month thereafter, on June 3, at his home in Chicago. Even measured by his few weeks of service, his place is secure in American history as the first and greatest of "War Democrats."

There was a rending pull of patriotism in opposing directions in the case of a number of men who were citizens of a seceding State and also owed allegiance to the national Government. Of these Robert E. Lee may be taken as the chief example. Lee was a graduate of West Point, whose ability had been recognized and rewarded

by the Government. On March 16 he had been made colonel of the First Cavalry by the new Administration. He was the favorite of General Scott, who intended, in case of armed conflict with the Confederacy, to make him the chief of his generals in the field. On the 18th of April, Francis P. Blair, Sr., at the request of the President, held an interview with Lee in which he unofficially offered him the command of the Union army.

There is a conflict of testimony as to Lee's answer. Lee in 1868 wrote to Reverdy Johnson: "I declined the offer . . . stating as candidly and courteously as I could that, although opposed to secession and deprecating war, I could take no part in the invasion of the Southern States." Montgomery Blair, the son of Francis P. Blair, Sr., and Postmaster-General at the time, deriving his information from his father, said in 1866 that Lee was undecided as to what he would do, answering that "he would consult with his friend, General Scott," and that Lee "went on the same day to Richmond, probably to arbitrate difficulties; and we see the result."

On April 20, after Lee had talked with friends in Richmond, he wrote to Scott, saying:

GENERAL: Since my interview with you on the 18th instant, I have felt that I ought not longer to retain my commission in the army. I therefore tender my resignation, which I request you will recommend for acceptance. It would have been presented at once, but for the struggle it has cost me to separate myself from a service to which I have devoted all the best years of my life and all the ability I possessed. . . . Save in defense of my native State, I never desire again to draw my sword.

On April 22 Lee accepted from the Governor

and Convention of Virginia the chief command of the Virginia State troops.

Throughout the North disinterested patriots and scheming politicians alike joined in the demands of duty, and urged that the insult to our glorious flag be avenged. Meetings were everywhere held, and fervid orators in impassioned strains fanned the people into a fierce flame of enthusiasm in behalf of our menaced Government. Politicians who, but ten months before, at Charleston, had clasped the hands of these traitors in fraternal concord, were now eager to raze that city of unsavory political memories to the ground. Benjamin F. Butler, an uneasy New England politician, who at Charleston had voted fifty-seven times for Jefferson Davis as his choice for President of the United States, was one of the earliest in the field. Obtaining a militia general's commission, he started promptly at the head of the hastily improvised Massachusetts regiment for the front.

Some of the lesser politicians who had opposed Mr. Lincoln's election at the North promptly joined in the general acclaim of patriotism; others, less enthusiastic and patriotic, were seized by the oncoming tide and borne on to their patriotic duty, while still others, more obdurate, headed the reactionary forces, and were Jacobins, and sometimes worse, to the bitter end. I almost distrust my own memory when I reflect on some utterances which in the opaque moral and political days which tried men's souls I heard from those in behalf of whom the voice of patriotic eulogy now emblazons the sober historic page.

The Governors of all the free States responded

nobly and with enthusiasm. They promptly offered more men than were required or could be armed. Places where "men most do congregate" were converted into recruiting stations; and the sound of the "ear-piercing fife" and the "spirit-stirring drum" resounded all over the land. The Governors of the border States, however, chose to bite against a file. Governor Jackson, of Missouri, said, "not one man will Missouri furnish to carry on such an unholy crusade;" Governor Magoffin, of Kentucky, said: "I say emphatically, Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing her sister Southern States;" and Governor Harris, of Tennessee, said: "Tennessee will not furnish a man for coercion, but 50,000 for the defense of our Southern brothers." And in each of these statements the author was guilty of unpremeditated error, for each of those States did furnish thousands of valiant Union troops to aid in putting down the rebellion.

As an answer to Lincoln's call for troops, Jefferson Davis, President of the Southern Confederacy, issued a proclamation on April 17, offering letters of marque and reprisal to privateers desiring to prey upon the commerce of the United States. Two days later President Lincoln replied by proclaiming a blockade of all the Confederate ports, and giving notice that privateering would be treated as piracy.

Massachusetts was the first Union State in the field. Governor John A. Andrew had the State militia equipped ready for the call; within two days thereafter the Sixth Massachusetts was *en route* to Washington, and on the morning of April 19 they reached Baltimore. There was a distance

of a mile between the Philadelphia station at which they arrived and the one for Washington. A number of the companies made the transfer in street-cars, amid the hooting of a gathering mob. The windows of the ninth car were broken by paving stones thrown by the rioters, who also fired pistols into the car. Several soldiers were injured, and Major Watson, who was aboard, finally gave orders to the soldiers to shoot back, which was done. The mob laid obstructions on the track, so that the last four companies were compelled to march between the stations. They had to fight their way through the mob, and several persons were killed on both sides.

A mass meeting of citizens was held at 4 P.M., in Monument Square, at which Governor Thomas H. Hicks of the State, and Mayor George W. Brown of the city, made speeches, the universal sentiment being in opposition to Federal "coercion" of the seceding States. After the meeting the city authorities, with the sanction of the State executive, ordered the railroad bridges between Baltimore and Philadelphia and Harrisburg to be destroyed. This was done, and Washington was thereby entirely cut off from railroad communication with the North.

In order that Maryland might not be incited to rebellion at this critical juncture, President Lincoln bowed to the aggression.

After correspondence with Governor Hicks and Mayor Brown, and two interviews with Mayor Brown in which these executives opposed further transit of Federal troops through Baltimore, or over an alternative route through Annapolis, the President on April 22 sent a diplomatic note through Secretary Seward to the

Governor, of which the tenor may be judged by the following appealing passage:

He [Lincoln] cannot but remember that there has been a time in the history of our country when a general of the American Union, with forces designed for the defense of its capital, was not unwelcome anywhere in the State of Maryland.

The Administration and our leading patriotic public men regarded the on-coming war as an awful but inevitable calamity, which it would tax the highest energies of the nation to sustain. Nor was our Administration at all confident of success. Senator Douglas' opinion, that a necessity existed for 200,000 troops at the first call, attested his opinion of the gloomy outlook. The Confederate cabal at Montgomery was more optimistic. The sanguine expression of expectation made by its Secretary of War attested its belief. The superficial on both sides regarded it as a national interlude of a few months' duration.

Beauregard was ordered into Northern Virginia to assume command of the forces gathering there from the Gulf States. Our troops were concentrating around the national capital. The scions of a slave-holding aristocracy took the field with all the paraphernalia of gentility: body-servants, kid gloves, "Byron" collars, perfumery, and pomatum. The backwoodsmen flocked in with ancient rifles, buckhorn-handled knives, and hunting shirts. In camp they wrestled, fought, pitched horseshoes, and talked "horse."

Although the Virginia secessionists had burned the Federal armory at Harper's Ferry on April 18, and seven ships and half the buildings at the Gosport navy yard at Norfolk, Mr. Lincoln ap-

plied his policy of non-aggression to Virginia no less than to Maryland. On April 24 he wrote a letter to Reverdy Johnson, of Maryland (who had taken a leading part in attempting to adjust amicably the relations of Virginia to the Federal government), which concluded with the words: "I have no objection to declare a thousand times that I have no purpose to invade Virginia or any other State, but I do not mean to let them invade us without striking back."

On April 25 Lincoln wrote to General Scott upon the question which had been submitted to him, of arresting and dispersing the Maryland Legislature, in view of its threatened action to arm the citizens of the State against the United States. He thought such repression neither justifiable nor efficient for the reasons that their action, whether peaceful or hostile, could not be known in advance; and even if the Legislature were dispersed it would reassemble elsewhere.

I therefore conclude that it is only left to the commanding general to watch and await their action, which if it shall be to arm their people against the United States, he is to adopt the most prompt and efficient means to counteract, even, if necessary, to the bombardment of their cities, and, in the extremest necessity, the suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*.

Annapolis, the capital of Maryland, being occupied by Massachusetts volunteers under command of Brigadier-General Benjamin F. Butler, Governor Hicks thought it wise to convene the Legislature at Frederick. Here on the 27th of April he sent it a special message, in which he admitted the right of transit through the State for Federal troops going to the defense of Wash-

ington, and counseled "that we shall array ourselves for Union and peace." He expressed the conviction that "the only safety of Maryland lies in preserving a neutral position between our brethren of the North and of the South."

The Legislature was divided in its sentiments. The Senate was secessionist; as it was about to pass a bill vesting the military control of the State in a secession "Board of Public Safety," it became alarmed at the evidence of a strong Union feeling in the lower house, and throughout the State, and desisted. Scharf, in his "History of Maryland," says that Senator Mason, of Virginia, appeared before the Legislature to arrange a military alliance of the two States. The only action taken, however, was to send a committee consisting of Otho Scott, R. M. McLane, and W. J. Ross to confer with President Lincoln. This they did on May 4; and on May 6 they reported to the Legislature that as a result of the conference they felt "painfully confident that a war is to be waged to reduce all the seceding States to allegiance to the United States Government."

On May 14 the Legislature adjourned to meet again on June 14, and at once Governor Hicks issued a proclamation calling into Federal service four regiments of State militia, in accordance with the President's call for troops. Already General Butler had occupied Baltimore [on May 13].

On April 27 the War Department organized the contemplated seat of war into departments as follows, viz.:

1. Washington, embracing the original District, Fort Washington and coterminous country

and Maryland to and including Bladensburg; under command of Colonel J. K. F. Mansfield.

2. Annapolis, embracing the country for twenty miles on both sides of the railway, between Washington and Annapolis; in charge of the militia general, Benjamin F. Butler.

3. Pennsylvania, embracing the rest of Maryland, Pennsylvania and Delaware; under command of the militia general, Robert Patterson.

On May 3, 1861, the President issued a proclamation calling for 42,034 more volunteers from the several States, and an increase in the regular army of 22,714 men, and in the navy of 18,000.

On the same day the Department of the Ohio, consisting of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, was created, and placed under the command of George B. McClellan, who had on April 23 been appointed by Ohio as major-general of its volunteers.

At that time McClellan was reputed the best military engineer in the country. He was graduated from West Point on July 1, 1846, being the leader of his class in mathematics. He went through the Mexican War as a lieutenant of engineers, and after it served for a few years as an instructor of practical engineering at West Point. This was followed by engineering duty in the West. In 1855 he was sent to Europe with two other officers to report on the conditions of the Crimean War. Captain McClellan's report, republished in 1861, under the title of "The Armies of Europe," is admirable for its clearness, fullness, and accuracy. In 1857 he resigned his commission to accept the place of civil engineer of the Illinois Central Railroad. He became its

vice-president in 1858. In 1859 he was elected president of the eastern division of the Ohio and Mississippi Railroad, with headquarters at Cincinnati. In 1860 he became president of the St. Louis, Missouri, and Cincinnati Railroad, which office he held at the outbreak of the war.

The frontier of the department being along the border State of Kentucky, which had not taken decisive action on the question of Union or secession, General McClellan recommended organization for observation rather than for action.

Many Kentuckians regarded with apprehension the presence of Federal troops on their border. A State Senator wrote to the President protesting in particular against the stationing of United States troops at Cairo. Lincoln dryly replied through his secretary, John Hay:

The President . . . directs me to say that the views so ably stated by you shall have due consideration, and to assure you that he would never have ordered the movement of troops complained of had he known that Cairo was in your senatorial district.

The position generally taken by Kentucky in regard to the burning issue of the day was that known as "armed neutrality." It was expressed in a resolution of a public meeting in Louisville, April 18, which declared that:

The present duty of Kentucky is to maintain her present independent position, taking sides not with the Administration, nor with the seceding States, but with the Union against them both; declaring her soil to be sacred from the hostile tread of either; and, if necessary, to make the declaration good with her strong right arm.

Governor Magoffin and General Simon B.

Buckner, commander of the State militia, who, as transpired in their later acts, were secessionists at heart, adopted this position. The Governor replied to President Lincoln's call for troops: "Kentucky will furnish no troops for the wicked purpose of subduing their sister Southern States," and this declaration was approved by the Kentucky Legislature.

The President, therefore, on May 7 sent Major Anderson, the hero of the hour on account of his defense of Fort Sumter, to Cincinnati to recruit volunteers from Kentucky and western Virginia. Recruiting camps were established in Kentucky by other officers, and by June 10 the First and Second Regiments of Kentucky volunteer infantry were organized. An election of Congressmen, which was rendered necessary by the President's call convening a special session of Congress upon July 4, was held on June 20, and resulted in the election of nine outspoken loyalists out of ten Kentucky Representatives.

Missouri was a Unionist State with a secessionist Governor and Legislature. The Governor, Claiborne F. Jackson, though elected upon the Douglas ticket, had become a disunionist, and the Breckinridge or pro-slavery party, owing to the division of their opponents among the Douglas, Bell, and Lincoln parties, had secured a majority of the Legislators. These called a State convention with the intention that it should pass an ordinance of secession. Instead a strong majority of Union delegates was elected, and when the convention met on February 28, it condemned secession; on March 22 it adjourned to December.

Governor Jackson thereupon established under

State laws a camp near St. Louis, nominally for the instruction of militia, but really to capture the State for the Confederacy. It was called "Camp Jackson," and was placed under the command of Brigadier-General D. M. Frost, a West Point graduate. Frost and Jackson planned to capture the Federal arsenal at St. Louis, and another secessionist, Jefferson M. Thompson, began drilling another camp at St. Joseph for the purpose of capturing the arsenal at Leavenworth, Kan. To oppose these purposes the Union men organized "Home Guards" and a "Committee of Safety."

The Government, feeling that General William S. Harney, commander of the department in which Missouri was situated, had been lax in repressing sedition, summoned him to Washington. On the way he was captured by Confederates at Harper's Ferry, and taken to Richmond, but was there released in order not to provoke wavering Missouri against the Confederacy, and was sent on to Washington. While he was absent from St. Louis the Government at Washington seized the opportunity to make a strong move.

On April 20 Secretary Cameron, of the War Department, wrote to Captain Nathaniel Lyon, an ardent anti-slavery man, who was in command of the St. Louis arsenal, the following order:

The President of the United States directs that you enroll in the military service of the United States the loyal citizens of St. Louis and vicinity, not exceeding, with those heretofore enlisted, ten thousand in number, for the purpose of maintaining the authority of the United States for the protection of the peaceable in-

habitants of Missouri; and you will, if deemed necessary, proclaim martial law in the city of St. Louis.

Upon this order General Scott made the indorsement, "It is revolutionary times, and therefore I do not object to the irregularity of this."

This was the first act of President Lincoln which can be criticised as arbitrary. It was significant of his determination to use the strongest measures to save the Union when nothing milder would suffice.

On May 8 Camp Jackson was supplied by Jefferson Davis with arms and ammunition from the stores of the captured arsenal at Baton Rouge, La.

The Safety Committee knew of this action, but permitted the consignment to reach its destination in order to have a legal excuse for capturing the camp. The next day Captain Lyon went in disguise to Camp Jackson to plan the method of taking it. On the following day, May 10, he suddenly surrounded the camp with Home Guards and Federal volunteers, and planted batteries in commanding positions. General Frost surrendered, protesting that he meant no hostility to the United States—an idle plea, since he was "caught with the goods."

Lyon's troops marched with the prisoners back to the arsenal. On the way they were attacked by a mob who killed two or three soldiers. The comrades of these fired into the crowd, killing a number of men, women, and children, most of whom, if not all, were innocent spectators.

The next morning the prisoners were paroled and disbanded. On the same day, General Harney returned from Washington, having been re-

instated in command largely because of the loyalty he had shown at Richmond in refusing overtures made by the Confederacy to win his interest and friendship.

General Harney at once assumed the leadership of the conservative pro-slavery faction of the Missouri Unionists. Captain Lyon was at the head of the radicals. A clash of policy and of personal interest ensued, which lasted almost throughout the war, and caused the President from first to last a great deal of concern and annoyance. The division entered even into his Cabinet, where Attorney-General Bates espoused the cause of the Harney faction, and Postmaster-General Blair that of the Lyon radicals.

Lincoln admired Captain Lyon for the wisdom and energy he had displayed in the capture of Camp Jackson. He distrusted Harney, not as disloyal, but as weak and temporizing. So he made Lyon a brigadier-general of volunteers, and on May 18 caused the War Department to send an order to Frank Blair, Jr., at St. Louis, relieving General Harney from his command, and appointing Lyon in his stead. At the same time Lincoln wrote Blair telling him to withhold the execution of this order until the necessity to the contrary became very urgent. This necessity arose within a fortnight.

On the night of the capture of Camp Jackson (May 10), Governor Jackson hastily convened the Legislature at Jefferson City and caused it to pass a military bill appointing the Governor a military dictator, and appropriating for his purposes three million dollars to be raised by diverting the school fund, issuing bonds, and anticipating two years' taxes. As his first step

under this dictatorship to force the State into the Confederacy, Governor Jackson appointed ex-Governor Sterling Price as Major-General in command of the Missouri State Guard. This was a clever appointment, for Price, while an ardent secessionist at heart, had impartially presided over the State convention which voted down secession, and since then had been active in allaying discord in the State, thereby winning the confidence of General Harney. On May 21 Price made a compact with Harney whereby the Federal officer agreed that he would not molest the State officer in his effort "to maintain order within the State," and that he would refrain from military movements of his own which might "create excitements and jealousies."

With this assurance Price began the organization all over the State of secessionist companies under the guise of militia. The Federal Government heard of this, and on May 27 the Adjutant-General wrote to Harney a warning to be watchful, saying, "The authority of the United States is paramount, and whenever it is apparent that a movement, whether by color of State authority or not, is hostile, you will not hesitate to put it down."

On May 30, before General Harney had time to heed this warning, Mr. Blair exercised his discretionary power, and delivered to Harney the order relieving him.

General Lyon, now in command, arranged a conference with Jackson and Price on June 11. He demanded that they disband the "State Guards" and give up the military bill. Jackson and Price refused to do so, and hurried to Jefferson City, burning the bridges behind them.

Arrived at the State capital, the Governor published a proclamation of war, and called 50,000 militia into service.

Lyon's answer was to embark batteries and troops on swift river steamboats, and on June 13 to steam to Jefferson City. He arrived on June 15 before resistance could be organized, and found the secessionists were fled. Lyon followed Price fifty miles up the river to Boonville, where on the 17th he defeated him in a skirmish and dispersed his militia.

The State convention, which had adjourned to December, met by special call on July 22; it abrogated the arbitrary acts of the Jackson administration and of the Legislature, and inaugurated a provisional government at St. Louis, choosing Hamilton R. Gamble, a conservative Unionist, as governor. Jackson, fleeing from place to place in the State, kept up the pretense of a State government. This the Jefferson Davis Government recognized, admitting the State into the Confederacy, but the substance of power lay entirely with the Union Government throughout the war.

Governor Gamble resorted to vigorous measures to purge from the politics of the State everything which at all savored of an adhesion to the Rebel Government. To this end he ordered all troops which had gone into the Rebel army from Missouri to return to their allegiance, promising, with the assent of the Federal Government, security to all who did so.

CHAPTER V

THE FIRST MESSAGE

WHEN the Virginia convention voted the State into the Confederacy, the western mountain counties, which had always been at odds with the eastern seaboard over the question of slavery, determined to remain in the Union. Their leaders appealed to Lincoln, with the result that on May 26 General McClellan sent four regiments into the State, under protection of which a provisional loyal State government was organized at Wheeling, on June 19. With such an encouraging opening General McClellan began planning to enter Confederate Virginia by way of the Kanawha river, and to capture Richmond. In the meantime, General Lee had arranged the militia of Virginia along the northern boundary of the State ostensibly as an army of defense against the Federal troops gathering at Washington, and thereby he invited the first attack upon the Confederacy from that quarter. As President Lincoln was soon to recall in his message to Congress in special session, the presence of troops from other Southern States in this Virginian army, as well as the seizure of the Federal Gosport navy-yard and the armory at Harper's Ferry, clearly showed that Virginia was in open rebellion, and there-

fore invasion of the State by Federal troops was not an act of aggression but of imperative necessity as a measure of defense.

On May 24 the first Michigan regiment under Colonel Elmer E. Ellsworth occupied Alexandria, causing the Rebel garrison at that place to retire. Colonel Ellsworth proceeded to the principal hotel, over which the Rebel flag had been flying in plain sight of the national capital for several weeks, and, climbing upon the roof with three companions, cut down the flaunting banner with his own hand. As he descended the stairs the hotel proprietor killed him with a shotgun, and was himself instantly done to death with rifle and bayonet by Francis E. Brownell, one of Ellsworth's companions.

No more grievous blow, except the assassination of one of his family, could have been struck at the tender heart of Lincoln than this murder of the gallant young colonel. Ellsworth had been a student in Lincoln's law office, and, coming with him to Washington, had formed a part of his household there.

A relation like that of knight and squire of the age of chivalry existed between the two. Lincoln had grown too wise to give of his confidences to the young men about him, but he none the less took a deep interest in them, studying their natures and loving them for their personal loyalty to him, and for their enthusiasm in his cause which they had made their own. Ellsworth had displayed no talent for law, and was something of a nuisance in the office, owing to his mislaying papers (one of Lincoln's most important speeches was lost to the world through Ellsworth losing the transcription of it), yet Lincoln

patiently bore with him, because he recognized in the young man's one passion, which was for arms, evidence of capacity for military leadership, and he sincerely respected him for it. On the day following Ellsworth's death Lincoln wrote a letter of condolence to the young officer's parents in which his reserve in not obtruding his own almost fatherly affection upon those in whom the natural jealousy of parenthood would be intensified by grief, reveals a courtesy even finer than his expression of that admiration for the noble qualities of the dead son which would bring unalloyed consolation to the bereaved father and mother.

MY DEAR SIR AND MADAM: In the untimely loss of your noble son, our affliction here is scarcely less than your own. So much of promised usefulness to one's country, and of bright hopes for one's self and friends, have rarely been so suddenly dashed as in his fall. In size, in years, and in youthful appearance a boy only, his power to command men was surpassingly great. This power, combined with a fine intellect, an indomitable energy, and a taste altogether military, constituted in him, as seemed to me, the best natural talent in that department I ever knew.

And yet he was singularly modest and deferential in social intercourse. My acquaintance with him began less than two years ago; yet through the latter half of the intervening period it was as intimate as the disparity of our ages and my engrossing engagements would permit. To me he appeared to have no indulgences or pastimes; and I never heard him utter a profane or an intemperate word. What was conclusive of his good heart, he never forgot his parents. The honors he labored for so laudably, and for which in the sad end he so gallantly gave his life, he meant for them no less than for himself.

In the hope that it may be no intrusion upon the sacredness of your sorrow, I have ventured to address

you this tribute to the memory of my young friend and your brave and early fallen child.

May God give you that consolation which is beyond all earthly power.

Sincerely your friend in a common affliction,

A. LINCOLN.

The capture of Alexandria inaugurated open conflict between the Confederacy and the Union in Virginia. General Beauregard, who was looked upon by the South as the hero of Fort Sumter, was sent on May 31 to command the Confederate forces centering about Manassas. General Joseph E. Johnston was in command at Winchester, having fallen back from Harper's Ferry before a superior Union force under General Robert Patterson. On June 19 President Lincoln called his Cabinet and the leading generals to a council of war, at which it was decided that General Irvin McDowell should lead the Union forces against Beauregard, while Patterson should remain confronting Johnston in the Shenandoah Valley, following him in a rear attack if he should attempt to join Beauregard.

This was the situation when Congress met in special session on July 4, and listened to the President's message.

In this important paper Mr. Lincoln described the state of affairs at the time of his inauguration; the suspension of all functions of the Federal Government, save those of the Post-office, in South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Florida; the seizure by the several governments of these States of forts and other Federal property, and the organization of these States into a Confederation which "was already invoking recognition, aid, and intervention

from foreign powers." The President recounted his forbearance in pursuing the policy expressed in his inaugural address of exhausting all peaceful measures before resorting to stronger ones.

He then lucidly recited the story of the assault upon Fort Sumter by South Carolina, demonstrating that it was in no sense an act of defense, but on the contrary of deliberate aggression, designed to force the hand of the Federal Government.

That this was their object the Executive well understood; and having said to them in the inaugural address, "You can have no conflict without being yourselves the aggressors," he took pains not only to keep this declaration good, but also to keep the case so free from the power of ingenious sophistry that the world should not be able to misunderstand it. By the affair at Fort Sumter, with its surrounding circumstances, that point was reached. . . . In this act, discarding all else, they have forced upon the country the distinct issue, "immediate dissolution or blood."

And this issue embraces more than the fate of the United States. It presents to the whole family of man the question whether a constitutional republic or democracy—a government of the people by the same people—can or cannot maintain its territorial integrity against its own domestic foes. It presents the question whether discontented individuals, too few in numbers to control administration according to organic law in any case, can always, upon the pretenses made in this case, or on any other pretenses, or arbitrarily without any pretense, break up their government, and thus practically put an end to free government upon the earth. It forces us to ask: "Is there, in all republics, this inherent and fatal weakness?" "Must a government, of necessity, be too strong for the liberties of its own people, or too weak to maintain its own existence?"

So viewing the issue, no choice was left but to call out the war power of the Government; and so to resist

force employed for its destruction by force for its preservation.

The President then discussed the action of the border States, particularly Virginia, pursuant to the attack on Sumter.

The course taken in Virginia was the most remarkable—perhaps the most important. A convention elected by the people of that State to consider the very question of disrupting the Federal Union was in session at the capital of Virginia when Fort Sumter fell. To this body the people had chosen a large majority of professed Union men. Almost immediately after the fall of Sumter, many members of that majority went over to the original disunion minority, and with them adopted an ordinance for withdrawing the State from the Union. Whether this change was wrought by their great approval of the assault upon Sumter or their great resentment at the Government's resistance to that assault, is not definitely known. Although they submitted the ordinance for ratification to a vote of the people, to be taken on a day then somewhat more than a month distant, the convention and the Legislature (which was also in session at the same time and place), with leading men of the State not members of either, immediately commenced acting as if the State were already out of the Union. They pushed military preparations vigorously forward all over the State. They seized the United States armory at Harper's Ferry, and the navy-yard at Gosport, near Norfolk. They received—perhaps invited—into their State large bodies of troops, with their warlike appointments, from the so-called seceded States. They formally entered into a treaty of temporary alliance and coöperation with the so-called "Confederate States," and sent members to their Congress at Montgomery. And, finally, they permitted the insurrectionary government to be transferred to their capital at Richmond.

The people of Virginia have thus allowed this giant insurrection to make its nest within her borders; and this Government has no choice left but to deal with it where it finds it. And it has the less regret as the loyal

citizens have, in due form, claimed its protection. Those loyal citizens this Government is bound to recognize and protect, as being Virginia.

The attitude of "armed neutrality" adopted by Kentucky, the President characterized as "disunion completed."

Figuratively speaking, it would be the building of an impassable wall along the line of separation—and yet not quite an impassable one, for under the guise of neutrality it would tie the hands of Union men and freely pass supplies from among them to the insurrectionists, which it could not do as an open enemy. . . . It recognizes no fidelity to the Constitution, no obligation to maintain the Union; and while very many who have favored it are doubtless loyal citizens, it is, nevertheless, very injurious in effect.

The President proceeded to justify his orders to Lieutenant-General Scott authorizing him at discretion to suspend the writ of *habeas corpus*, an order which had been harshly criticised as arbitrary and unconstitutional.

The provision of the Constitution that "the privilege of the writ of *habeas corpus* shall not be suspended, unless when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require it," is equivalent to a provision—is a provision—that such privilege may be suspended when, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public safety does require it. It was decided that we have a case of rebellion, and that the public safety does require the qualified suspension of the privilege of the writ which was authorized to be made. Now it is insisted that Congress, and not the Executive, is vested with this power. But the Constitution itself is silent as to which or who is to exercise the power; and as the provision was plainly made for a dangerous emergency, it cannot be believed the framers of the instrument intended that in every case the danger should run its course until

Congress could be called together, the very assembling of which might be prevented, as was intended in this case, by the rebellion.

The President concluded his message proper with an appeal to Congress to pass those measures which would enable him to suppress the rebellion quickly and decisively:

It is now recommended that you give the legal means for making this contest a short and decisive one: that you place at the control of the Government for the work at least four hundred thousand men and \$400,000,000. That number of men is about one-tenth of those of proper ages within the regions where, apparently, all are willing to engage; and the sum is less than a twenty-third part of the money value owned by the men who seem ready to devote the whole. A debt of \$600,000,000 now is a less sum per head than was the debt of our Revolution when we came out of that struggle; and the money value in the country now bears even a greater proportion to what it was then than does the population. Surely each man has as strong a motive now to preserve our liberties as each had then to establish them.

A right result at this time will be worth more to the world than ten times the men and ten times the money. The evidence reaching us from the country leaves no doubt that the material for the work is abundant, and that it needs only the hand of legislation to give it legal sanction, and the hand of the Executive to give it practical shape and efficiency. One of the greatest perplexities of the Government is to avoid receiving troops faster than it can provide for them. In a word, the people will save their Government if the Government itself will do its part only indifferently well.

The latter half of the message was in its nature an address to the country upon the fallacies of secession and the constitutional duty imposed upon the President to suppress it by arms. The movers of secession, said Mr. Lincoln,

in order to undermine the loyalty of the South to the Union "invented an ingenious sophism, which if conceded was followed by perfectly logical steps through all the incidents, to the complete destruction of the Union. The sophism itself is that any State in the Union may, consistently with the national Constitution, withdraw from the Union without the consent of the Union or of any other State. The little disguise that the supposed right is to be exercised only for just cause, themselves to be the sole judges of its justice, is too thin to merit any notice."

This sophism, said Mr. Lincoln, is based upon the false doctrine of State sovereignty. "Our States," he said, "have neither more nor less power than that reserved to them in the Union by the Constitution—no one of them ever having been a State out of the Union. . . . The States have their *status* in the Union, and they have no other legal *status*. If they break from this, they can only do so against law and by revolution. The Union, and not themselves separately, procured their independence and their liberty. . . . The Union is older than any of the States, and, in fact, it created them as States."

The rights of the States reserved to them by the Constitution, argued Mr. Lincoln, are obviously administrative powers, and certainly do not include a power to destroy the Government itself. "This relative matter of national power and State rights, as a principle, is no other than the principle of generality and locality. Whatever concerns the whole should be confined to the whole—to the General Government; while whatever concerns only the State should be left exclusively to the State."

“The nation purchased with money,” continued Mr. Lincoln, “the countries out of which several of these States were formed; is it just that they shall go off without leave and without refunding? . . . The nation is now in debt for money applied to the benefit of these so-called seceding States in common with the rest; is it just that . . . the remaining States pay the whole? . . . Again, if one State may secede, so may another; and when all shall have seceded none is left to pay the debts. . . The principle itself is one of disintegration, and upon which no government can possibly endure.”

It may be affirmed, without extravagance, that the free institutions we enjoy have developed the powers and improved the condition of our whole people beyond any example in the world. Of this we now have a striking and an impressive illustration. So large an army as the Government has now on foot was never before known without a soldier in it but who had taken his place there of his own free choice. But more than this; there are many single regiments whose members, one and another, possess full practical knowledge of all the arts, sciences, professions, and whatever else, whether useful or elegant, is known in the world; and there is scarcely one from which there could not be selected a President, a Cabinet, a Congress and perhaps a court, abundantly competent to administer the Government itself. Nor do I say this is not true also in the army of our late friends, now adversaries in this contest; but if it is, so much better the reason why the Government which has conferred such benefits on both them and us should not be broken up. Whoever, in any section, proposes to abandon such a Government, would do well to consider in deference to what principle it is that he does it; what better he is likely to get in its stead; whether the substitute will give, or be intended to give, so much of good to the people? There are some foreshadowings on this subject. Our adversaries have adopted some declarations of independence, in which, unlike the

good old one, penned by Jefferson, they omit the words, "all men are created equal." Why? They have adopted a temporary national constitution, in the preamble of which unlike our good old one, signed by Washington, they omit, "We, the people," and substitute, "We, the deputies of the sovereign and independent States." Why? Why this deliberate pressing out of view the rights of men and the authority of the people?

This is essentially a people's contest. On the side of the Union it is a struggle for maintaining in the world that form and substance of government whose leading object is to elevate the condition of men; to lift artificial weights from all shoulders; to clear the paths of laudable pursuits for all; to afford all an unfettered start and a fair chance in the race of life. Yielding to partial and temporary departures, from necessity, this is the leading object of the Government for whose existence we contend.

I am most happy to believe that the plain people understand and appreciate this. It is worthy of note, that while in this the Government's hour of trial, large numbers of those in the army and navy who have been favored with the offices have resigned and proved false to the hand which had pampered them, not one common soldier or common sailor is known to have deserted his flag.

Great honor is due to those officers who remained true, despite the example of their treacherous associates; but the greatest honor, and most important fact of all, is the unanimous firmness of the common soldiers and common sailors. To the last man, so far as known, they have successfully resisted the traitorous efforts of those whose commands but an hour before they obeyed as absolute law. This is the patriotic instinct of plain people. They understand, without an argument, that the destroying the Government which was made by Washington means no good to them.

Our popular Government has often been called an experiment. Two points in it our people have already settled—the successful establishing and the successful administering of it. One still remains—its successful maintenance against a formidable internal attempt to overthrow it. It is now for them to demonstrate to the world that those who can fairly carry an election can also suppress a rebellion; that ballots are the rightful

and peaceful successors of bullets; and that when ballots have fairly and constitutionally decided, there can be no successful appeal back to bullets; that there can be no successful appeal, except to ballots themselves, at succeeding elections. Such will be a great lesson of peace; teaching men that what they cannot take by an election, neither can they take by a war; teaching all the folly of being the beginners of a war.

It was with the deepest regret that the Executive found the duty of employing the war power in defence of the Government forced upon him. He could but perform this duty or surrender the existence of the Government. No compromise by public servants could, in this case, be a cure; not that compromises are not often proper, but that no popular Government can long survive a marked precedent that those who carry an election can only save the Government from immediate destruction by giving up the main point upon which the people gave the election. The people themselves, and not their servants, can safely reverse their own deliberate decisions.

As a private citizen the Executive could not have consented that these institutions shall perish; much less could he, in betrayal of so vast and so sacred a trust as the free people have confided to him. He felt that he had no moral right to shrink, nor even to count the chances of his own life in what might follow. In full view of his great responsibility he has, so far, done what he has deemed his duty. You will now, according to your own judgment, perform yours. He sincerely hopes that your views and your actions may so accord with his, as to assure all faithful citizens who have been disturbed in their rights of a certain and speedy restoration to them, under the Constitution and the laws.

And having thus chosen our course without guile and with pure purpose, let us renew our trust in God, and go forward without fear and with manly hearts.

Congress, like the President, rose to heroic stature in meeting the crisis thrust upon the nation. It sat for a month and in that time did all that the Executive desired. All the acts of

the President for the suppression of the rebellion which he performed were declared valid, and he was authorized to accept the service of 500,000 volunteers, and \$500,000,000 were voted to prosecute the war.

The press and people heartily indorsed the action of Congress and the President; and Mr. Lincoln entered into consideration of the mighty problem of war with a resolute purpose and a single aim to restore the Union of the States as they were. That the country had thus settled down to the serious business of war, and that Congress and the loyal people were *en rapport* with the Executive, armed that branch of government with the mighty power of unity and concord. If there could have been celerity and effectiveness in military operations, or if the people had remained constant and patient, all would have gone well, but no such gratifying conditions existed, for military matters were unsatisfactory. In time diversity of policy and feeling was engendered, the President's current policy and ability were criticised, and the *entente cordiale* which had existed between the Administration and the people was strained.

Mr. Lincoln's conception of the situation was tersely stated to me, with the license and unrestrained freedom of intimate friendship, on the 26th day of July, 1861. He then said: "We must make a feint against Richmond and in that way dislodge them [the Rebels] from Manassas; we must pursue as rigidly as possible the blockade; we must march a column of the army into East Tennessee, so as to liberate the Union sentiment there; and then we must rely upon the time coming when the people down South will

rise and say to their leaders: 'This thing has got to stop;' for [said he impressively], it is no use trying to conquer those people if they remain united and bound not to be conquered."

Leonard Swett said, that during the first and second years of the war Mr. Lincoln had little hope of preserving the Union, but that after the issuance and reception of the Emancipation Proclamation he then and thereafter expected to prevail. Such is my own view. Mr. Lincoln was not of a hopeful and enthusiastic, but of a despondent and somber character. He fully apprehended the odds against us, including the hostility of England and France, and the sympathy of border State slave-holders with their brethren in the Cotton States.

The disadvantage which the Administration of a constitutional government labors under, in conducting an internecine war, was exhibited by the sedulous care necessary to be observed in not invading the area of constitutional right, or in making ample apology for doing so, and showing its inherent necessity. Both in his official utterances and in his loose talk, Lincoln was careful to guarantee to all classes their utmost rights and privileges, and to "curry favor" personally with all classes and conditions in an indirect, unobtrusive, and manly way, thus weakening the power of the opposition, and gaining accretions of power to his own side.

Monarchical powers do none of these things; they decide on the war in the Cabinet; order the lines, and organize the army; conscript the needed troops or hire mercenaries, as may be needed, but they omit to take the people into their confidence. While Mr. Lincoln was en-

gaged in defining his proposition in all ways he could, Jefferson Davis embraced opportunities to do the same in reference to his government. Both appealed to their several constituencies for strength to uphold their governments, and both laid their claim before the civilized world for its approval.

The differences between the two governments and the modes of their action were apparent; for, while Mr. Lincoln's government never at any time showed infringements upon constitutional liberty beyond a moderate draft, the issue of fiat money, and a suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus*, scarcely exercised, the Davis government, though vaunting its devotion to enlarged liberty and almost the freedom of license, became an absolute and implacable despotism: fiercely taking supplies and products, enforcing the currency of a circulating medium of neither present nor prospective value, and robbing the fireside and the cradle and the grave by press gangs to recruit its armies. The people were impoverished and deprived of almost every vestige of liberty.

Almost the sole business of the Southern country was to furnish supplies and men for the army; there was but little progress in emigration, manufactures, commerce, science, education or the arts; cruel, unrelenting war was the sole business, and all of the current and floating capital having been engulfed in the vortex, the fixed capital and reserved wealth were rapidly disappearing in the same way.

Despite the fact that State rights and slavery were the twin pillars of their fabric of government, the former was disregarded entirely, and the protests of Governors Brown, of Georgia, and

Vance, of North Carolina, against the improper use of their troops were wholly disregarded. Had Mr. Lincoln attempted to administer his government in such utter disregard of constitutional rights and of the primary principles of liberty, it would not have endured for a single year.

CHAPTER VI

BULL RUN AND MILITARY EMANCIPATION

TEN days after the President had promulgated his enheartening message, Congress, as well as the Northern people, were mightily encouraged by the report of General McClellan that he had defeated the "crack regiments of Eastern Virginia, aided by Georgians, Tennesseans, and Carolinians," at Rich Mountain and Carrick's Ford, killing in the second battle their general, Robert S. Garnett. "Our success is complete," said McClellan, "and secession is killed in this country." These quickly succeeding and decisive victories recalled Napoleon's campaign in Italy, and comparisons were drawn between the "Little Corporal" and "Little Mac," as McClellan was affectionately dubbed. It was thought that he who had so quickly won an entire province, virtually a State, to the Union, was the military genius of the war, and the commander destined to lead the soldiers of the Union, now proved to be superior to the boasted Southern chivalry, "on to Richmond," the speedy capture of which would undoubtedly "kill secession" in the entire South.

However, these anticipations of a "ninety days' conquest" were rudely shattered by the defeat at Bull Run, or Manassas. On July 18 Johnston

executed a stolen march which completely deceived Patterson, his opponent, and by Saturday, July 20, 6,000 of his 9,000 men had joined the 22,000 under Beauregard, in time to resist McDowell's attack on Sunday, the 21st, and the remaining 3,000 arrived in time to turn the tide of victory in favor of the Confederates. The Union retreat became a disorderly flight back to Washington. Many civilians had gone to see the battle, and these, mingling with the retreating soldiers, contributed to the confusion. One Congressman was captured by the Rebels—a salutary lesson to his colleagues of the evil effects of over-confidence.

Jefferson Davis, hurrying from Richmond, reached the scene of conflict just before the final *dénouement*, and, impressing a cavalry horse, reached the immediate theater of operations in time to exclaim to the troops of a division just ordered forward, "Forward! my brave boys, and win." In 1880 I spent an entire day with Hon. T. H. Watts, of Alabama, who was the Attorney-General of the Confederacy for a time, and he told me very much of his side of the rebellion; among which was this fact, that Davis accepted the Presidency with extreme reluctance, deeming his *forte* to be as Commander of the Army. This idea possessed him throughout, and he was in a frequent state of nervous irritation at what he deemed the bad policy and mistakes of his generals. Governor Watts thought that if the authorities had rated his military qualities as highly as he did himself, and allowed him to take supreme command of the army, he would willingly at any time have resigned the Executive chair for that purpose. Governor Watts said

he and Davis had often talked about it, both in the office and in the social circle. It was, in fact, a hobby with Davis. Beauregard, however, in his report on the battle ignored Davis' services, if any, in the battle, and simply said that the President came on the field at, or toward, the close of the battle; and General Johnston made no mention of the President at all. Davis never forgave either of these gallant officers, but, in all ways that he could, crippled and injured each of them throughout the war. Johnston's preëminent talents generally assured him an independent command; but Beauregard's lesser abilities were unable to enforce such a position, and he was relegated to subordinate places.

I reached Washington from Chicago on the Monday evening after the rout, and recollect vividly the disorganized condition of the capital; the weather was unusually—I might say, phenomenally—hot; showers would fall, and immediately it seemed as if the heat was more intense and stifling than before. The night brought little relief. Judiciary Square and Capitol Hill afforded comfortable lodging places for our brave boys, whose mattress was Mother Earth and whose covering was the blue dome of Heaven. At each street pump soldiers might be seen washing some rude article of clothing, the iron railings of the *élite* serving in lieu of clothes-lines for laundry uses; the boys would break up in squads, and each take a block where three of them together would visit each house and respectfully solicit their breakfasts, nor was the request ever denied, and their dinners and suppers were procured similarly, nor was there any complaint of misbehavior. General Mansfield was intrusted

with the duty of reorganization, a task which was accomplished in a few days.

Lincoln held a Cabinet meeting at General Scott's office late Sunday afternoon to take measures to save the capital. Soldiers were hurried from recruiting stations to Washington. McClellan was ordered to come down to the Shenandoah Valley with all his available troops.

The entire country was thrown into a panic from which it was some time in recovering. As an evidence of the general demoralization the following letter to Lincoln from Horace Greeley, editor of the *New York Tribune*, may be cited:

NEW YORK, *Monday, July 29, 1861. (Midnight.)*

This is my seventh sleepless night—yours, too, doubtless—yet I think I shall not die, because I have no right to die. I must struggle to live, however bitterly. But to business. You are not considered a great man, and I am a helplessly broken one. . . . Can the Rebels be beaten after all that has occurred, and in view of the actual state of feeling caused by our late, awful disaster? If they can,—and it is your business to ascertain and decide,—write me that such is your judgment, so that I may know and do my duty. And if they *cannot* be beaten,—if our recent disaster is fatal,—do not fear to sacrifice yourself to your country. If the Rebels are not to be beaten,—if that is your judgment in view of all the light you can get,—then every drop of blood henceforth shed in this quarrel will be wantonly, wickedly shed, and the guilt will rest heavily on the soul of every promoter of the crime. I pray you to decide quickly and let me know my duty. . . . If it is best for the country and for mankind that we make peace with the Rebels at once and on their own terms, do not shrink even from that.

Lincoln had spent sleepless nights, not in selfish nursing of grief, but in planning for the salvation of the republic. On July 23 he wrote

memoranda looking to the vigorous maintenance of every defensive policy that had been entered upon, and on July 27 he added to these memoranda of three offensive operations; recovery of the railroad connections lost by the defeat, and joint movements from Cairo on Memphis, and from Cincinnati on East Tennessee.

Congress ably supported the President in this emergency. On July 22, following the defeat at Bull Run, John J. Crittenden, an aged Representative from Kentucky, the State where the policy of neutrality had been strongest, voiced the spirit of his legislative body in a resolution declaring that the war had been forced upon the country by the disunionists, and would be waged by the Federal Government not for subjugation, "but to defend and maintain the supremacy of the Constitution, and to preserve the Union with all the dignity, equality, and rights of the several States unimpaired; and that as soon as these objects are accomplished the war ought to cease."

This, and a similar resolution offered in the Senate by Andrew Johnson, of Tennessee, were passed with but few dissenting votes.

On July 27 General McClellan was endued with the chief command at Washington, and empowered to organize a new army out of the three years' regiments beginning to pour in upon the capital.

History does not recount a career in which the road to immortal fame was so manifest, obvious, and clearly defined as that upon which McClellan now entered. He had a good army record, the prestige of excellent scholarship, fine opportunities for military observation, admirable social qualities, an excellent moral character, a fine

(parlor) presence, a polished address, the friendship of the commanding General, and great political influence. Unfortunately, he fell into the embraces of society people at Washington, which was a clog to proper vigor and progress in field operations, especially as the class most in favor with him was not favorable to a rigorous prosecution of the war. In addition, he accepted the proffered services of many carpet knights as volunteer and other staff officers, who, when in commission and on dress parade, were brilliant and imposing in appearance, but constituted only the edging and passementerie, and not the substance of war.

Instead of taking up his headquarters in the field with his army, he procured an aristocratic mansion close by the White House, and fell into luxurious and methodical habits of empty reviews and dull routine instead of campaigning and field operations. He had a cavalry bodyguard which did nothing except attend him in his diurnal reviews. He had also an infantry bodyguard which did nothing but attend at his magnificent headquarters. Two French princes were on his staff; one of them afterwards said: "I here point out a characteristic trait of the American people—delay!" It is needless to say that this prince had not served with Grant, Sherman, or Sheridan. John Jacob Astor was a volunteer on his staff, and he paid all his own expenses and lived as he was wont to in Fifth Avenue, served by a *chef* and a steward. This was patriotic in Mr. Astor, but it was not *war*; and such surroundings emasculated McClellan of vigor, self-reliance, and the real business which the nation had employed him to do. When he was finally forced to take the

field after seven weary months of fanfaronade and pinchbeck reviews, it required six immense four-horse wagons, drawn by twenty-four horses, to haul the baggage of himself and his staff.

On the same day that the House was debating the Crittenden resolution, the Senate voted to confiscate the slaves employed in aid of the rebellion. This act was a long stride onward toward emancipation. Credit for pointing out the military principle upon which the confiscation was justified is due to General Butler. He was in command at Fortress Monroe, and had as his opponent John B. Magruder, who with scant troops, set to work to construct earthworks, putting negroes at the task. A number of these ran away to Fortress Monroe. Three of them were farmhands, belonging to Colonel Mallory, who demanded their return under the Fugitive Slave Act. Now General Butler had been the keenest lawyer in Massachusetts, and he took a reasonable legal position rather than a military course in refusing the bold demand. He replied that Virginia claimed to be a foreign state, and therefore its citizens, at least those that indorsed this claim, could not consistently assert as their right a duty of the Nation to one of its States.

This reasoning led to an even more advanced position, which was concisely summed up in a single phrase, viz., that negroes employed in aid of rebellion were "contraband of war." Since the Southerners regarded slaves as chattels they could not consistently except to this conclusion.

The Government heartily approved General Butler's course. On May 30 Secretary Cameron of the War Department gave him a formal order authorizing him to pursue the policy he had

adopted, and this was subsequently enacted into law by Congress. Even the border-State Union men did not voice any objections, for to do so would impeach their loyalty. The public generally applauded Butler. When, however, Major-General John C. Frémont, in command of the Western Department, consisting of Illinois and all the region between the Mississippi and the Rocky Mountains, attempted to gain a similar popular acclaim by issuing on his own responsibility a proclamation confiscating all property of persons in rebellion, and emancipating their slaves, neither the Administration nor the country as a whole supported him. General Frémont had already proved himself an incompetent commander. His neglect to reënforce the brave General Lyon, isolated at Springfield in southwestern Missouri among gathering Rebel forces, had led to the defeat and death of Lyon at Wilson's Creek on August 10; and his egotism in refusing to consult with the civil authorities and his subordinate officers had thoroughly demoralized his entire department.

President Lincoln therefore was watching for danger in that quarter, and as soon as he was informed of Frémont's proclamation on August 30 of military emancipation, wrote him on September 2 to modify it so that it should conform to the Act of Congress confiscating property used for insurrection, giving as a reason for his objection that the liberation of slaves would alarm Southern Unionists, and perhaps precipitate Kentucky into the Confederacy.

Before Lincoln received a reply to this, he wrote to General David Hunter a letter full of shrewd foresight and delicate diplomacy:

September 9, 1861.

MY DEAR SIR: General Frémont needs assistance which it is difficult to give him. He is losing the confidence of men near him, whose support any man in his position must have to be successful. His cardinal mistake is that he isolates himself, and allows nobody to see him; and by which he does not know what is going on in the very matter he is dealing with. He needs to have by his side a man of large experience. Will you not, for me, take that place? Your rank is one grade too high to be ordered to it; but will you not serve the country and oblige me by taking it voluntarily?

Two days later he received an answer from Frémont to his letter of September 2. It was full of excuses and self-justification. Mrs. Frémont brought it in person. She adopted a hostile attitude toward the President, and, insinuating that there was a conspiracy against her husband, demanded a copy of the President's Missouri correspondence. To this Lincoln courteously but firmly replied:

I do not feel authorized to furnish you with copies of letters in my possession, without the consent of the writers. No impression has been made on my mind against the honor or integrity of General Frémont, and I now enter my protest against being understood as acting in any hostility towards him.

The situation precipitated by General Frémont's proclamation was most critical. The border States, for whose adherence to the Union Lincoln had thus far most successfully played, seemed about to escape from his control. Besides, soldiers from the Northern States, who had enlisted to save the Union and not to free the negro, were greatly disaffected by Frémont's proclamation. On the other hand events had rapidly developed many conservative Northern-

ers into anti-slavery radicals, and these, together with the original Abolitionists, made a hero of General Frémont. Such persons had to be treated with utmost consideration.

One of these was an old friend and adviser of Lincoln, Orville H. Browning, who had succeeded Stephen A. Douglas in the Senate. On September 17 he wrote to the President objecting to his attitude toward Frémont's proclamation. To this letter Lincoln replied on the 22d :

MY DEAR SIR: Yours of the 17th is just received; and coming from you, I confess it astonishes me. That you should object to my adhering to a law which you had assisted in making and presenting to me less than a month before is odd enough. But this is a very small part. General Frémont's proclamation as to confiscation of property and the liberation of slaves is purely political and not within the range of military law or necessity. If a commanding general finds a necessity to seize the farm of a private owner for a pasture, an encampment, or a fortification, he has the right to do so, and to so hold it as long as the necessity lasts; and this is within military law, because within military necessity. But to say the farm shall no longer belong to the owner, or his heirs forever, and this as well when the farm is not needed for military purposes as when it is, is purely political, without the savor of military law about it. And the same is true of slaves. If the general needs them, he can seize them and use them; but when the need is past, it is not for him to fix their permanent future condition. That must be settled according to laws made by law-makers, and not by military proclamations. The proclamation in the point in question is simply "dictatorship." It assumes that the general may do anything he pleases—confiscate the lands and free the slaves of loyal people, as well as of disloyal ones. And going the whole figure, I have no doubt, would be more popular with some thoughtless people than that which has been done! But I cannot assume this reckless position, nor allow others to assume it on my responsibility.

You speak of it as being the only means of saving the Government. On the contrary, it is itself the surrender of the Government. Can it be pretended that it is any longer the Government of the United States—any government of constitution and laws—wherein a general or a president may make permanent rules of property by proclamation? I do not say Congress might not with propriety pass a law on the point just such as General Frémont proclaimed. I do not say I might not, as a member of Congress, vote for it. What I object to is, that I, as President, shall expressly or impliedly seize and exercise the permanent legislative functions of the Government.

So much as to principle. Now as to policy. No doubt the thing was popular in some quarters, and would have been more so if it had been a general declaration of emancipation. The Kentucky legislature would not budge till that proclamation was modified; and General Anderson telegraphed me that on the news of General Frémont having actually issued deeds of manumission, a whole company of our volunteers threw down their arms and disbanded. I was so assured as to think it probable that the very arms we had furnished Kentucky would be turned against us. I think to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game. Kentucky gone, we cannot hold Missouri, nor, as I think, Maryland. These all against us, and the job on our hands is too large for us. We would as well consent to separation at once, including the surrender of this capital. On the contrary, if you will give up your restlessness for new positions, and back me manfully on the grounds upon which you and other kind friends gave me the election and have approved in my public documents, we shall go through triumphantly. You must understand I took my course on the proclamation because of Kentucky. I took the same ground in a private letter to General Frémont before I heard from Kentucky.

There has been no thought of removing General Frémont on any ground connected with his proclamation. . . . I hope no real necessity for it exists on any ground.

After his victory over General Lyon, the Confederate General Price advanced northward with-

out opposition till on September 18 he met the Chicago Irish Brigade under Colonel James A. Mulligan at Lexington on the Missouri River. Mulligan had held the place against great odds for more than two days, during which Frémont could easily have sent him reinforcements, but neglected to do so. Mulligan was forced to surrender on the 20th. General Scott wrote to Frémont that "The President . . . expects you to repair the disaster at Lexington without loss of time."

So desirous was President Lincoln that General Frémont should take the offensive that, in a memorandum which he made about October 1 proposing a defensive plan of campaign, he specifically exempted him from the general inaction (see p. 195).

Nevertheless General Frémont continued inactive. Accordingly, Secretary Cameron and Adjutant-General Lorenzo Thomas went to Missouri to investigate the situation, and if advisable, to remove General Frémont. They arrived at Frémont's camp on October 13, and on the 14th Cameron wrote the President informing him that he had shown Frémont the order for his removal and that the General, greatly mortified, had made an earnest appeal for further trial. "In reply to this appeal," wrote Cameron, "I told him that I would withhold the order until my return to Washington, giving him the interim to prove the reality of his hopes as to reaching and capturing the enemy; giving him to understand that, should he fail, he must give place to some other officer. He assured me that, should he fail, he would resign at once."

President Lincoln waited until October 24 for

signs of activity by Frémont and, none forthcoming, he sent to Brigadier-General Samuel R. Curtis at St. Louis an order to General Frémont to turn over his command to Major-General David Hunter. However, he gave Curtis instructions that the order was to be withheld if, by the time the messenger reached Frémont, the general had won a victory or was in the midst or on the eve of battle.

General Hunter by the President's orders was on hand when the message was delivered. General Frémont had given orders to attack the Confederates who were supposed to be at Wilson's Creek. Hunter sent a reconaissance to this place and found no enemy there. General Frémont thereupon gracefully resigned his command to General Hunter and returned to St. Louis, where he was publicly welcomed by the radical faction of the Unionists. General Hunter, in accordance with the instructions of the President, drew back the troops from Springfield to Rolla, the terminus of a railroad, and dispatched most of them to other points that were threatened. Thereupon the Confederate Brigadier-General Ben McCulloch occupied Springfield.

On November 9 the Department of the West was divided into the Department of Kansas and the Department of Missouri. The Department of Kansas included the State of Kansas and the Territories of Nebraska, Colorado, Dakota, and Indian Territory; General Hunter was assigned to its command, with headquarters at Fort Leavenworth. The Department of Missouri embraced Arkansas, Missouri, Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, Illinois, and that part of Kentucky lying west of the Cumberland River; General

Henry W. Halleck was assigned to its command, with headquarters at St. Louis.

General Halleck set himself at once to settle the vexatious problem of the relation of the army to fugitive slaves. Contrary to Frémont's policy he issued an order on November 20 excluding these fugitives from the army lines on the ground that they conveyed information to the enemy. For this order he was violently attacked by the anti-slave press and Congressmen, who averred that, on the contrary, the fugitives brought in valuable information about the enemy.

Bushwhacking on both sides had brought Missouri into a state of anarchy, and Halleck turned his attention to its suppression. Various Confederate detachments were ravaging northern Missouri, and he sent troops to drive them southward. He assigned to General John Pope the duty of intercepting and capturing them as they crossed the Missouri River. On December 19, near Milford, Colonel Davis of Pope's command captured 2,000 of these Confederates, with a great quantity of arms, horses, and supplies.

General Halleck was equally severe upon the Union bushwhackers. In the beginning of the war the President had given Senator James H. Lane, of Kansas, authority to raise a brigade in his State. The men who enlisted under him were wild spirits who had taken part in the merciless strife over the admission of Kansas, and they now continued the same order of barbaric warfare. Halleck ordered that they be expelled from his department, and if caught, disarmed and held as prisoners. "They are no better than a band of robbers," he wrote to McClellan. "They cross the line, rob, steal, plunder, and burn whatever .

they can lay hands upon. They disgrace the name and uniform of American soldiers, and are driving good Union men into the ranks of the secession army."

Lincoln tried to hold Lane and his soldiers within bounds by making him clearly understand that he was under command of General Hunter. As a result, Lane, who had contemplated an expedition against Texas which should bring him great glory, became disgruntled and inactive. Hunter, disgusted with his small and insubordinate forces, and believing that he should have had the command assigned to General Buell, wrote to the President expressing his humiliation and disappointment.

To this Lincoln replied on December 31 but allowed the letter to remain on his table a month, and then sent it by special conveyance to General Hunter, directing that it be given him only when he was in good humor. As one of the most characteristic letters written by the President it is here presented in full:

DEAR SIR: Yours of the 23d is received, and I am constrained to say it is difficult to answer so ugly a letter in good temper. I am, as you intimate, losing much of the great confidence I placed in you, not from any act or omission of yours touching the public service, up to the time you were sent to Leavenworth, but from the flood of grumbling dispatches and letters I have seen from you since. I knew you were being ordered to Leavenworth at the time it was done; and I aver that, with as tender a regard for your honor and your sensibilities as I had for my own, it never occurred to me that you were being "humiliated, insulted and disgraced"; nor have I, up to this day, heard an intimation that you have been wronged, coming from any one but yourself. No one has blamed you for the retrograde movement from Springfield, nor

for the information you gave General Cameron; and this you could readily understand, if it were not for your unwarranted assumption that the ordering you to Leavenworth must necessarily have been done as a *punishment* for some *fault*. I thought then, and think yet, the position assigned to you is as responsible, and as honorable, as that assigned to Buell—I know that General McClellan expected more important results from it. My impression is that at the time you were assigned to the new Western Department, it had not been determined to replace General Sherman in Kentucky; but of this I am not certain, because the idea that a command in Kentucky was very desirable, and one in the farther West undesirable, had never occurred to me. You constantly speak of being placed in command of only 3,000. Now tell me, is this not mere impatience? Have you not known all the while that you are to command four or five times that many?

I have been, and am sincerely your friend; and if, as such, I dare to make a suggestion, I would say you are adopting the best possible way to ruin yourself. “Act well your part, there all the honor lies.” He who does *something* at the head of one regiment, will eclipse him who does *nothing* at the head of a hundred.

Your friend, as ever, A. LINCOLN.

It became apparent that the division of the Department of the West had been a mistake, and on March 11, 1862, the two commands were reunited under Halleck, and Hunter was sent to command a new Department, that of the South, composed of Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina.

The division of feeling concerning the action of the Government in regard to Frémont tended to foment other disorders, and to create other and further political divisions, and to render life in Missouri not worth living, for there was no escape from the political complications which equally affected men and women, churches, Sabbath Schools, and even made its appearance with-

in the sanctity of the family circle, and at the family altar. Men who had been sworn friends for a half century suddenly became bitter and unrelenting enemies. Later, when the Rebel army had been driven from the State, the Rebels of Missouri, who had not had the courage and manhood to enter the army, resorted to guerrilla warfare. They infested sparsely populated neighborhoods, stole horses, murdered defenseless and unarmed men and women, plundered banks, and committed acts even more reprehensible, making life in the rural districts of Missouri as wretched and uncomfortable as was possible. The culmination of these atrocities took place in the raid on Lawrence, Kan., on August 21, 1863, by which all the men in the place were cruelly massacred. Stores were pillaged and burned, and kindred disorders were perpetrated.

Governor Gamble got up an effective State militia, and soon cleared the State of guerrillas; and General Thomas Ewing, Jr., commanding at Kansas City, issued Order 409 requiring citizens of the border counties to leave their farms and resort to the towns, where they were kept under surveillance, and thus debarred the privilege of harboring and secreting guerrillas at their homes. General Ewing was a brother-in-law to General Sherman and had been his law partner. Although he was a son of Thomas Ewing, the old veteran Whig statesman, he was nevertheless a candidate for Vice-President at the Democratic convention in New York in 1868, and was defeated chiefly by an exhibition of this order No. 409, which Frank Blair, the successful candidate for the position, had procured, duplicated, and circulated among the rebel delegates, of whom

Forrest, the hero of the massacre at Fort Pillow, was one of the most highly honored.

General Curtis of Iowa was put in command, succeeding Halleck. After a brief and stormy career, he was removed in the spring of 1863, and General J. M. Schofield put in his place. Schofield got into trouble at once; there was an irreconcilable hostility and rivalry between the two Union factions in Missouri, and no commander could please both sides.

In July the Missouri State Convention passed an act amending the Constitution, barring slavery after July 4, 1870. That gave great offense to the Radical party, who desired immediate emancipation, and political excitement became more intense than ever. In September, an immense mass convention was held in Jefferson City, at which a committee was appointed to visit the President, to obtain a change in the military policy, and other executive action. Likewise a Committee of Public Safety was appointed to organize and arm the loyal men of the State and, failing to interest the President in their behalf, to call on the people in their sovereign capacity to "take such measures of redress as the emergency of the case might require;" in other words, a counter-revolution was proposed. And this committee of one hundred of the leading citizens of Missouri, headed by Charles D. Drake, later eminent as a U. S. Senator and Chief Judge of the Court of Claims, visited the President, and forcibly stated their demands, having besides the moral courage or impudence to present resolutions censuring the President "for closing his ears to the just, loyal, and patriotic demands of the Radical party, while he endorsed the disloyal

and oppressive demands of Governor Gamble, General Schofield and their adherents."

The President heard them respectfully and patiently; and on October 5 presented them a letter in which he said:

We are in civil war. In such cases there always is a main question, but in this case that question is a perplexing compound—Union and slavery. It thus becomes a question not of two sides merely, but of at least four sides, even among those who are for the Union, saying nothing of those who are against it. Thus, those who are for the Union *with*, but not *without slavery*; those for it *without*, but not *with*; those for it *with* or *without*, but prefer it *with*; and those for it *with* or *without*, but prefer it *without*.

Among these, again, is a subdivision of those who are for *gradual*, but not for *immediate*; and those who are for *immediate*, but not for *gradual* extinction of slavery.

It is easy to conceive that all these shades of opinion, and even more, may be sincerely entertained by honest and truthful men. Yet, all being for the Union, by reason of these differences, each will prefer a different way of sustaining the Union. At once, sincerity is questioned, and motives are assailed. Actual war coming, blood grows hot, and blood is spilled. Thought is forced from old channels into confusion. Deception breeds and thrives. Confidence dies, and universal suspicion reigns. Each man feels an impulse to kill his neighbor, lest he be killed by him. Revenge and retaliation follow. And all this, as before said, may be among honest men only. 'But this is not all. Every foul bird comes abroad, and every dirty reptile rises up. These add crime to confusion. Strong measures deemed indispensable but harsh at best, such men make worse by maladministration. Murders for old grudges, and murders for pelf, proceed under any cloak that will best serve for the occasion.

These causes amply account for what has occurred in Missouri, without ascribing it to the weakness or wickedness of any general. The newspaper files, those chroniclers of current events, will show that the evils now complained of were quite as prevalent under Frémont, Hunter, Halleck, and Curtis, as under Schofield.

Accordingly the President sustained General Schofield and Governor Gamble in their respective administrations. The disorder continuing, however, on January 24, 1864, he substituted General Rosecrans for Schofield. This, however, did not end the strife—in fact, it continued until the close of the war, and even afterwards.

CHAPTER VII

THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL McCLELLAN

ALL this while troops were pouring into Washington, where they were organized, equipped, and drilled by General McClellan and his staff of officers with great expedition. The 50,000 soldiers, of whom the "Young Napoleon" took command on July 27, swelled in three months to 168,318, with more troops on the way. Yet by a strange paradox General McClellan became pessimistic in just the ratio of the increase of his army. On taking command he wrote enthusiastically to his wife: "I find myself in a new and strange position here; President, Cabinet, General Scott, and all deferring to me. By some strange operation of magic I seem to have become the power in the land." Then he became panic-stricken over the increase of the enemy, acquiring the hallucination that the Confederate forces in Virginia, which were really about one-third his own, greatly outnumbered the Army of the Potomac.

On August 4 he presented to the President his plan of campaign, which was the same as the "Anaconda" plan of General Scott, already indorsed by the Government, except that he would thin the coil which was to surround the Confederacy in all other parts but where he was

in command, which portion he proposed to swell to the enormous aggregate of 273,000 men.

On August 16 he wrote to his wife: "I am here in a terrible place; the enemy have from three to four times my force; the President, the old general [Scott] cannot or will not see the true state of affairs . . . [but] Providence is aiding me by heavy rains which are swelling the Potomac, which may be impassable for a week; if so, we are saved."

On September he wrote to War Secretary Cameron demanding that his army be reënforced at once "by all the disposable troops that the East and West and North can furnish," as well as "the whole of the regular army," and the choicest of its officers. So loath was he to act on the offensive until he had what he considered the proper number of troops, that he permitted the enemy unmolested to put their batteries on the Virginia bank of the Potomac, and so to cut off transportation by water to and from the national capital.

Indeed, the first battle of McClellan's new command occurred not by his intention. On the evening of October 20 Brigadier-General Charles P. Stone sent troops under the command of Colonel Edward D. Baker, Lincoln's old comrade, who had resigned from the Senate to enter the army, across the Potomac into Virginia near Leesburg, to make a reconnaissance in force. They met the enemy at Ball's Bluff. Baker was a man of fiery courage, and, though he had orders to retire if advisable, he bravely resisted the enemy's attack, with the result that he was killed while rallying his fleeing troops, and nearly all of his command was captured.

General Stone was made a scapegoat for the defeat, being incarcerated for six months in Fort Lafayette on the absurd charge of treason. General McClellan's prestige was even increased by the disaster, which revealed the prowess of the enemy, and thereby justified the Union commander's policy of careful preparation to meet him.

On November 1 McClellan's ambition was realized by the retirement of the "old general," Scott, who with Lincoln "could not or would not see the true state of affairs," and by his own elevation to the vacant position of chief commander. While General Scott gave his advanced age and physical infirmities as his reason for resigning, the real cause was his indignation at McClellan's treatment of him in "going over his head" to the War Department, and even ignoring his positive orders. McClellan's treatment of his chief had not passed without reproof from the veteran. At a Cabinet meeting held in September, at the headquarters of General Scott, the President asked what was the number of troops. McClellan, who was present, said he had no reports with him, and did not know. As the meeting was breaking up, General Scott said that he wished to talk to McClellan, and desired the President and Cabinet to remain and hear. McClellan had his hand on the knob of the door, about to leave the room, and seemed very much embarrassed by the situation. Scott then said:

You are perhaps aware, General McClellan, that you were brought to these headquarters by my advice, and by my orders, after consulting the President. I knew you to be intelligent, and to be possessed of some excellent military qualities, and after our late disaster,

it appeared to me that you were a proper person to organize and take active command of the army. I brought you here for that purpose. Many things have been, as I expected they would be, well done, but in some respects I have been disappointed. You do not seem to be aware of your true position, and it was for this reason I desired that the President and these gentlemen should hear what I have to say. You are here upon my staff, to obey *my* orders, and should daily report to *me*. This you have failed to do, and you appear to labor under the mistake of supposing that you, and not I, am General-in-Chief, and in command of all the armies. I, more than you, am responsible for military operations, but since you came here, I have been in no condition to give directions, or to advise the President, because my Chief-of-Staff neglects to make reports to me. I cannot answer simple inquiries which the President or any member of his Cabinet makes, as to the number of troops here. They must go to the State department, and not come to military headquarters for that information.

At a later period the General-in-Chief thus lectured his overweening subaltern.

You are too intelligent and too good a disciplinarian not to know your duties and the proprieties of military intercourse. You seem to have misapprehended your right position. I, you must understand, am General-in-Chief; you are my Chief-of-Staff. When I brought you here, you had my confidence and friendship. I do not say you have yet lost my confidence entirely. Good-by, General McClellan.

But these appeals made no impression, and did not cause any change to occur in McClellan's treatment of the old hero. The general was approaching senility, and McClellan was satisfied that, if he continued his contemptuous neglect and cavalier treatment, the general would ask to be relieved.

The plan worked to a charm. The old veteran

had great pride of character; had been conventionally honored and affectionately revered by all the juniors, except McClellan, and his temperament and the premonitory symptoms of second childhood made the ingratitude of McClellan especially bitter to his soul.

Nothing that McClellan did or omitted to do exhibits his character in a more somber shade than this unworthy treatment of General Scott. No other officer of the army, no matter how *brusque* and unamiable as a rule, failed to entertain and exhibit a profound respect for the grandest military hero of our history after Washington; it was a duty incumbent on junior officers to recognize and obey him, and all but McClellan not only did this, but they deemed it a privilege to honor and revere him as well. Now these requirements applied with tenfold force to McClellan, for Scott had passed by all other officers of the army, of whom there were many in and about Washington at that time, and singled out McClellan to achieve the most brilliant destiny of that era, had he been *true*. The now attenuated coterie which can still excuse the shortcomings of McClellan's career should not be oblivious to the facts that, at the start, he had the very best wishes and sympathy of Abraham Lincoln, Winfield Scott, Edwin M. Stanton, William D. Kelley and men closely approaching them in character; and that these early realized the methods and animus of McClellan, so that, in less than ninety days from the commencement of his brilliant career, McClellan had lost the support of all those who might be considered above him in power, except Lincoln. By Lincoln's sufferance alone he remained in power a year. Had the matter been

left to Scott, Stanton, Lincoln's Cabinet, or the Committee on the Conduct of the War, McClellan's inglorious career would have terminated at least eight months earlier than it did.

The head of the army, kept indoors by illness and the infirmities of age, chafed vainly at the supercilious and cavalier treatment accorded to him by his ambitious junior. Unable to endure it longer, on the 31st of October, 1861, Scott took leave of the army. And the President, attended by his entire Cabinet, waited on the distinguished patriot, and assured him of the appreciation of the Administration of his worth and patriotism, and with reluctance parted with him, and placed him on the retired list of the army.

My judgment was and is that, if Winfield Scott had been twenty years younger, or if he had not carried about British lead in his body for nearly a half century, or if the gout had left him alone so that his body had been equal to his valor and military prowess, he would have marched into Richmond at the head of a victorious army almost as promptly as he marched in military array to the City of Mexico.

McClellan now began to employ the same tactics with the "obstructionist" who still remained his superior—President Lincoln. Lincoln had great faith in the young general, and a friendly regard that even promised to develop into affection. He personally called at McClellan's headquarters a number of times early in November, and placed himself at the General's service. These visits were abruptly terminated by the rudeness of McClellan, who, returning one evening to his house and finding that the President was waiting for him in the drawing-room,

slipped upstairs and went to bed. On another occasion McClellan failed to appear at a conference arranged between the President, McClellan, General O. M. Mitchel, and Governor Dennison, of Ohio. As reported by General Mitchel's son and aide, F. A. Mitchel, either General Mitchel or Governor Dennison commented upon the disrespect shown to the President by McClellan absenting himself, whereupon Lincoln remarked, "Never mind; I will hold McClellan's horse if he will only bring us success."

While the President refrained for a time from further personal visits upon General McClellan, he continued to offer him suggestions by letter. Early in December he did so in the form of hypothetical inquiries about a forward movement of the Army of the Potomac by the road from Alexandria to Richmond, to which McClellan contemptuously responded with studied brevity and restraint of confidence, saying: "I have now my mind actively turned toward another plan of campaign that I do not think at all anticipated by the enemy nor by many of our own people."

This forward movement was further delayed by McClellan's illness about the beginning of the year. Because of this inaction the President was greatly cast down.

General Irvin McDowell has described this despondent condition of the President in a memorandum of a visit he made him on January 10, 1862. This account was submitted to the President in 1864 by Henry J. Raymond, who desired to use it in his "Life of Abraham Lincoln." The President indorsed upon it: "See nothing for me to object to in the narrative . . . except the phrase attributed to me of *the Jacobinism of*

Congress, which phrase I do not remember using literally or in substance, and which I wish not to be published in any event."

General McDowell's account is in part as follows :

Repaired to the President's house at eight o'clock P.M. Found the President alone. Soon after, we were joined by Brigadier-General Franklin, the Secretary of State, Governor Seward, the Secretary of the Treasury, and the Assistant Secretary of War [Thomas A. Scott]. The President was greatly disturbed at the state of affairs. Spoke of the exhausted condition of the Treasury; of the loss of public credit; of the Jacobinism in Congress; of the delicate condition of our foreign relations; of the bad news he had received from the West, particularly as contained in a letter from General Halleck on the state of affairs in Missouri; of the want of coöperation between General Halleck and General Buell; but, more than all, the sickness of General McClellan.

The President said he was in great distress, and, as he had been to General McClellan's house, and the General did not ask to see him, and as he must talk to somebody, he had sent for General Franklin and myself, to obtain our opinion as to the possibility of soon commencing active operations with the army of the Potomac.

To use his own expression, if something was not soon done, the bottom would be out of the whole affair; and if General McClellan did not want to use the army he would like to "*borrow it*," provided he could see how it could be made to do something.

As a result of this consultation, and of succeeding conferences at which General McClellan, who had recovered from his illness, and other officers were present, and in connection with his study night and day of strategical works and reports of the military situation, Mr. Lincoln issued the

PRESIDENT'S GENERAL WAR ORDER NO. 1.

JANUARY 27, 1862.

Ordered, That the 22d day of February, 1862, be the day for a general movement of all the land and naval forces of the United States against the insurgent forces. That especially the army at and about Fortress Monroe; the Army of the Potomac; the Army of Western Virginia; the army near Munfordville, Ky.; the army and flotilla at Cairo, and a naval force in the Gulf of Mexico, be ready to move on that day.

That all other forces, both land and naval, with their respective commanders, obey existing orders for the time, and be ready to obey additional orders when duly given.

That the heads of departments, and especially the Secretaries of War and of the Navy with all their subordinates, and the general-in-chief, with all other commanders and subordinates of land and naval forces, will severally be held to their strict and full responsibilities for prompt execution of this order.

Taken in connection with the recent appointment of a man of proved executive ability as Secretary of War, this assumption of military leadership by the President inspired new hope in the country and filled the soldiers of the field, impatient for advance, with high enthusiasm.

Three days later this was supplemented by the

PRESIDENT'S SPECIAL WAR ORDER NO. 1.

JANUARY 31, 1862.

Ordered, That all the disposable force of the Army of the Potomac, after providing safely for the defense of Washington, be formed into an expedition for the immediate object of seizing and occupying a point upon the railroad southwestward of what is known as Manassas Junction, all details to be in the discretion of the commander-in-chief, and the expedition to move before or on the 22d day of February next.

This special order was in direct conflict with General McClellan's plan. Accordingly, on February 3, the President wrote him the following letter:

MY DEAR SIR: You and I have distinct and different plans for a movement of the Army of the Potomac—yours to be down the Chesapeake, up the Rappahannock to Urbana, and across land to the terminus of the railroad on the York River; mine to move directly to a point on the railroads southwest of Manassas.

If you will give me satisfactory answers to the following questions, I shall gladly yield my plan to yours:

First. Does not your plan involve a greatly larger expenditure of time and money than mine?

Second. Wherein is a victory more certain by your plan than mine?

Third. Wherein is a victory more valuable by your plan than mine?

Fourth. In fact, would it not be less valuable in this, that it would break no great line of the enemy's communications, while mine would?

Fifth. In case of disaster, would not a retreat be more difficult by your plan than mine?

In reply General McClellan, with his exaggerated view of the enemy's strength, vehemently opposed attacking him at Manassas with its "strong line of defense enabling him to remain on the defensive, with a small force on one flank, while he concentrates everything on the other for a decisive action." Instead he urged the advantages of his own plan, whereby he expected to cut off the enemy in detail, take Richmond, and end the war.

By direction of the President, General McClellan called a council of war of twelve general officers, who voted 8 to 4 in favor of McClellan's plan. Accordingly the President abandoned his

plan and set heartily to work promoting the execution of McClellan's.

Congress, as indicated by the protest of its Committee on the Conduct of the War, and the country in general, which had come to distrust its former military hero, "the young Napoleon," for his inaction, were greatly displeased and disheartened by the President's relinquishment of the helm of military policy he had seized with so vigorous a hand, especially since his "Plan of Campaign" (see p. 195) had already resulted in signal victories.

The descent upon the Atlantic coast was inaugurated by the expedition of Flag-Officer Silas H. Stringham and Major-General Butler against Forts Hatteras and Clark commanding Hatteras Inlet, the main entrance to Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds off the coast of North Carolina. These forts were surrendered on August 29, to the great joy of Union men not only in the North but in North Carolina. At the suggestion of the President a meeting was held in New York early in November to take measures to relieve the loyalists of Hatteras who had suffered by the blockade. George Bancroft, the distinguished historian and statesman, presided at the meeting. He reported its action to the President on November 15, in a letter which closed with the following paragraph:

Your administration has fallen upon times which will be remembered as long as human events find a record. I sincerely wish to you the glory of perfect success. Civil War is the instrument of Divine Providence to root out social slavery. Posterity will not be satisfied with the result unless the consequences of the war shall effect an increase of free States. This is the universal expectation and hope of men of all parties.

To this Lincoln replied on the 18th :

The main thought in the closing paragraph of your letter is one which does not escape my attention, and with which I must deal in all due caution, and with the best judgment I can bring to it.

On October 29 an expedition under Captain Samuel F. DuPont and General Thomas W. Sherman sailed from Fortress Monroe against Port Royal, S. C., a harbor between Charleston and Savannah, commanded by Forts Beauregard and Walker. These forts were captured on November 7, and with them fell into Federal possession, to quote from General Sherman's report, "the whole coast from the North Edisto to Warsaw Sound," and "a network of waters, an inland water communication, running all the way from Charleston to Savannah."

On January 7 General McClellan gave General Ambrose E. Burnside command of the newly created Department of North Carolina. Acting in conjunction with a fleet of twenty vessels under Lieutenant Louis M. Goldsborough, on February 8 Burnside captured Roanoke Island which, dividing Albemarle and Pamlico Sounds, commanded both of these inland waters. Five forts, 32 guns, 300 stands of arms, and 2,700 men were taken. Two days later the entire Confederate fleet in North Carolina waters was destroyed near Elizabeth City. Thereafter the fortified places on the North Carolina coast were reduced one by one—New Berne on March 14, and Beaufort on April 26, being the most considerable conquests. An advance from the coast on Goldsboro, which commanded the railroad running southward from Richmond, was contem-

plated, but abandoned in July, when the disasters of McClellan in Virginia forced him to call Burnside's troops to his aid.

During the month of March a combined military and naval expedition under Flag-Officer Samuel F. DuPont and General H. G. Wright, operating from Port Royal, occupied all the Atlantic coast from that harbor south to St. Augustine.

Appalling disaster, however, was threatened in Virginia waters. In the destruction of the Gosport Navy Yard at Norfolk, Va., the United States steam-frigate *Merrimac* had been burned and sunk. The Confederates raised the hull, which, together with her engines, was found to be capable of restoration, and converted her, at the Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond, into an ironclad with a heavy ram, which they named the *Virginia*. At noon, on Saturday, March 8, she steamed out of the James River accompanied by five armed vessels, two steam tugs and three side-wheel steamers, into Hampton Roads. Three United States wooden frigates, the *Minnesota*, *St. Lawrence*, and *Roanoke*, lying at Fortress Monroe, went out to meet her, but were grounded, owing to unusually low water. Two other wooden frigates, the sailing vessel *Congress*, and the *Cumberland*, at Newport News, remained to give battle. They proceeded bravely against the steel-scaled and steel-nosed leviathan with no hope of victory. The *Virginia* met the *Cumberland* first, rammed her, and, as she was sinking, poured into her wooden hull a hail of iron metal. The devoted vessel answered broadside with broadside until the last gun was submerged, and ship and crew sank beneath the

waves. With her iron ram torn off in the encounter, and two guns put out of action, the *Virginia* then attacked the *Congress*. Knowing that her comrade's fate awaited her if she resisted, the Union vessel ran ashore where the Confederate destroyer could not follow. Nevertheless the *Virginia* was able to reach her with her guns, which soon silenced those of the *Congress* and forced her to surrender. The Union vessel caught fire, which reached the magazine, causing an explosion which destroyed her. The *Virginia* and her consorts anchored for the night under protection of the Rebel shore-batteries at Sewell's Point, the head of the Norfolk channel. During the night tugs managed to pull the *St. Lawrence* and *Roanoke* off the shoals, and take them back to Fortress Monroe. But the *Minnesota* could not be moved, and remained awaiting her fate on the morrow.

The Cabinet at Washington met early next morning in utter despair of saving the seaboard cities of the Union. To prevent the approach of the impenetrable war-monster to Washington, orders were given to sink loaded canal-boats in the Potomac channel. Yet so little time remained for this measure that Secretary Stanton predicted that that very Cabinet meeting might be terminated by a shell fired into the room from the *Virginia*.

However, the salvation of the Union had already been assured by the provident policy of the President and his faithful and efficient Secretary of the Navy, Gideon Welles, upon whose recommendations the special session of Congress had appropriated \$1,500,000 for experiment in constructing the best possible form of the ironclad,

which naval experts foresaw was the coming type of war-vessel. The board of officers to whom the matter was intrusted had decided upon a vessel "invulnerable to shot, and of light draught," had adopted three plans of such an iron-clad, and had ordered a vessel to be constructed in accordance with each plan. One vessel, that according to the plan of John Ericsson, of New York, an inventor, of Swedish birth, had been completed, and was on her way to Hampton Roads, at the time of the destruction of the *Cumberland* and *Congress*. She arrived in tow on Saturday night under command of Lieutenant John L. Worden, and took her station near the grounded *Minnesota*.

The *Monitor*, as the new invention was modestly named, was 127 feet over all, 36 feet in beam, and 12 feet draught, and with closed deck rising but a few feet above the water-line. She was symmetrically shaped fore and aft, each end terminating in a steel point for ramming. In the center rose a cylindrical turret nine feet high and twenty feet in diameter, which revolved, enabling the two 11-inch Dahlgren guns it carried upon one side to be wheeled around after firing and recharged in safety in the lee of the storm of war. The term popularly applied to it, "a cheesebox on a raft" very aptly describes its appearance.

The *Virginia* was four times the *Monitor* in bulk and displacement, and had five times the number of guns. When on Sunday morning the two iron-clads approached each other to give battle the contrast presented was that of a giant and pygmy, an inevitable comparison which appeared in all reports of the battle. The duel lasted three hours; while the fire of each was

comparatively ineffective, the lighter draught and greater mobility of the little *Monitor* enabled her to tire out her big antagonist in a contest of endurance, and the *Virginia*, leaking badly, at last was forced to retire.

This was the last battle of the *Virginia*. When the Confederates abandoned Norfolk on May 10, 1862, as the result of the evacuation of Yorktown on May 3, they burned the Gosport Navy Yard, and also beached and blew up the *Virginia* on May 11. It was also the *Monitor's* last battle. In December, 1862, while being towed around Cape Hatteras by the *Rhode Island* to join in the conquest of the Southern coast, she foundered in a gale, her crew, however, having been transferred before she sank to the *Rhode Island*. She was commemorated in the most fitting of monuments—the creation of a fleet of ironclads built after her model and bearing her name as a generic designation.

On the day preceding the battle of the *Virginia* and *Monitor*, the President had issued two general war orders, Nos. 2 and 3. No. 2 divided that part of the Army of the Potomac intended to advance upon Richmond into four army corps, commanded respectively by Major-General Irvin McDowell and Brigadier-Generals E. V. Sumner, S. P. Heintzelman, and E. D. Keyes, and provided that a reserve be left for the defense of Washington under Brigadier-General James S. Wadsworth. It also ordered the formation of a fifth army corps from the troops of Brigadier-General Shields and Major-General Nathaniel P. Banks in the Shenandoah Valley and placed General Banks in its command. Order No. 3 gave more specific directions for the defense

of the capital, and the capture of the enemy's batteries upon the Potomac between Washington and Chesapeake Bay. Special War Order No. 3 was issued by the President on March 11. It relieved General McClellan from chief command of all the armies, retaining him only as the head of the Army of the Potomac. It consolidated the commands of Generals Halleck and Hunter and the western part of Buell's into the Department of the Mississippi, under Halleck. It created a third department out of the eastern part of Buell's command and West Virginia, which was designated as the Mountain Department, and was placed under the command of Major-General Frémont.

In most leisurely fashion McClellan conducted through April the siege of Yorktown, the first place to be reduced in his plan of campaign against Richmond. He refused to be hurried by the Government at Washington, which was exceedingly anxious that no time should be permitted the enemy to concentrate its forces against him. Instead, he clamored for reënforcements. In reply, President Lincoln wrote him on April 9, stating that the troops left to defend Washington were already reduced below the limit of safety, and questioning McClellan's low estimate of the strength of his forces. The letter closed as follows:

I suppose the whole force which has gone forward to you is with you by this time; and if so, I think it is the precise time for you to strike a blow. By delay the enemy will relatively gain upon you—that is, he will gain faster by fortifications and reënforcements than you can by reënforcements alone.

And once more let me tell you it is indispensable

to you that you strike a blow. I am powerless to help this. You will do me the justice to remember I always insisted that going down the bay in search of a field, instead of fighting at or near Manassas, was only shifting and not surmounting a difficulty; that we would find the same enemy and the same or equal intrenchments at either place. The country will not fail to note—is noting now—that the present hesitation to move upon an intrenched enemy is but the story of Manassas repeated.

I beg to assure you that I have never written you or spoken to you in greater kindness of feeling than now, nor with a fuller purpose to sustain you, so far as in my most anxious judgment I consistently can; but you must act.

During the first two weeks of April General McClellan delayed storming Yorktown, although, according to the testimony of its Confederate commander, Major-General John B. Magruder, it could easily have been captured. On April 17 General Joseph E. Johnston took command of the Confederate forces, 53,000 strong as opposed to 133,000 Federal troops investing Yorktown. Valuing every day's delay, he determined to hold the place until McClellan should at last feel himself strong enough to assail it, and then retire before the overwhelming numbers. On May 3, finding that McClellan's batteries were ready to open on him, Johnston evacuated Yorktown with his forces. McClellan on the 4th telegraphed to Washington of his "victory."

The President and Secretaries Chase and Stanton determined to visit the seat of war and observe conditions for themselves. They arrived at Fortress Monroe on May 6. By the President's orders the fleet made an attack on May 8 upon the Confederate batteries at Sewell's Point, during which the President and his party saw the

Virginia retire before the approach of the *Monitor*. It was observed that Sewell's Point, defended by the ironclad, was too strong to be taken.

The President, after talking with the pilot and studying a chart of the waters, selected a place where a landing might be made, and here on May 10 General Wool debarked with 6,000 men, and marched upon Norfolk. This precipitated the evacuation of both Sewell's Point and Norfolk, and the destruction of the *Virginia*, which the Confederates had already determined upon when Yorktown fell. Secretary Chase, who was with Wool, received the surrender of Norfolk, and the President and Stanton next day visited the captured town, passing the ruined hulk of the *Virginia* on the way. "So," wrote Chase, with excusable extravagance to his daughter, "has ended a brilliant week's campaign of the President; for I think it quite certain that if he had not come down, Norfolk would still have been in possession of the enemy, and the *Merrimac* as grim and defiant and as much a terror as ever. The whole coast is now virtually ours."

McClellan was caught napping by Johnston's sudden retreat from Yorktown, and there was much confusion in the pursuit. While McClellan remained at Yorktown preparing an advance on Richmond up the James River, General Joseph Hooker came upon the Confederate rear-guard under General James Longstreet at Williamsburg, and hotly engaged him during the forenoon of May 5. Owing to an entire lack of support, Hooker was beaten back. In the afternoon General Winfield S. Hancock regained the lost ground; this General McClellan, who arrived

late in the day, was satisfied to hold, fearing the "superior force" of the enemy. Accordingly, Johnston reached Richmond in good order on the 17th, and occupied the strong intrenchments before that city.

McClellan protested vigorously to the Government against the organization of the army as determined by the President in the General War Order No. 2, ascribing to it the lack of success in the Williamsburg engagement. In reply the President, who was still at Fortress Monroe, sent an order authorizing him to adopt the organization he desired, but accompanied it with a private letter of frank criticism:

I ordered the army corps organization not only on the unanimous opinion of the twelve generals whom you had selected and assigned as generals of division, but also on the unanimous opinion of every military man I could get an opinion from (and every modern military book), yourself only excepted. Of course I did not on my own judgment pretend to understand the subject. I now think it indispensable for you to know how your struggle against it is received in quarters which we cannot entirely disregard. It is looked upon as merely an effort to pamper one or two pets and to persecute and degrade their supposed rivals. I have had no word from Sumner, Heintzelman, or Keyes. The commanders of these corps are of course the three highest officers with you, but I am constantly told that you have no consultation or communication with them; that you consult and communicate with nobody but General Fitz-John Porter and perhaps General Franklin. I do not say these complaints are true or just, but at all events it is proper you should know of their existence. Do the commanders of corps disobey your orders in anything?

When you relieved General Hamilton of his command the other day, you thereby lost the confidence of at least one of your best friends in the Senate. And here let me say, not as applicable to you personally,

that senators and representatives speak of me in their places as they please without question, and that officers of the army must cease addressing insulting letters to them for taking no greater liberty with them.

But to return. Are you strong enough—are you strong enough, even with my help—to set your foot upon the necks of Sumner, Heintzelman, and Keyes all at once? This is a practical and very serious question for you.

The success of your army and the cause of the country are the same, and of course I only desire the good of the cause.

McClellan at once proved the truth of the President's criticism that he made favorites of Porter and Franklin by reforming the army into two provisional corps and placing these officers in command. At the earnest request of McClellan for reënforcements, the President, who was now back in Washington, ordered General McDowell to march upon Richmond with 35,000 or 40,000 men by the shortest route. "McDowell," wrote Secretary Stanton to McClellan on May 18, "is sent forward to coöperate in the reduction of Richmond, but charged in attempting this not to uncover the city of Washington; and you will give no order, either before or after your conjunction, which can put him out of position to cover this city."

However, General McDowell and his troops were forced to be retained where they were owing to circumstances that are indicated in the following telegram of May 24 to General Halleck who, like McClellan, was crying for reënforcements:

Several dispatches from Assistant Secretary Scott and one from Governor Morton asking reënforcements for you have been received. I beg you to be assured

we do the best we can. I mean to cast no blame when I tell you each of our commanders along our line from Richmond to Corinth supposes himself to be confronted by numbers superior to his own. Under this pressure we thinned the line on the upper Potomac, until yesterday it was broken at heavy loss to us, and General Banks put in great peril, out of which he is not yet extricated, and may be actually captured. We need men to repair this breach, and have them not at hand. My dear general, I feel justified to rely very much on you. I believe you and the brave officers and men with you can and will get the victory at Corinth.

On the same day the President telegraphed McDowell at Fredericksburg to move with 20,000 men for the Shenandoah for the purpose of capturing Jackson and Ewell, who was at that moment fighting Banks near Winchester. General McDowell obeyed the order with alacrity, at which the President expressed by telegraph his gratification, saying: "The change (of plans) was as painful to me as it can possibly be to you or to anyone."

On the following day, with shrewd inference of what is now known to have been the real situation at Richmond, the President telegraphed to McClellan:

The enemy is moving north in sufficient force to drive General Banks before him—precisely in what force we cannot tell. He is also threatening Leesburg and Geary, on the Manassas Gap Railroad, from both north and south—in precisely what force we cannot tell. I think the movement is a general and concerted one, such as would not be if he was acting upon the purpose of a very desperate defense of Richmond. I think the time is near when you must either attack Richmond or give up the job and come to the defense of Washington. Let me hear from you instantly.

Later in the day the President telegraphed

McClellan more detailed information: that Banks, weakened by the detail of a part of his forces for the march on Richmond, was retreating in probable rout to Martinsburg; and that two other Confederate forces of 10,000 each, one of them led by Stonewall Jackson, were pressing forward in the same direction. "Stripped bare, as we are here," said the President, "it will be all we can do to prevent them crossing the Potomac at Harper's Ferry or above." McDowell and Frémont, he continued, were moving to get in the enemy's rear. "If McDowell's force," his telegram concluded, "was now beyond our reach we should be utterly helpless. Apprehension of something like this, and no unwillingness to sustain you, had always been my reason for withholding McDowell's force from you. Please understand this and do the best you can with the force you have."

On May 21 forces under General McClellan had arrived at the Chickahominy about ten miles east of Richmond, and McClellan set to work with energy and enthusiasm to solve the difficult engineering problem of quickly bridging a river which had a swamp on either bank, and was liable to sudden freshets. The work was completed in little more than a week, and on the 30th Johnston was informed that two of McClellan's original five army corps had crossed the river. The Confederate general resolved to attack them next morning. A heavy rainstorm in the night, which he hoped would prevent the crossing of more Federal troops, encouraged him in the project. One of the Federal divisions was at Seven Pines on the left (east) and the other at Fair Oaks on the right (west). By night Johnston had driven

back the left division toward the river. The right, however, retained its position, having been reënforced by General Sumner from the opposite bank, who with soldierly promptitude, as soon as he heard firing, had anticipated in his preparations the order to cross the river, and, marching his men over a bridge that was on the point of sweeping away, and through thick mud, had come in the nick of time to the rescue. On June 1 the battle was renewed with General Robert E. Lee in Confederate command, General Johnston having been severely wounded in the first day's battle. The Federal right regained its position. At two o'clock in the afternoon Lee stopped his attack, and at night withdrew his disheartened troops to Richmond.

Increasing rain prevented further Federal troops from crossing the river, and both divisions employed themselves intrenching. General Lee set to work to organize and reënforce his army for the desperate conflict which he saw before him.

In the meanwhile the President was arduously engaged in the active duties of Commander-in-Chief of the Army, which had devolved upon him after General McClellan's reduction from the general command. His particular concern was the critical situation in the Shenandoah Valley, the danger of which he and Secretary Stanton seemed alone to realize. Even the officers in the field lightly regarded the Confederate movement down the valley. McDowell, whom the President ordered to strike eastward from Fredericksburg and follow after Jackson, thought that, by the time he reached the valley, the enemy would have retired. Nevertheless he was prompt in sending

on the mission a detachment under Brigadier-General James Shields, Lincoln's old-time antagonist in his one "affair of honor," who had proved himself in the Mexican War a soldier of courage and ability. Shields was even contemptuous of his task, boasting that he could thrash Jackson without assistance and asking disrespectfully if he could do anything else for the President.

On the 30th of May Shields was at the place appointed, Fort Royal, in advance of the time set, ready to intercept Jackson, whose advance had been blocked at Harper's Ferry, if he should retreat in that direction. It was Frémont, who had been ordered to block the other possible line of Jackson's retreat, that failed to appear at his station, which was Harrisonburg in the Shenandoah Valley. Indeed, believing that Jackson would remain before Harper's Ferry, he deliberately disobeyed instructions, and proceeded north by the more convenient valley to the west of the Shenandoah Mountains. When this action was discovered at Washington, there was still time for him to intercept Jackson, who had not yet begun his retreat, lower down the valley at Strasburg, and the President ordered him to do so. Still acting upon his own judgment, Frémont gave his troops an entire day of rest, and, in consequence, arrived at Strasburg just after Jackson's rear-guard had passed through it in retreat. Had Frémont occupied the place the day before, Jackson would have been caught between three commands each equal in size to his own: Frémont's in front, the pursuing column of Banks, and Shields's detachment twelve miles to the east. A few weeks after this (on June 26) the Army of

Virginia was formed from the commands of Frémont, Banks, and McDowell, and placed under General John Pope. Frémont refused to serve under one who had been his subordinate (when he commanded the Department of the West), and was relieved from duty.

In place of Shields's division, which had been put "terribly out of shape, out at elbows, and out at toes," by the campaign against Jackson, as Lincoln wrote McClellan on June 15, the President sent the importunate commander of the Army of the Potomac 10,000 new recruits, and as many more old troops from Fortress Monroe, where General Wool was replaced by General John A. Dix. "Doubtless," wrote Mr. Lincoln, "the battles and other causes have decreased you half as much in the same time; but then the enemy have lost as many in the same way. I believe I would come and see you were it not that I fear my presence might divert you and the army from more important matters."

On the 18th the President telegraphed McClellan the report that Lee had sent 10,000 to 15,000 reënforcements to Jackson. "This," said he, "is as good as a reënforcement to you of an equal force." He asked McClellan what day he could attack Richmond. McClellan promptly replied that the army were about to advance at once, and that this would undoubtedly bring on a general engagement, since "the enemy exhibit at every point a readiness to meet us. They certainly have great numbers and extensive works," he added; and he drew an inference directly contrary to the President's hopeful deduction from the fact of Jackson's reënforcement, saying that it illustrated Lee's strength and

confidence. Lincoln replied on the 19th, giving another alternative to McClellan's deduction:

If large reënforcements are going from Richmond to Jackson, it proves one of two things: either that they are very strong at Richmond, or do not mean to defend the place desperately.

McClellan soon learned that Jackson was coming to the aid of Lee rather than lessening Lee's forces, and foregoing his former logic, and accepting Lincoln's, he clamored even more loudly than before for reënforcements. To this appeal the President replied on June 26:

Your dispatch suggesting the probability of your being overwhelmed by 200,000, and talking of where the responsibility will belong, pains me very much. I give you all I can, and act on the presumption that you will do the best you can with what you have, while you continue, ungenerously I think, to assume that I could give you more if I would. I have omitted and shall omit no opportunity to send you reënforcements whenever I possibly can.

The Federal army had now advanced within four miles of Richmond. On the afternoon of the 26th the Confederates made a desperate attack on the Union position at Beaver Dam Creek, held by Porter, and were repulsed with great loss. As Longstreet, one of the Confederate commanders testified, they were thoroughly demoralized. Yet McClellan abandoned this strong position, which could easily have been further strengthened by reënforcements, and ordered Porter to retire to a more protected place, where McClellan evidently considered reënforcements were not needed, for, on the morrow, when Porter was again attacked by almost the entire Southern

army, he sent no troops to his aid until late in the day, when he ordered Slocum's division to support him. This was the Battle of Gaines's Mill, or the Chickahominy. Lee commanded his army in person. Porter, thinking that the purpose of his chief was to enter Richmond with the rest of his troops while the enemy was thus engaged, fought the unequal contest bravely and serenely, and at nightfall retired in good order, having inflicted a loss equal to his own on the enemy.

But McClellan was deterred from his march to Richmond by the demonstration made against him by Magruder with a comparatively small force, which the apprehension of McClellan magnified into a greater one than that attacking Porter. Accordingly he changed his base to the James, to approach the Confederate capital from that quarter. On the 29th Sumner repulsed Magruder at Allen's Farm, and, later in the day, he and Franklin completely defeated him at Savage's Station, opening the way for a direct advance on Richmond, but they were compelled to fall back by McClellan's orders. Again the golden opportunity was lost, when on the next day Franklin held his position at Glendale against a fierce attack by Longstreet and A. P. Hill, for if the Union forces had been concentrated here, in the opinion of military strategists, Richmond must have fallen.

On July 1 came the general engagement to which events had been leading. Lee, inferring from its successive retirements from strong positions that his enemy was demoralized, drove the whole force of his army in charge after charge upon the strong position of the Union army on

Malvern Hill, without effect and with fearful loss to himself. It would have been an easy matter for McClellan on the morrow to have put to rout the broken enemy, but, persisting in his view of the superior force of Lee, he gave the order instead to retire to Harrison's Landing on the James, where supplies could be readily landed for a siege of the city.

On the day after the battle of Gaines's Mill McClellan wrote a bitter letter to Secretary Stanton, casting the blame upon the Government. It closed as follows:

I only wish to say to the President that I think he is wrong in regarding me as ungenerous when I said that my force was too weak. . . . I know that a few thousand more men would have changed this battle from a defeat to a victory. As it is, the Government must not and cannot hold me responsible for the result. I feel too earnestly to-night; I have seen too many dead and wounded comrades to feel otherwise than that the Government has not sustained this army. If you do not do so now, the game is lost. If I save this army now, I tell you plainly that I owe no thanks to you or to any other persons in Washington. You have done your best to sacrifice this army.

Recognizing the sincerity of this letter, the President overlooked its insolence and insubordination. He answered it, promising to send reinforcements as rapidly as possible. He said:

I have not said you were ungenerous for saying you needed reinforcements. I thought you were ungenerous in assuming that I did not send them as fast as I could. I feel any misfortune to you and your army quite as keenly as you feel it yourself. If you have had a drawn battle, or a repulse, it is the price we pay for the enemy not being in Washington. We protected Washington, and the enemy concentrated on you. Had we stripped Washington, he would have

been upon us before the troops could have gotten to you. Less than a week ago you notified us that reënforcements were leaving Richmond to come in front of us. It is the nature of the case, and neither you nor the Government are to blame.

On the same day the President telegraphed to Halleck to send 25,000 of his troops by the nearest route to Richmond. Burnside in North Carolina was also ordered to contribute all the troops he could spare without abandoning his position, and as a result was forced to give up his expedition against Goldsboro, the important railroad centre, on the eve of almost certain success. At the same time Lincoln wrote to Secretary Seward his view of the situation, taking that shrewd political counselor into confidence upon the raising of more troops, a matter which required the greatest discretion:

The evacuation of Corinth and our delay by the flood in the Chickahominy have enabled the enemy to concentrate too much force in Richmond for McClellan to successfully attack. In fact there soon will be no substantial rebel force anywhere else. But if we send all the force from here to McClellan, the enemy will, before we can know of it, send a force from Richmond and take Washington. Or if a large part of the western army be brought here to McClellan, they will let us have Richmond, and retake Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, etc. What should be done is to hold what we have in the West, open the Mississippi, and take Chattanooga and East Tennessee without more. A reasonable force should in every event be kept about Washington for its protection. Then let the country give us a hundred thousand new troops in the shortest possible time, which, added to McClellan directly or indirectly, will take Richmond without endangering any other place which we now hold, and will substantially end the war. I expect to maintain this contest until successful, or till I die, or am con-

quered, or my term expires, or Congress or the country forsake me; and I would publicly appeal to the country for this new force were it not that I fear a general panic and stampede would follow, so hard it is to have a thing understood as it really is. I think the new force should be all, or nearly all, infantry, principally because such can be raised most cheaply and quickly.

On June 30 the President solved the question of calling for more soldiers without causing a panic by getting the loyal State Governors to sign a request that more troops be raised, the request being dated back a few days. In accordance with this "spontaneous demand," on July 1, the President called for 300,000 troops—three times the number he had suggested to Secretary Seward as sufficient—assigning to each State its quota. On the 2d he wrote General McClellan in answer to his insistent demand for 50,000 reënforcements to be sent him at once, to be patient, hold his position, and wait for the new levy. On the 3d he offered to all the Governors a reduction in their quota if they hurried forward enough troops to sum up 50,000, which he believed to be sufficient reënforcements to end the war substantially in two weeks.

General McClellan had for some time been preparing a statement of his "general views concerning the existing state of the rebellion," which, he confessed, did not "strictly come within the scope of his official duties." This, on July 7, he laid before the President. In the course of this lecture on executive policy he said:

A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present armies. The policy of the Government must be supported by concen-

trations of military power. The national forces should not be dispersed in expeditions, posts of occupation, and numerous armies; but should be mainly collected into masses and brought to bear upon the armies of the Confederate States. Those armies thoroughly defeated, the political structure which they support would soon cease to exist.

In carrying out any system of policy which you may form, you will require a commander-in-chief of the army; one who possesses your confidence, understands your views, and who is competent to execute your orders by directing the military forces of the nation to the accomplishment of the objects by you proposed. I do not ask that place for myself. I am willing to serve you in such position as you may assign me, and I will do so as faithfully as ever subordinate served superior.

I may be on the brink of eternity, and as I hope forgiveness from my Maker, I have written this letter with sincerity towards you and from love for my country.

On July 8 the President visited General McClellan at his headquarters before Richmond, and catechised him and his corps commanders most searchingly concerning the numbers, health, etc., of their forces, the position and condition of the enemy, safety of retreat from Richmond, and the maintenance of the present position before it. Returning to Washington, he adopted General McClellan's suggestion about appointing a Commander-in-Chief, but did not choose the man for the place whom the adviser had in mind. It was the captor of Corinth that was selected rather than the befooled strategist before Richmond. On the 11th the President issued an order assigning Major-General Henry W. Halleck "to command the whole land forces of the United States, as General-in-Chief," and ordering him to repair as soon as possible to the capital.

In order to prevent misunderstanding of the military situation, the President determined to take the public into his confidence. He seized the opportunity presented by a Union meeting at the capital on August 6 to make an address, in which he confirmed the general rumor of disagreement between General McClellan and Secretary Stanton, and at the same time dispelled the panic fear which was spreading among the people because of the rumor, by showing how natural and inevitable was the clash between two public servants who were equally zealous in performing their duties, the one by increasing his particular army, the other by conserving all the Union forces and preventing waste of the nation's greatest resources, the lives of its citizen-soldiers.

Said Mr. Lincoln:

Sometimes we have a dispute about how many men General McClellan has had, and those who would disparage him say that he has had a very large number, and those who would disparage the Secretary of War insist that General McClellan has had a very small number. The basis for this is, there is always a wide difference . . . between the grand total on McClellan's rolls and the men actually fit for duty; and those who would disparage him talk of the grand total on paper, and those who would disparage the Secretary of War talk of those present fit for duty. General McClellan has sometimes asked for things that the Secretary of War did not give him. General McClellan is not to blame for asking for what he wanted and needed, and the Secretary of War is not to blame for not giving when he had none to give. And I say here, as far as I know, the Secretary of War has withheld no one thing at any time in my power to give him. I have no accusation against him. I believe he is a brave and able man, and I stand here, as justice requires me to do, to take upon myself what has been charged on the Secretary of War, as withholding from him.

Halleck, upon assuming the general military command, visited the Army of the Potomac on the James. Upon his return to Washington he ordered its withdrawal from Richmond, and its union with the newly created Army of Virginia under Pope. This was not accomplished until late in August.

Pope, in taking his new command, had aroused the enmity of McClellan and his subordinates by an address in which he instituted a contrast between the aggressive methods of the Western commanders and the defensive tactics of the Eastern. By thus rendering harmonious action between himself and his future coadjutors impossible he prepared his own downfall.

Pope set out vigorously to drive back Jackson in order to aid McClellan's withdrawal from Richmond. Banks, one of his three corps commanders, attacked Jackson at Cedar Mountain on August 9 so impetuously that, impressed by the Union strength, two days later the Confederate general withdrew to the Rapidan, whither Lee sent Longstreet with 54,000 men to oppose Pope's advance on Richmond. In view of this force, which was greater than his own, Pope in turn withdrew behind the Rappahannock, and for eight days prevented the Confederates from crossing that river. Lee then sent Jackson around to the left to break Pope's line of communications. This Jackson did by occupying Manassas Junction. Pope saw the opportunity afforded by Jackson's separation from Longstreet to effect Jackson's capture. While he confronted the "Stonewall Brigade" with his main army, and while McDowell was holding back Longstreet, Pope ordered Porter to attack Jackson on the right and rear.

This Porter did not do. Pope in anger ordered him to report in person with his command next morning. This Porter did, and, in the afternoon of that day, August 30, without waiting for Franklin's corps, approaching from Alexandria with culpable slowness, Pope resolved on a decisive battle. Erroneously thinking that Jackson's was the stronger of the two Confederate divisions, he threw his main force against the position which Jackson had taken near the site of the first battle of Bull Run, and so permitted Longstreet, really the more powerful of his opponents, to crush the Union attack from the side with his batteries. Disastrously defeated, Pope retreated to Centreville. On the morrow Lee did not follow up his victory with a direct attack, but pursued his favorite tactics by sending Jackson to flank the Union right wing. Pope was prepared for this, and repulsed him at Chantilly, though with the loss of two brave and efficient Union generals, Philip Kearny and Isaac I. Stephens.

Pope, attributing Porter's disobedience and Franklin's delay to hostility against him, asked consent of Halleck to withdraw the army to the intrenchments before Washington, where it could be reorganized. This was granted, and the retreat was safely accomplished. A court-martial was instituted, and it cashiered Porter for disobedience. Porter justified himself for failing to obey his superior's order by the lateness of the hour when he received it, and by the strength and nearness, unsuspected by Pope, of Longstreet. After a contest of a quarter of a century he was reinstated in command. It developed that Franklin's slowness in reënforcing

Pope had been due to McClellan's inertia, if not to his positive disinclination to assist his fellow commander.

Owing to the discord between its commanders, and the lack of confidence of its soldiers in their leaders, the army was thoroughly demoralized. And, by a strange paradox, the man who was chiefly responsible for this situation was the only one that could restore the army's *morale*. The President realized this, and, against the advice of almost all his ministers, on September 2 placed General McClellan in charge of the defense of Washington. McClellan justified the appointment by setting to work "like a beaver," as Lincoln expressed it, and within five days he had the army in excellent shape even to take the offensive.

On September 3 General Pope at his own request was relieved from command of the Army of Virginia. He was assigned to the Department of the Northwest, where shortly afterwards he completely quelled an insurrection of the Minnesota Indians.

Lee crossed the Potomac near Leesburg, Va., on September 4-7, and encamped near Frederick, Md., intending to move northward into Pennsylvania, and choose the field upon which to fight a decisive battle with McClellan. He was deceived, however, in his expectations that Maryland would rise in revolt against the Union, and "cast from her neck the tyrant's heel" when the opportunity for doing so was afforded. Instead, he found the State inimical to him as an invader of its soil. Furthermore, the Federal Government did not withdraw in panic its garrison from Harper's Ferry, as he had hoped it would. Accordingly

he sent a division under Jackson to capture Harper's Ferry, and for greater safety crossed the Blue Ridge to Boonesboro with the rest of his army. In the meantime McClellan was marching toward Frederick, very slowly, in spite of the proddings of the President, who, informed that the movement of Jackson was a retreat across the Potomac, was anxious that the enemy should not "get off without being hurt." On the 13th McClellan arrived at Frederick, where he had the good fortune to discover Lee's entire plan of campaign. Instead of striking the divided Confederate Army at once, however, he waited till the morrow, by which time the rear-guard of the Jackson division was able to hold back for a day the Federal detachment sent under Franklin to the relief of Harper's Ferry, by a stubborn resistance at Crampton's Gap, and so to enable Jackson to rejoin Lee, who was hastening south to the meeting, his rear-guard having held back for a day the Federal detachment sent against him, by sharp resistance at Turner's Gap. Another day was lost by McClellan's slowness, and on the 17th both armies were arrayed against each other at Antietam Creek, near Sharpsburg, Lee having succeeded in uniting all his forces, and obtaining the advantage of position on the field of contest. McClellan with superior numbers won the battle which ensued by brute strength, losing about 12,000 killed and wounded to Lee's 11,000. On the 18th and 19th the Confederate general withdrew his broken army, reduced to less than three-fourths of the numbers with which he had invaded Maryland, across the Potomac, entirely unmolested. The "hurt" which McClellan had given him was severe, but

not the completely disabling blow which the President had expected, and which such a commander as Grant, had he been in McClellan's place, would have inflicted upon the demoralized enemy in its retreat.

The failure of General McClellan to crush General Lee's army when it was in his power, and so to end the war in the East, caused a murmur to run throughout the country that McClellan and his officers were deliberately prolonging the conflict for purposes of their own. Color was given to this rumor by the reply of an officer, Major John K. Key, brother of a colonel upon General McClellan's staff, to the inquiry of Major Levi C. Turner, a judge-advocate, "Why was not the Rebel army bagged immediately after Antietam?" Key answered: "That is not the game. The object is that neither army shall get much advantage of the other, that both shall be kept in the field till they are exhausted, when we will make a compromise and save slavery." This conversation was reported directly to the President, and, bringing its participants before him on September 27, he secured from Key an acknowledgment that his sentiments had been correctly reported. Thereupon the President dismissed Major Key from the service.

About two months later Mr. Key, affected by the recent loss of a son in the army, wrote a pleading letter to the President protesting his loyalty, which he thought had been impugned by his dismissal. The President replied, expressing sympathy with him in the death of his "brave and noble son," and expressly disclaiming that he had charged Mr. Key with disloyalty. The reason for the dismissal he gave as follows:

I had been brought to fear that there was a class of officers in the army, not very inconsiderable in numbers, who were playing a game to not beat the enemy when they could, on some peculiar notion as to the proper way of saving the Union; and when you were proved to me, in your own presence, to have avowed yourself in favor of that "game," and did not attempt to controvert the proof, I dismissed you as an example and a warning to that supposed class.

General McClellan remained north of the Potomac demanding reënforcements of men and horses, and more equipments and supplies in order to drive Lee southward, for the Confederate general, in seeming contempt for his opponent, held his ground near the Potomac, and, indeed, early in October, sent his most dashing cavalry general, J. E. B. Stuart, on a raid into Maryland, which successfully encompassed the entire Northern Army. The Federal Government faithfully fulfilled, so far as it was able, the demands made upon it, but McClellan complained that he did not receive all the reënforcements which, it was told him, were sent forward. Lincoln, in despair, remarked, "Sending men to that army is like shoveling fleas across a barnyard; not half of them get there," and early in October went to the front to observe conditions for himself. There he found over 100,000 men, fully equipped and ready for action. But their commander turned aside all of the President's suggestions for an immediate forward movement. Sorrowfully remarking to a friend, "They call it the Army of the Potomac, but it is only McClellan's bodyguard," Lincoln left the great encampment, and returned to Washington, with the resolution, it would appear from his subse-

quent correspondence with General McClellan, to stir him to action, and, if he failed to respond, to replace him with a more energetic commander.*

On October 6, through Halleck, the President ordered McClellan "to cross the Potomac, and give battle to the enemy, or drive him south." "Your army," said Halleck, "must move now, while the roads are good. . . . You will immediately report what line you adopt and when you intend to cross the river."

In response to this peremptory order, McClellan urged the impossibility of supplying the army on its advance until certain pending arrangements were completed. To this Lincoln sharply replied on October 13 as follows:

You remember my speaking to you of what I called your overcautiousness. Are you not overcautious when you assume that you cannot do what the enemy is constantly doing? Should you not claim to be at least his equal in prowess, and act upon the claim?

As I understand, you telegraphed General Halleck that you cannot subsist your army at Winchester unless the railroad from Harper's Ferry to that point be put in working order. But the enemy does now subsist his army at Winchester, at a distance nearly twice as great from railroad transportation as you would have to do without the railroad last named. He now waggons from Culpeper Court-House, which is just about twice as far as you would have to do from Harper's Ferry. He is certainly not more than half as well provided with waggons as you are. I certainly should be pleased for you to have the advantage of the railroad from Harper's Ferry to Winchester; but it wastes all the re-

* General Keyes related an almost identical conversation as occurring between the President and himself at Harrison's Landing, when McClellan was besieging Richmond.

mainder of autumn to give it to you, and, in fact, ignores the question of *time*, which cannot and must not be ignored.

Again, one of the standard maxims of war, as you know, is, "to operate upon the enemy's communications as much as possible, without exposing your own." You seem to act as if this applies *against* you, but cannot apply in your *favor*. Change positions with the enemy, and think you not he would break your communication with Richmond within the next twenty-four hours? You dread his going into Pennsylvania. But if he does so in full force, he gives up his communications to you absolutely, and you have nothing to do but to follow and ruin him; if he does so with less than full force, fall upon and beat what is left behind all the easier.

Exclusive of the water line, you are now nearer Richmond than the enemy is by the route that you *can* and he *must* take. Why can you not reach there before him, unless you admit that he is more than your equal on a march? His route is the arc of a circle, while yours is the chord. The roads are as good on yours as on his. . . . I say "try"; if we never try, we shall never succeed. If he make a stand at Winchester, . . . I would fight him there, on the idea that if we cannot beat him when he bears the wastage of coming to us, we never can when we bear the wastage of going to him. . . . We should not so operate as to merely drive him away. As we must beat him somewhere, or fail finally, we can do it, if at all, easier near to us than far away. If we cannot beat the enemy where he now is, we never can, he again being within the intrenchments of Richmond. Recurring to the idea of going to Richmond on the inside track, the facility of supplying from the side away from the enemy is remarkable, as it were, by the different spokes of a wheel, extending from the hub towards the rim, and this whether you move directly by the chord, or on the inside arc, hugging the Blue Ridge more closely. . . . I should think it preferable to take the route nearest the enemy, disabling him to make an important move without your knowledge, and compelling him to keep his forces together for dread of you. The gaps [in the Blue Ridge] would enable you to attack if you should wish. For a great part of the way you would be practically between

the enemy and both Washington and Richmond, enabling us to spare you the greatest number of troops from here. When, at length, running to Richmond ahead of him enables him to move this way, if he does so, turn and attack him in the rear. But I think he should be engaged long before such point is reached. It is all easy if our troops march as well as the enemy, and it is unmanly to say they cannot do it. This letter is in no sense an order.

McClellan still delayed obeying the President's instructions, wasting in his camp week after week of fine marching weather. To promptings from Washington he made excuse after excuse. Finally, on his report of October 24, that his horses were unfit for duty, he was cuttingly rebuked by the President, who telegraphed: "Will you pardon me for asking what the horses of your army have done since the battle of Antietam that fatigues anything?"

As in the promulgation of his emancipation policy (see p. 254), Lincoln in despair resorted to the lot of events. He decided to remove McClellan if Lee safely escaped behind the Blue Ridge. By November 1 the Army of the Potomac had crossed the river whence it received its name, and behind whose protection its long retirement had tinged with satire the appellation. Thereupon Lee began his retreat and by November 5 was at Culpeper Court House far to the east of the Blue Ridge. The President thereupon issued an order replacing General McClellan with Major-General Burnside, who had won the honor by his successful campaign in North Carolina. At the same time he replaced Major-General Porter with Major-General Hooker. General McClellan retired to

private life, shortly to reappear in public affairs as the Presidential candidate of the opposition party.

The magnanimity of the great President did not end with McClellan's expulsion from the army, but the succeeding year Mr. Lincoln sent a message to him that if he, McClellan, would preside at a Union meeting to be held in Union Square, New York, and make a Union speech, he, Lincoln, would stand aside at the next election, and do all in his power to make McClellan his successor; to this McClellan agreed in writing and the meeting was arranged, but McClellan backed out just before the meeting was held, and then denied ever having promised to preside. He probably thought it would be distasteful to the "peace-at-any-price" crowd which held him in hand.

CHAPTER VIII

BURNSIDE, HOOKER, AND MEADE

GENERAL AMBROSE E. BURNSIDE was, through the instrumentality of General McClellan, his classmate, made cashier of the Illinois Central Railroad Company, at Chicago, at the same time that McClellan was vice-president and chief engineer, and I was brought frequently in contact with him in an official capacity. He was a man of commanding presence, then as always thereafter, and equally affable, courteous, and accommodating. During the war, it chanced that I was on duty in the city (Cincinnati) where he had his headquarters, and my acquaintance with him was renewed, and to it was added the acquaintance and friendship of his staff officers, which I esteemed to be a great honor, as well as a great pleasure. General Burnside in my judgment was fully as accomplished, valiant, and efficient a soldier as Hooker or Meade, but lacked self-confidence. The President considered that he was not properly supported by Hooker and some others. When Burnside, with extreme reluctance and self-distrust, took command of the Army of the Potomac on November 8, he promptly formulated a plan of movement which he wrote out and sent to the War Department on the succeeding day. It was, in general terms:

to make a feint of moving to the southwest of Warrenton on Culpeper or Gordonsville, under cover of which he would advance his army to, and capture Fredericksburg; then, making that fine strategic point a base of operation, and Aquia Landing a base of supplies, to operate on that line against Richmond. This plan was foredoomed to failure. Lacking the engineering ability of McClellan, Burnside had opposed to him the greatest engineer of the Confederacy, if not, indeed, of the war, General Robert E. Lee, entrenched in the strongest fortifications. Had Burnside's appointment been made before Antietam, with his superior forces and energetic tactics he would undoubtedly have annihilated the Confederate general in pitched battle on the open fields of Maryland and in the retreat of the demoralized enemy through the valleys of northwestern Virginia. Burnside recommended the division of the army into three parts: right, left, and centre, each under command of the senior generals, Sumner, Franklin, and Hooker respectively.

To this plan the Government acceded, and professed faith in its success provided he moved rapidly, and General Halleck, the Commander-in-chief and General Meigs, the Quartermaster-General, at once visited his headquarters and had a full and satisfactory conference about it. As an indispensable part of the plan a pontoon train should have been started from Washington for Falmouth at once, and the General supposed it had been ordered by Halleck, but, on account of a misunderstanding, it was not started till the 19th, or one week from the time it was ordered, and did not reach the army till the 25th. The

evidence indicates no fault on the part of General Burnside, but must be charged to apathy, indifference, red tape, and inherent difficulties at Washington. Meanwhile the army was put in motion and Sumner reached Falmouth, opposite Fredericksburg, on the 17th, and found no pontoon train. The army was therefore compelled to lie there and wait for the pontoons, and it was not till the 10th day of December that these were finally laid. The army moved across on the 11th and 12th. On the 13th the Federal forces, led by their bravest generals, charged upon the fortifications, and were beaten back with fearful loss. At last the reserves under "Fighting Joe Hooker," who had protested against the waste of life in the impossible attempt, were sent against the works. They fought desperately, even attempting to rush the Confederate batteries on Marye's Heights in a bayonet charge. Beaten back with a loss of one man in four, they withdrew at dusk.

Since Hooker had advised against the attack, Burnside believed that he had been half-hearted in it, and so determined to lead a charge in person on the morrow. From this he was dissuaded by his other division generals, Sumner and Franklin, and on the night of the 15th he withdrew across the river.

In his report to the Government on the 17th, General Burnside assumed all the blame for the disaster. The President, in acknowledgment of his manly spirit and in congratulation of the bravery of his troops, wrote, on December 22, the following:

CONGRATULATIONS TO THE ARMY OF THE
POTOMAC:

I have just read your commanding general's report of the battle of Fredericksburg. Although you were not successful, the attempt was not an error, nor the failure other than accident. The courage with which you, in an open field, maintained the contest against an intrenched foe, and the consummate skill and success with which you crossed and recrossed the river in the face of the enemy, show that you possess all the qualities of a great army, which will yet give victory to the cause of the country and of popular government.

The country, in the midst of high hopes of good fortune under the new commander of the Army of the Potomac, was appalled by this defeat, greater than any disaster of McClellan's; a mutinous spirit spread in the army itself, many officers resigning, and many privates deserting; even the generals voiced their censure, General Hooker denouncing the President as well as General Burnside for the defeat, and saying that nothing would go well until the country had a dictator.

In the face of this universal disapproval, Burnside determined to go ahead with his plan of campaign. Thereupon, on January 1, 1863, the President wrote to the General-in-chief, Halleck, requesting him to confer with Burnside and his officers upon it, and, by approving or disapproving it, assume the responsibility for results. He closed his letter with the sentence, "Your military skill is useless to me if you do not do this."

Halleck, offended by the harshness of the President's tone, offered his resignation. Mr. Lincoln, feeling himself in the wrong, withdrew

his letter, whereupon General Halleck consented to remain in his position.

Finding that his general officers were opposed to the forward movement which commended itself to his judgment, General Burnside offered to the President on January 5 the choice of indorsing the movement or accepting his resignation. To this General Halleck replied, approving the movement, but leaving Burnside to decide upon the "time, place, and character" of crossing the Rappahannock. This letter the President indorsed, saying:

I deplore the want of concurrence with you in opinion by your general officers, but I do not see the remedy. Be cautious, and do not understand that the Government or country is driving you. I do not yet see how I could profit by changing the command of the Army of the Potomac; and if I did, I should not wish to do it by accepting the resignation of your commission.

The march to Banks's Ford, where it was intended to cross the river, was made on January 21. Rain began to fall, rendering the ground so muddy that it became impassable for wagons and artillery, and the expedition had to return to camp, amid the jeers of the soldiers.

Stung by the criticisms of General Hooker and others of his subordinates, General Burnside, on January 23, again offered an alternative to the President—the dismissal of the offending officers or the acceptance of his resignation. This time the President accepted the resignation, appointing Burnside to the Department of Ohio, with headquarters at Cincinnati.

In spite of General Hooker's insubordination, the President felt that, more than any other

officer, he possessed the confidence of the Army of the Potomac, and therefore, on January 25, appointed him as its head. Next day he sent him a letter frankly criticising his unsoldierly conduct towards General Burnside and the Government. It read:

GENERAL: I have placed you at the head of the Army of the Potomac. Of course I have done this upon what appear to me to be sufficient reasons, and yet I think it best for you to know that there are some things in regard to which I am not quite satisfied with you. I believe you to be a brave and skilful soldier, which of course I like. I also believe that you do not mix politics with your profession, in which you are right. You have confidence in yourself, which is a valuable if not an indispensable quality. You are ambitious, which, within reasonable bounds, does good rather than harm; but I think that during General Burnside's command of the army you have taken counsel of your ambition and thwarted him as much as you could, in which you did a great wrong to the country and to a most meritorious and honorable brother officer. I have heard, in such a way as to believe it, of your recently saying that both the army and the Government needed a dictator. Of course it was not for this, but in spite of it, that I have given you the command. Only those generals who gain success can set up dictators. What I now ask of you is military success, and I will risk the dictatorship. The Government will support you to the utmost of its ability, which is neither more nor less than it has done and will do for all commanders. I much fear that the spirit which you have aided to infuse into the army, of criticising their commander and withholding confidence from him, will now turn upon you. I shall assist you as far as I can to put it down. Neither you nor Napoleon, if he were alive again, could get any good out of an army while such a spirit prevails in it; and now beware of rashness. Beware of rashness, but with energy and sleepless vigilance go forward and give us victories.

General Halleck and Secretary Stanton de-

sired the appointment of General Rosecrans, instead of that of General Hooker, to the command of the Army of the Potomac, but it was probably with the unfortunate appointment of General Pope in mind that the President chose a commander who already possessed the confidence of his officers and men. General Hooker was greatly moved by the President's letter reproving him for his treatment of his predecessor. "He talks to me like a father," he said; "I shall not answer the letter until I have won him a great victory."

He set to work with enthusiasm disciplining and drilling his men, until, when spring opened, it was with reason that he called his army "the finest on the planet."

On April 11 he presented to the President his plan of campaign against Richmond. On this Lincoln indorsed the very cogent criticism:

My opinion is that, just now, with the enemy directly ahead of us, there is no eligible route for us into Richmond; and consequently a question of preference between the Rappahannock route and the James River route is a contest about nothing. Hence our prime object is the enemy's army in front of us, and is not with or about Richmond at all unless it be incidental to the main object.

What then? The two armies are face to face with a narrow river between them. Our communications are shorter and safer than are those of the enemy. For this reason we can, with equal powers, fret him more than he can us. I do not think that by raids towards Washington he can derange the Army of the Potomac at all. He has no distant operations which can call any of the Army of the Potomac away; we have such operations which may call him away, at least in part. While he remains intact, I do not think we should take the disadvantage of attacking him in his intrenchments; but we should continually harass and menace him, so

that he shall have no leisure nor safety in sending away detachments. If he weakens himself, then pitch into him.

By the 30th of April Hooker had crossed both the Rappahannock and the Rapidan above Fredericksburg under cover of a feigned attack below the town by three army corps under General John Sedgwick. Hooker did not pursue the advantage of this surprise, but on May 1 advanced cautiously toward Lee from Chancellorsville, a small town lying about ten miles west of Fredericksburg.

At night Hooker, in the words of General Lee, his opponent, "assumed a position of great natural strength, surrounded on all sides by a dense forest, filled with a tangled undergrowth, in the midst of which breastworks of logs had been constructed, with trees felled in front, so as to form an almost impenetrable abatis. His artillery swept the few narrow roads by which his position could be approached from the front, and commanded the adjacent woods." However, the extreme right of the line, under General Oliver O. Howard, was unprotected. Around this, on the 2d, Jackson made a forced march, and late in the afternoon took the right wing of the army in reverse, driving it in confusion toward the center. In his ardor General Jackson rode ahead of his men, and, turning to rejoin them, was killed from a shot from one of his own soldiers. General J. E. B. Stuart succeeded him. On the morning of the 3d Stuart attacked desperately the compacted front before him near the Chancellor House, which formed Hooker's headquarters. As Hooker was standing on the ve-

randa, a cannon ball struck one of the pillars and hurled it against him. For some time he lay unconscious, and it would appear that he did not thoroughly recover his wits during the day. Certainly his orders were the reverse of what was to be expected of a general with his militant sobriquet. He withdrew from his strong position which his troops were bravely and successfully defending, and clearly indicated to the soldiers that he was preparing to retreat over the river, by reforming them in an arc in front of the United States Ford below the junction of the Rapidan and Rappahannock. He had already ordered Sedgwick, who had made the attack on the east which deceived Lee, to march to his aid through Fredericksburg.

Hooker complained that Sedgwick failed to obey his order with all possible energy and dispatch, and this charge was sustained by an investigation by a committee of Congress. Military opinion, however, has generally exonerated Sedgwick. He had to fight his way by flanking movements through Fredericksburg, and on the 3d at Salem Church, on the road to Chancellorsville, he had a pitched battle with the Confederate rear-guard, reënforced by the main army. He continued fighting on the 4th, and then, finding his advance was blocked, crossed the river by Hooker's permission. Hooker that night held a council of war with his division commanders, the result of which was that the army withdrew across the river on the 5th.

As soon as the President heard the sad tidings of this second disaster to the Army of the Potomac, he and Halleck took a steamer to Hooker's headquarters. Arriving there in the gener-

al's absence, he wrote him the following note, assuring him of confidence and coöperation:

The recent movement of your army is ended without effecting its object, except, perhaps, some important breakings of the enemy's communications. What next? If possible, I would be very glad of another movement early enough to give us some benefit from the fact of the enemy's communication being broken; but neither for this reason nor any other do I wish anything done in desperation or rashness. An early movement would also help to supersede the bad moral effect of the recent one, which is said to be considerably injurious. Have you already in your mind a plan wholly or partially formed? If you have, prosecute it without interference from me. If you have not, please inform me, so that I, incompetent as I may be, can try and assist in the formation of some plan for the army.

On his return to Washington, the President telegraphed encouraging news to General Hooker, informing him of General Grant's capture of Grand Gulf; of Federal cavalry raids near Richmond, that, on the information of an exchanged prisoner, could have easily captured the city had the raiders known its weakness, there being "not a sound pair of legs in Richmond;" and of a captured despatch of General Lee telling of the "fearful loss" he had sustained in the recent battle.

General Hooker replied to the President's note intimating that he was contemplating a forward movement as soon as he had tested the temper of his troops. He wrote again on the 13th, explaining his delay, and saying that he hoped to be able to commence his movement upon the morrow. To this the President replied that, "the enemy having reëstablished his communications, regained his positions, and actually received reën-

forcements," any attempt of Hooker's to cross the Rappahannock at this time was not practicable. He advised the general to hold the enemy at bay with occasional attacks and cavalry raids, and to put his own army in good condition. If, however, Hooker believed he could succeed at the intended movement, the President would not restrain him. But, said Lincoln, "bearing upon this last point, I must tell you that I have some painful intimations that some of your corps and division commanders are not giving you their entire confidence. This would be ruinous, if true, and you should therefore, first of all, ascertain the real facts beyond all possibility of doubt."

Upon this hint it was easy for Hooker to discover who were the offending officers. Yet, because of the more active disloyalty he had shown toward Burnside, he was compelled to exercise forbearance and discretion instead of taking drastic action, as Burnside had proposed. Thereby, while he did not prevent his downfall, he delayed it.

By the first of June it became apparent that Lee was contemplating another invasion of the North. On the 5th of the month General Hooker advised the President that in the case of such a movement the enemy ought to be attacked in the rear at Fredericksburg. Lincoln turned over the proposition to Halleck for consideration, and in the meantime gave it as his opinion to Hooker that such an attack was inadvisable. He said, using a characteristic simile:

I would not take the risk of being entangled upon the river, like an ox jumped half over a fence and liable to be torn by dogs front and rear without a fair chance to gore one way or kick the other. If

Lee would come to my side of the river, I would keep on the same side, and fight him or act on the defense, according as might be my estimate of his strength relatively to my own.

While this correspondence was going on the Confederate movement was already in progress, following the south bank of the Rappahannock up toward the Blue Ridge. It was headed by the strong force of the Confederate cavalry. Against this Hooker sent his cavalry under Generals Alfred Pleasonton and David McM. Gregg. Pleasonton met the enemy at Brandy Station before Gregg arrived, and engaged him fiercely, forcing the Confederate movement to change its course westward into the Shenandoah Valley. Feeling that Washington was less immediately threatened, Hooker proposed to march directly upon Richmond, trusting to be able to hurry his troops back after the capture of the Confederate capital in time to save the Federal. But the President would not agree to this. On the 10th he telegraphed Hooker:

If you had Richmond invested to-day, you would not be able to take it in twenty days; meanwhile your communications, and with them your army, would be ruined. I think Lee's army, and not Richmond, is your objective point. If he comes toward the upper Potomac, follow on his flank and on his inside track, shortening your lines while he lengthens his. Fight him, too, when opportunity offers. If he stays where he is, fret him and fret him.

Hooker's plan was one that Lee hoped he would attempt, since the Confederate general was ready to risk the capture of Richmond for the chance of taking Washington. He had already expressed his willingness to "swap queens" in the

game of war. It was the wearing down of his lesser strength by equal losses on both sides, such as Lincoln's plan involved, that Lee dreaded.

Through his foolhardiness, Major-General Robert H. Milroy, commanding a Federal detachment at Winchester in the Shenandoah Valley, allowed himself to be surrounded on the 13th. On the 14th the President telegraphed Hooker:

So far as we can make out here, the enemy have Milroy surrounded at Winchester and Tyler at Martinsburg. If they could hold out a few days, could you help them? If the head of Lee's army is at Martinsburg and the tail of it on the plank road between Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville, the animal must be very slim somewhere. Could you not break him?

But Milroy had already been driven back with heavy loss. On the 15th the Confederate van under Ewell was crossing the Potomac at Williamsport. The President immediately called for 100,000 militia from Maryland, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and West Virginia to serve for six months. On the 16th he wrote to Hooker, who was complaining of Halleck withholding confidence and support from him, that the complaint was groundless and that the two must act in concert in the crisis that confronted the country. He said:

I believe you are aware that since you took command of the army I have not believed you had any chance to effect anything till now. As it looks to me, Lee's now returning toward Harper's Ferry gives you back the chance that I thought McClellan lost last fall. Quite possibly I was wrong both then and now; but, in the great responsibility resting upon me, I cannot be entirely silent. Now, all I ask is that you will be in such

mood that we can get into our action the best cordial judgment of yourself and General Halleck, with my poor mite added, if indeed he and you shall think it entitled to any consideration at all.

¹ Later in the day, to prevent misunderstanding, he telegraphed General Hooker, placing him in "strict military relation to General Halleck of a commander of one of the armies to the general-in-chief of all the armies."

Leaving Stuart's cavalry to obstruct the parallel advance of the Federal troops, Lee rushed the rest of his army after Ewell across the Potomac, in the vicinity of Hagerstown. Thence he marched along the rich Cumberland Valley into Pennsylvania, causing the inhabitants to flee before him. Ewell occupied Carlisle; and Early, York. Harrisburg, the State capital, was menaced, as well as other cities on the Susquehanna. Along this river the newly enlisted militia gathered to stop Lee's advance upon Philadelphia and the other Eastern cities, in all of which panic reigned.

Stuart's cavalry was entirely ineffectual in hindering Hooker, and indeed, was so harassed itself, that it failed to regain the main army either in time or condition to render much service in the decisive battle. Hooker waited to cross the Potomac until Lee's troops had all passed it; and then proceeded to follow after him. Fearing his enemy's strength, he asked Halleck to let him add to his army of pursuit the now useless garrison at Harper's Ferry. This the general-in-chief refused him. Thereupon, the date being June 27, Hooker telegraphed to Halleck that he was not able with his forces to

garrison both Harper's Ferry and Washington and at the same time fight the superior force of the enemy in front, and so he tendered his resignation. This the President at once accepted, and appointed to the vacant place Major-General George G. Meade, who by strange nemesis, had been the chief critic of Hooker among the division generals, as Hooker had formerly been of Burnside. Meade desired not to have his former chief under him, and so Hooker was sent to the West, where, in the battles about Chattanooga, he won back his old reputation as a fighting division general.

General Meade made few changes in his predecessor's plan of campaign; he compromised upon the question of adding the garrison at Harper's Ferry to his army of attack, by accepting half of it. By the 30th his left wing had crossed the Pennsylvania line, south of Gettysburg, while the right remained in Maryland thirty miles to the southwest. Learning, however, that Lee was returning to attack him, Meade determined to take up his position of defense along Pipe Creek in Maryland, near to and parallel with the State line. But on July 1, before the formation could be made, the van of Lee's forces was upon Meade's left wing, the First Corps, which, under General John F. Reynolds, was guarding the roads from Chambersburg and Hagerstown which entered Gettysburg on the west.

Reynolds realized that his duty was to check the advance of the superior forces at any cost, until Meade could bring up his troops and establish his lines of battle. Part of the cost that he paid was his own life. On his death General Abner Doubleday took command. For a time

the advantage was with the Federal troops. The Eleventh Corps then arrived on the field, and its commander, General O. O. Howard, being higher in rank, superseded Doubleday. But the Confederate forces also received accessions in the form of Ewell's and Early's cavalry, and the Eleventh Corps was beaten back through Gettysburg. It halted on Cemetery Hill, south of the town.

Meade remained in headquarters at Taneytown throughout the day, still intending to mass his army on the line of Pipe Creek for the defense of Washington and Baltimore; Manchester and Taneytown forming the extremes of the line. It would appear that this absence from a battle that was raging within his hearing did not commend itself to the army. At noon he obtained news of the death or severe wounding of Reynolds, and he sent Hancock forward to assume command and also to report to Meade if the ground was favorable for a general engagement. Hancock returned at night and reported favorably as to the field, and Meade then abandoned the idea of the Pipe Creek campaign and rode to Howard's headquarters at Cemetery Hill, reaching there at eleven o'clock at night. An immediate concentration of the army was ordered and a posting of the various divisions was begun. Howard with the Eleventh, Doubleday with the First, and Hancock with the Second, held the center. The Twelfth, under Slocum, formed the right; the Third, under Sickles, constituted the left. The Fifth, under Sykes, was posted in reserve to the right. Sedgwick, with the Sixth, was at Manchester, thirty-two miles distant from Gettysburg, and at seven o'clock in the evening

he got orders to march to Taneytown, and about nine o'clock received another order to make a forced march to Gettysburg. He reached there at 2 o'clock P. M. on the afternoon of the 2d, and was ordered in reserve to the right, taking the place of Sykes's Corps, which latter corps was then posted to the extreme left of the line. The center and headquarters were on Cemetery Hill; the right extended down to Rocky Creek, and so on to Wolf Hill; and the left reached to an eminence called Round Top. The army line was in shape like a crescent and had a great advantage of position. Meade had one hundred guns, which were under the command of General Hunt; Lee had one hundred and fifty guns.

Both sides remained on the defensive until 2.29 P. M., when Longstreet prepared to attack Sickles with his whole corps, to be followed by A. P. Hill. Sickles, having been informed of the design of Longstreet by Berhan, of the sharpshooters, who had made a reconnoissance in force, moved out further and disconnected his corps from the center, his right resting on Round Top. The battle was opened by the Rebel artillery, which was responded to by Sickles' guns, and the enemy came defiantly on with the "Rebel yell," but were met with volley after volley of grape and canister, and sent back in confusion. Another intact line, however, advanced from out of the woods, and Warren, Meade's Adjutant-General, ordered up reënforcements, which were slow in coming. Meanwhile Sickles was slowly forced back by superior numbers. At this juncture, the Fifth came up, steadied the Third, and, united, they repelled Longstreet and Hill,

but Sickles lost his leg here, and was borne off the field, Birney assuming his command.

Anderson then assailed the center; Hancock met the attack with heroic valor, being wounded in the thigh, while Gibbon was wounded in the shoulder. The Rebel onslaught was here terrific; in some instances the antagonists fought with clubbed guns, and hand-to-hand. The First and Second were thrown into confusion, when Sedgwick came up opportunely with the Sixth, relieved the ill fortunes, and repulsed the enemy with great loss. Our right had been severely drawn upon to aid the center and left; and Ewell made a furious onslaught on Slocum's extreme right, designing to turn it. After a bloody conflict, the First and part of the Sixth came and took part, repulsing the Rebels, and night closed on the scene, with Union victories throughout. All houses, barns, and outbuildings were occupied as hospitals; the floors were filled with wounded and dying, and the surgeons and nurses were busy without a moment for rest or sleep, all night, amputating legs or arms, probing for bullets, stanching wounds, administering morphine, etc. It was no unusual sight to see a soldier handing some memento or trinket, a ring, or a lock of hair, or a pistol, or a watch, or a button, to a comrade or a surgeon, with a charge to deliver it to the one he loved best. Friday morning the gallant Sickles was sent to Washington to have his leg properly attended to.

At daylight the Rebels resumed the offensive by pouring artillery charges into our ranks, and Slocum, with Humphreys's and Sykes's divisions of the Third Corps, charged resolutely upon Ewell's Corps; after a gallant contest on both

sides, for six hours, our forces prevailed, and Ewell was overpowered and the battle ceased for two or three hours. Lee was now in a desperate condition, which he determined to retrieve by a *coup-de-main* on the key to our position on Cemetery Hill, where our headquarters were. To that end, he dexterously ranged his guns to the number of an hundred, in a sort of semicircle, all bearing on the hill, and upon the stroke of one, unexpectedly to our troops, one hundred or more guns simultaneously burst forth, dealing death and destruction to the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps, who were not in battle line. Many were killed and many disabled, and every man that could escape did so, but the terrible cannonade continued for an hour and a half, being replied to by our batteries on the side hills. This terrible cannonade was kept up till four o'clock, when General Hunt slackened our fire so that the guns, which were much heated, might cool. The enemy thought they had silenced our guns permanently, and a charge under Pickett was ordered. On came the Rebels, their whole destiny being borne on the advancing banners; they were met with a terrific artillery fire from forty guns, but though mowed down, they pressed on with bravery and desperation. They crossed the Emmetsburg road, and were near to our infantry. Gibbon was in command; he watched closely, saying, "Steady, boys,—don't fire till I command." The Rebels set up the "Rebel yell," and came double-quick, with fixed bayonets. "Fire!" cried Gibbon; one simultaneous sheet of flame and smoke enveloped the whole front, and down went half the Rebels; the rest kept on, and were mowed down with

grape and canister, till it was unendurable—those who survived threw down their arms and guns and gave themselves up. A great many others of the Rebels gave up besides, and our forces were overburdened with prisoners. The Rebel loss was 25,000 killed, wounded, and missing; and 14,000 prisoners. The Union loss was 23,000 in all.

The “high-water mark” of the Rebellion was here attained; henceforth the Rebellion ebbed until the bottom was reached, at Appomattox. Had our side been vanquished as Lee’s army was, the victor would have taken his choice of marching on to Baltimore and Washington, or to Harrisburg and Philadelphia.

Meade, however, did not realize the extent of the disaster to Lee, and was disheartened by his own losses, especially the disablement by wounds of Sickles, Hancock, and other generals upon whom he specially relied. Therefore, though Hancock, from his stretcher, wrote him urging immediate pursuit of the enemy, Meade decided to wait until the next day, which was the Fourth of July. Yet even this auspicious day passed without action, Meade deciding that it should be spent in burying the dead, caring for the wounded, and bringing up supplies. A storm came up late in the afternoon, and under cover of this, and the succeeding night, Lee began to retreat. By morning, when his movement was discovered, he had passed through Fairfield Pass, where he left a strong rear-guard, and was on the other side of the Blue Ridge.

The President, grieved to learn that Meade had allowed the enemy to slip out of his hands, heard with joy on the same day that Major-General

William H. French had destroyed the pontoon bridge by which Lee expected to retreat across the Potomac. Then his high hopes for ending the war by capturing the enemy's chief general and army were cast down by indications that Meade and French, and other officers in the field, preferred that the enemy should be allowed to escape. Troops were so slowly advancing down the Cumberland Valley that, in Lincoln's words, they were "quite as likely to capture the man in the moon" as any part of Lee's army. On July 6 the President telegraphed from the Soldiers' Home in Washington, where he was accustomed to spend much of the heated term, to the general-in-chief, saying:

MAJOR-GENERAL HALLECK: I left the telegraph office a good deal dissatisfied. You know I did not like the phrase—in [Meade's] Orders, No. 68, I believe—"Drive the invaders from our soil." Since that, I see a dispatch from General French, saying the enemy is crossing his wounded over the river in flats, without saying why he does not stop it, or even intimating a thought that it ought to be stopped. Still later, another dispatch from General Pleasonton, by direction of General Meade, to General French, stating that the main army is halted because it is believed the rebels are concentrating "on the road toward Hagerstown, beyond Fairfield," and is not to move until it is ascertained that the rebels intend to evacuate Cumberland Valley.

These things all appear to me to be connected with a purpose to cover Baltimore and Washington, and to get the enemy across the river again without a further collision, and they do not appear connected with a purpose to prevent his crossing and to destroy him. I do fear the former purpose is acted upon and the latter is rejected,

If you are satisfied the latter purpose is entertained, and is judiciously pursued, I am content. If you are not so satisfied, please look to it.

By repeated urgings from Halleck, Meade brought his army up to the Potomac by the 10th in front of the strong intrenchments which Lee had thrown up to protect himself while repairing the bridge. Upon the 12th Meade called a council of war of his officers. The majority overruled his own desire to fight Lee. Upon reporting this decision next day to Washington he was sharply reprovcd by Halleck for calling the council, and was ordered not to let the enemy escape. Upon the following morning Lee crossed the river. Meade, knowing that the President held him responsible for the enemy's escape, asked to be relieved of his command. This request Mr. Lincoln refused through Halleck. In every way he tried to make the best of the disappointing situation. Feeling that another change of command in the Army of the Potomac was for the time inadvisable, and that the present commander should feel that the Government was heartily supporting him, the President refrained from any remark that Meade could construe as censure, and forced himself to look only at the positive services the general had rendered the Union. This is indicated in a letter from him to General Howard upon July 21.

I was deeply mortified by the escape of Lee across the Potomac, because the substantial destruction of his army would have ended the war, and because I believed such destruction was perfectly easy—believed that General Meade and his noble army had expended all the skill, and toil, and blood, up to the ripe harvest, and then let the crop go to waste.

Perhaps my mortification was heightened because I had always believed—making my belief a hobby, possibly—that the main Rebel army going north of the Potomac could never return, if well attended to; and because

I was so greatly flattered in this belief by the operations at Gettysburg. A few days having passed, I am now profoundly grateful for what was done, without criticism for what was not done.

General Meade has my confidence, as a brave and skillful officer and a true man.

The success of the navy continued throughout 1863. Admiral DuPont had maintained a very successful blockade of the Atlantic coast. On the 27th of February Commander Worden, of *Monitor* fame, went in with the monitor *Montauk* under the very guns of Fort McAllister near the mouth of the Ogeechee River, and, coolly receiving the fire of the fort, destroyed with his shells the blockade-runner *Nashville*, which was stranded in the river. On April 7 DuPont attacked the defenses of Charleston with his whole strength of ironclads and met with complete failure. He retired, informing the Government that it was impossible to take Charleston by naval attack. On April 14 the President, being desirous to hold Carolinian reënforcements from Lee, gave orders to Admiral DuPont and General Hunter to act in coöperation in renewing the attack, either in earnest or as a demonstration merely.

"Once again before Charleston, do not leave till further orders from here." Admiral DuPont chose to consider this order as a rebuke for his failure to take Charleston at the first attempt, and an ignoring of his opinion that the sea-defenses were impregnable. Accordingly he asked to be relieved of his command, as soon as it was convenient for the Government to do so, promising to obey his instructions faithfully in the meantime. He was relieved late in June by

Admiral John A. Dahlgren. Shortly before this, on June 17, a monitor of his fleet, the *Weehawken*, had captured the swiftest and most powerful ironclad of the Confederacy, the *Atlanta*, in an engagement which lasted only a quarter of an hour, and in which the *Weehawken* fired only four shots.

Early in June General Hunter had also been relieved of his command, being replaced by General Quincy A. Gillmore, who possessed unusual ability as an engineer, and was therefore better fitted than Hunter to reduce such a stronghold as the Confederacy had, by this time, made of the city of its birth. The President wrote to General Hunter a letter of commendation for his distinguished services, assuring him that he had been superseded for causes which seemed sufficient for the Government, but which conveyed no imputation upon his "known energy, efficiency and patriotism." Secretary Welles sent a similar letter to Admiral DuPont, for, while an unsparing critic of official misconduct, in a case like this the "Father Neptune" of the Cabinet was as kindly-hearted as "Father Abraham" himself.

During the summer of 1863 General Gillmore and Admiral Dahlgren coöperated in the reduction of the strong harbor defenses of Charleston, meeting with gratifying success in view of the smallness of Gillmore's forces, a large part of which was negro troops. On the 9th of July Morris Island was taken with the exception of that part of it commanded by Fort Wagner. Two assaults were made on this fort, one on July 11 and the other on July 18. Of the second assault, which took place at nightfall, a negro regi-

ment led the advance. They were met by a deadly fire from the defenders of the fort, which killed their colonel, Robert George Shaw, a young Massachusetts Abolitionist, and swept them back in disorder. Two brigades gained a foothold upon the works, but were dislodged by the severe fire of the enemy which killed their commanders. The total loss was great, 1,500 men. The death of Colonel Shaw was especially deplored in the North. The indignity that the enemy intended to his remains by "burying him under a layer of his negroes" was celebrated by Northern poets as the highest and most fitting honor that could have been accorded him, and in later years Harvard University, his Alma Mater, erected to him one of the most artistic memorials in America, the work of Augustus St. Gaudens.

General Gillmore advanced his works toward the enemy by constructing parallel after parallel. He built a battery (christened by his soldiers the "Swamp Angel") upon a morass, whence he threw shells a distance of five miles into Charleston. On the 17th of August, by a combined bombardment of land batteries and gunboats, Gillmore and Dahlgren pounded Fort Sumter into a pile of ruins. And on September 5 they began a furious attack upon Fort Wagner, which resulted on the 7th in its evacuation by the enemy.

The burial of the dead at Gettysburg was a duty which fell upon Pennsylvania and Governor Curtin of that State, who set about performing it in a fitting manner. The governors of the sixteen other Northern States that were represented in the battle gave him their hearty coöperation in his design, which was to form a permanent national cemetery upon the battlefield. Thurs-

day, November 19, was set for the dedication ceremonies, and Edward Everett, a veteran orator of Massachusetts, was selected to deliver the chief address. President Lincoln was invited, in the words of the committee, to "formally set apart these grounds to their sacred use by a few appropriate remarks."

Mr. Everett delivered a long and eloquent oration, befitting the occasion and honorable to the distinguished orator. Mr. Lincoln then gave his simple tribute, which would consign him to immortality if he had no other title thereto. When he had concluded, Mr. Everett seized him with a fervent grasp of the hand and exclaimed wistfully: "Ah, Mr. Lincoln! how gladly I would exchange all my hundred pages to be the author of your twenty lines."

This is the authoritative text of the President's speech:

Fourscore and seven years ago our fathers brought forth on this continent a new nation, conceived in liberty, and dedicated to the proposition that all men are created equal.

Now we are engaged in a great civil war, testing whether that nation, or any nation so conceived and so dedicated, can long endure. We are met on a great battle-field of that war. We have come to dedicate a portion of that field as a final resting-place for those who here gave their lives that that nation might live. It is altogether fitting and proper that we should do this.

But, in a larger sense, we cannot dedicate—we cannot consecrate—we cannot hallow—this ground. The brave men, living and dead, who struggled here, have consecrated it far above our poor power to add or detract. The world will little note nor long remember what we say here, but it can never forget what they did here. It is for us, the living rather, to be dedicated here to the unfinished work which they who fought

here have thus far so nobly advanced. It is rather for us to be here dedicated to the great task remaining before us—that from these honored dead we take increased devotion to that cause for which they gave the last full measure of devotion; that we here highly resolve that these dead shall not have died in vain; that this nation, under God, shall have a new birth of freedom; and that government of the people, by the people, for the people shall not perish from the earth.

CHAPTER IX

THE ARMY IN THE WEST

IN striking contrast to the favorable conditions inaugurating the career of McClellan were the straitened circumstances under which began the upward rise of the man destined to become the great soldier of the war—Ulysses S. Grant. In the Mexican War he had been faithful over the few things committed to his charge as lieutenant, chiefly in expeditiously handling with a few men a large supply train. After this war, when going in 1852 with his regiment to California by way of Panama, he displayed the same skill and dispatch in his care and transportation of soldiers who had been stricken with cholera on the Chagres River, and left behind in his charge to be sent forward as circumstances best permitted. Grant was appointed Colonel of the Twenty-first Illinois Volunteers by Governor Yates, and assumed command on June 17. The regiment was noted for insubordination, and Grant at once set to work, in citizen's clothes and with a stick for a sword, drilling them, patiently and pertinaciously, but with little success in reducing them to soldierly order. Accordingly, when orders came to take the regiment to Quincy, Ill., whence they were to be sent against the bushwhackers in northern Missouri, Grant seized the

opportunity afforded for more drastic discipline by marching them thither, instead of transporting them by rail.

On July 31 he was assigned to the command of a sub-district under General Pope, and on August 7 he was appointed a brigadier-general of volunteers. On August 28 General Frémont sent him to southeastern Missouri to concentrate the scattered Federal forces in the region, and to drive out the enemy, particularly from Belmont on the Mississippi River, where it was rumored that a rebel battery was established. Grant discovered that the Confederates under General Leonidas Polk were advancing along the Kentucky shore, and before they could be prevented would seize Columbus, which is situated on a high bluff commanding the river. Accordingly he abandoned operations in Missouri, and quickly formed an expedition, with which, on September 5 and 6, he descended from Cairo, Ill., his headquarters, upon Paducah, Ky., the possession of which, from its position at the mouth of the Tennessee River and near that of the Cumberland, was even more strategically important than that of Columbus. Having arranged for the fortification of the place, he returned to Cairo to forward reënforcements.

At the time of Grant's descent on Paducah, General Anderson was transferring his headquarters from Cincinnati to Louisville. With his two efficient subordinates, Brigadier-Generals William T. Sherman and George H. Thomas, he set about resisting the Confederate invasion of Kentucky, which had assumed threatening proportions, General F. K. Zollicoffer entering the State through Cumberland Gap on September

10, shortly after General Polk had captured Columbus.

In coöperation with these movements, the secession militia of the State under General Simon B. Buckner occupied Bowling Green on the 18th, and threatened to move on Frankfort, the State capital, and disperse the Union Legislature there assembled.

There was not only consternation throughout northern Kentucky over this advance, but also serious apprehension in the States north of the Ohio River. Governor Oliver P. Morton of Indiana wrote to President Lincoln asking for arms and troops for the defense of the southern boundary of his State, and in compliance the President sent ten heavy guns, directing the Governor to supply the troops. Later, Governor Morton wrote again, urging the importance of defending Louisville. To this Lincoln replied on September 29 in a letter which displays his thorough grasp of the military situation:

As to Kentucky, you do not estimate that State as more important than I do, but I am compelled to watch all points. While I write this I am, if not in range, at least in hearing of cannon-shot from an army of enemies more than 100,000 strong. I do not expect them to capture this city; but I know they would if I were to send the men and arms from here to defend Louisville, of which there is not a single hostile armed soldier within forty miles, nor any force known to be moving upon it from any distance. It is true, the army in our front may make a half-circle around southward and move on Louisville, but when they do we will make a half-circle around northward and meet them; and in the meantime we will get up what forces we can from other sources to also meet them.

Within a day or so after writing this letter to

Governor Morton, the President elaborated his military policy in the following:

MEMORANDA FOR A PLAN OF CAMPAIGN.

On or about the 5th of October (the exact date to be determined hereafter) I wish a movement made to seize and hold a point on the railroad connecting Virginia and Tennessee near the mountain-pass called Cumberland Gap. That point is now guarded against us by Zollicoffer, with 6,000 or 8,000 rebels at Barboursville. Ky.,—say twenty-five miles from the Gap, toward Lexington. We have a force of 5,000 or 6,000 under General Thomas, at Camp Dick Robinson, about twenty-five miles from Lexington and seventy-five from Zollicoffer's camp, on the road between the two. There is not a railroad anywhere between Lexington and the point to be seized, and along the whole length of which the Union sentiment among the people largely predominates. We have military possession of the railroad from Cincinnati to Lexington, and from Louisville to Lexington, and some home guards, under General Crittenden, are on the latter line. We have possession of the railroad from Louisville to Nashville, Tenn., so far as Muldraugh's Hill, about forty miles, and the rebels have possession of that road all south of there. At the Hill we have a force of 8,000, under General Sherman, and about an equal force of rebels is a very short distance south, under General Buckner.

We have a large force at Paducah, and a smaller at Fort Holt, both on the Kentucky side, with some at Bird's Point, Cairo, Mound City, Evansville, and New Albany, all on the other side, and all which, with the gunboats on the river, are perhaps sufficient to guard the Ohio from Louisville to its mouth.

About supplies of troops, my general idea is that all from Wisconsin, Minnesota, Iowa, Illinois, Missouri, and Kansas, not now elsewhere, be left to Frémont. All from Indiana and Michigan, not now elsewhere, be sent to Anderson at Louisville. All from Ohio needed in Western Virginia be sent there, and any remainder be sent to Mitchel at Cincinnati, for Anderson. All east of the mountains be appropriated to McClellan and to the coast.

As to movements, my idea is that the one for the coast and that on Cumberland Gap be simultaneous, and that in the meantime preparation, vigilant watching, and the defensive only be acted upon; this, however, not to apply to Frémont's operations in northern and middle Missouri. That before these movements Thomas and Sherman shall respectively watch but not attack Zollicoffer and Buckner. That when the coast and Gap movements shall be ready Sherman is merely to stand fast, while all at Cincinnati and all at Louisville, with all on the line, concentrate rapidly at Lexington, and thence to Thomas's camp, joining him, and the whole thence upon the Gap. It is for the military men to decide whether they can find a pass through the mountains at or near the Gap which cannot be defended by the enemy with a greatly inferior force, and what is to be done in regard to this.

The coast and Gap movements made, Generals McClellan and Frémont, in their respective departments, will avail themselves of any advantages the diversions may present.

General Anderson was in poor health, and, in view of the grave responsibility thrust upon him of repelling the Confederate advance through Kentucky, he resigned his position on October 8. General Sherman was appointed to succeed him.

From the beginning Sherman had prophesied that the war would be a long and bitter conflict, and had received the sobriquet of "Crazy Billy" because of this prediction. On assuming command, he at once began to urge upon the Governor the necessity of supplying troops to his command. About the middle of October, Secretary Cameron, returning from his visit to Frémont, stopped at Louisville to see Sherman.

President Lincoln, with his great political genius and warm sympathy for the Southern Unionists, had his mind and heart set upon relieving the loyalists of East Tennessee, so sorely

oppressed by the Confederate Government. Knowing the desire of his chief, Secretary Cameron urged upon General Sherman that Cumberland Gap should be occupied and the East Tennessee and Virginia railroad be seized, thus cutting off "the artery that supplied the rebellion." General Thomas had already expressed his willingness to undertake this movement if four regiments were supplied him. The Government, however, had picked upon General Ormsby M. Mitchel for the duty, whereat General Thomas was offended and asked to be relieved. Sherman, however, now superior to both Thomas and Mitchel, persuaded Thomas to remain in his command, intimating that he would be his choice for the task when the time came to execute it.

But Sherman was not ready to take the offensive with his scant forces, and he directed Thomas merely to hold Zollicoffer in check. He himself grew despondent because of the failure of the Government to increase his forces, which "were too small to do good, and too large to sacrifice," and so, on November 6, he asked that his command be transferred to some one of "more sanguine mind," since he was "forced to order according to his convictions."

Accordingly, on November 9, the Department of the Ohio was formed out of Sherman's forces, and General Don Carlos Buell, a personal friend of McClellan, now General-in-Chief, was placed in command, with McClellan's particular injunctions to capture East Tennessee, and, if possible, Nashville. By Lincoln's special request Sherman was retained in the Louisville command.

Grant had not yet made good soldiers out of

his troops, as was shown in the battle of Belmont. Belmont was a steamboat landing on the Missouri shore opposite Columbus, and here the Confederates had established an encampment. Against this Grant led an expedition on November 6 and 7, capturing the fortified camp after a closely contested engagement. But his troops gave themselves up to disorderly rejoicing, and thereby offered the Confederate General Polk an opportunity to retrieve his defeat by throwing reënforcements across the river and driving the victors from the field in confusion.

The movement urged by President Lincoln for the capture of East Tennessee, or, rather, for the relief of the oppressed loyalists there, was shelved by Buell, who had been appointed for the express purpose of executing it, in favor of a movement along the more direct and less arduous route through Bowling Green against Nashville, which, in view of his small force, seemed much more feasible to him; for having an essentially military mind, he could not appreciate the political importance of the relief of the Tennessee loyalists that loomed so large in Lincoln's eyes as a means of dividing the South not only into separate, disconnected geographical sections, but also into parties of opposing political sentiment. Lincoln believed that if the Tennessee loyalists were supported the suppressed Union sentiment would be encouraged to revive throughout the entire South, and lead to the overthrow of the secessionists.

In spite of Lincoln's instructions, and a telegram from McClellan, who heartily supported the President in his plan, and a pleading message from Andrew Johnson and Horace Maynard that

he move to the relief of their fellow Tennessean loyalists, "oppressed and pursued as beasts of the forest," Buell kept on concentrating troops at Louisville, though he returned assuring, but evasive, answers to Washington. Finally, on January 4, 1862, Lincoln sent a direct inquiry: "Have arms gone forward for East Tennessee?" In reply Buell, for the first time, revealed his intentions, which were to do nothing that "should render at all doubtful the success of a movement against the great power of the rebellion in the West, which is mainly arrayed on the line from Columbus to Bowling Green, and can speedily be concentrated at any point of that line which is attacked singly."

To this cool confession Lincoln replied on January 6, with great forbearance:

Your dispatch of yesterday has been received, and it disappoints and distresses me. I have shown it to General McClellan, who says he will write you to-day. I am not competent to criticise your views, and therefore what I offer is in justification of myself. Of the two, I would rather have a point on the railroad south of Cumberland Gap than Nashville. First, because it cuts a great artery of the enemy's communication, which Nashville does not; and secondly, because it is in the midst of loyal people, who would rally around it, while Nashville is not. Again, I cannot see why the movement on East Tennessee would not be a diversion in your favor, rather than a disadvantage, assuming that a movement towards Nashville is the main object. But my distress is that our friends in East Tennessee are being hanged and driven to despair, and even now, I fear, are thinking of taking rebel arms for the sake of personal protection. In this we lose the most valuable stake we have in the South. My dispatch, to which yours is an answer, was sent with the knowledge of Senator Johnson and Representative Maynard of East Tennessee, and they will be upon me to know

the answer, which I cannot safely show them. They would despair, possibly resign to go and save their families somehow, or die with them. I do not intend this to be an order in any sense, but merely, as intimated before, to show you the grounds of my anxiety.

General McClellan heartily indorsed the movement against East Tennessee, since this would undoubtedly divert, for defense of that region, Confederate troops from reënforcing the army which opposed him, and whose numbers he so greatly magnified. He was sick at the time, and, possibly embittered by his illness, he wrote General Buell a letter which, while polite in phrase, was stinging in its censure. He told his subordinate that he had deceived him and disarranged his plans. His letter closed with a cutting inference that Buell was consulting his own ambition rather than furthering the plans of his chief and the highest good of the nation.

Interesting as Nashville may be to the Louisville interests, it strikes me that its possession is of very secondary importance in comparison with the immense results that would arise from the adherence to our cause of the masses in East Tennessee, West North Carolina, North Georgia, and Alabama; results that I feel assured would ere long flow from the movement I allude to.

Nevertheless Buell adhered to his plans, which he thought too far advanced to be relinquished. General Halleck, who had been asked by President Lincoln to coöperate with General Buell by attacking Columbus, in reply on January 9, expressed his disapproval of the movement against Bowling Green as inviting a disaster similar to Bull Run. He said: "To operate on exterior lines against an enemy occupying a cen-

tral position will fail, as it always has failed, ninety-nine cases out of a hundred."

Upon this letter Lincoln wrote on January 10 the heart-sick indorsement: "It is exceedingly discouraging. As everywhere else nothing can be done."

Realizing that the War Department required thorough reorganization, the President next day procured the resignation of Simon Cameron, Secretary of War, by appointing him Minister to Russia, replacing him in the War Department by Edwin M. Stanton.

For three days after Lincoln wrote his melancholy indorsement upon Halleck's letter, he cogitated upon the parallel that general had drawn between the cases of Bull Run (Manassas) and Bowling Green. On the 13th he wrote to both Buell and Halleck a letter, in which he said:

I state my general idea of this war to be that we have the greater numbers, and the enemy has the greater facility of concentrating forces upon points of collision; that we must fail unless we can find some way of making our advantage an overmatch for his; and that this can only be done by menacing him with superior forces at different points at the same time, so that we can safely attack one or both if he makes no change; and if he weakens one to strengthen the other, forbear to attack the strengthened one, but seize and hold the weakened one, gaining so much. To illustrate. Suppose, last summer, when Winchester ran away to reinforce Manassas, we had forborne to attack Manassas, but had seized and held Winchester. . . . Applying the principle to your case, my idea is that Halleck shall menace Columbus and "down river" generally, while you menace Bowling Green and East Tennessee. If the enemy shall concentrate at Bowling Green, do not retire from his front, yet do not fight him there either, but seize Columbus and East Tennessee, one or both,

left exposed by the concentration at Bowling Green. It is a matter of no small anxiety to me, and one which I am sure you will not overlook, that the East Tennessee line is so long and over so bad a road.

In the meantime General Halleck had decided to meet the President's wishes in part, and, on the same day that he wrote his discouraging letter to the President, had ordered General Grant and Flag-Officer Foote to make a combined military and naval demonstration to the south of Paducah, which should lead the enemy to suppose an attack was to be made on Fort Donelson at Dover, Tenn., on the Cumberland River. This reconnaissance, made during the following week, discovered the weakness of Fort Henry, on the Tennessee River, parallel with Fort Donelson.

General Buell had also responded to the prodings from Washington so far as to order General Thomas to attack General Zollicoffer at his fortified camp at Mill Springs on the Cumberland River, whither Zollicoffer had advanced from Cumberland Gap. Here, on January 19, with six regiments Thomas defeated ten of the enemy's. General Zollicoffer was killed, and, demoralized by the death of their leader, the Confederates dispersed among the mountains, leaving Cumberland Gap open for entrance into East Tennessee. Had not Grant already shown the way by which Western Tennessee could be captured, Buell would undoubtedly have invaded the State by this eastern door.

Grant, the man of action, by repeated urging, had secured an order from Halleck to attack Fort Henry. Taking 15,000 men on transports, and accompanied by Foote with seven

gunboats, he steamed up the Tennessee River, landing four miles below the fort on February 4. He captured it easily on the 5th, since General Lloyd Tilghman, its commander, convinced that it would fall, had sent all his forces but one artillery company on to Fort Donelson. Grant telegraphed to his chief, "Fort Henry is ours. I shall take and destroy Fort Donelson on the 8th."

The Confederate general, Albert Sidney Johnston, at once fell back from Bowling Green, sending 8,000 men under Generals Buckner and Floyd to Fort Donelson (also reënforced by 4,000 under Pillow from Columbus), and 14,000 men under Hardee to the defense of Nashville. Rising waters delayed the plans of Grant a week. In the meantime President Lincoln threw his whole soul into encouragement of the enterprise, as his telegram to Halleck on the 16th gives evidence.

You have Fort Donelson safe, unless Grant shall be overwhelmed from outside; to prevent which latter will, I think, require all the vigilance, energy, and skill of yourself and Buell, acting in full coöperation. Columbus will not get at Grant, but the force from Bowling Green will. They hold the railroad from Bowling Green to within a few miles of Fort Donelson, with the bridge at Clarksville undisturbed. It is unsafe to rely that they will not dare to expose Nashville to Buell. A small part of their force can retire slowly towards Nashville, breaking up the railroad as they go, and keep Buell out of that city twenty days. Meantime Nashville will be abundantly defended by forces from all South and perhaps from here at Manassas. Could not a cavalry force from General Thomas on the Upper Cumberland dash across almost unresisted, and cut the railroad at or near Knoxville, Tenn.? In the midst of a bombardment at Fort Donelson, why could not a gunboat run up and destroy the bridge

at Clarksville? Our success or failure at Fort Donelson is vastly important, and I beg you to put your soul in the effort. I send a copy of this to Buell.

Even while this telegram was in transmission Buckner was proposing to Grant an armistice to arrange terms of capitulation, to which Grant replied: "No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately upon your works."

To these "ungenerous and unchivalric terms," as Buckner characterized them, the Confederate general felt himself compelled to yield, and thereupon he surrendered. That same day Grant telegraphed to Halleck: "We have taken Fort Donelson and from 12,000 to 15,000 prisoners, including Generals Buckner and Bushrod R. Johnson; also about 20,000 stands of arms, 48 pieces of artillery, 17 heavy guns, from 2,000 to 4,000 horses and large quantities of commissary stores."

Because of this sweeping victory the whole country rang with Grant's praises and, recognizing in him the uncompromising spirit destined to end the war, it dubbed him from the striking phrase in his reply to Buckner—which by happy chance bore the initials of his Christian names—"Unconditional Surrender Grant."

General Halleck lost no time in attempting to secure honor and an increase of power for himself out of the victory of his subordinate. On February 17 he telegraphed to General McClellan:

Make Buell, Grant, and Pope major-generals of volunteers, and give me command in the West. I ask this in return for Fort Henry and Donelson.

On the next day Halleck sent a frantic message to Buell, in which he said :

To remove all question as to rank I have asked the President to make you a major-general. Come down to the Cumberland and take command. The battle of the West is to be fought in that vicinity. . . . Throw all your troops in the direction of the Cumberland.

It was Halleck's intention to have Buell move up the Cumberland, while Grant acted on the Tennessee, with himself in command of both movements. This command he demanded of McClellan in telegrams on the 19th and 20th. McClellan answered, temporizing until he should hear from Buell. Secretary Stanton, on behalf of the President, who was at the bedside of his dying son, William Wallace Lincoln, telegraphed to Halleck on the 22d that the President did not think any change in military organization advisable, and desired Halleck and Buell to coöperate as equals.

Meantime General Grant and Flag-Officer Foote, unconcerned by this contest for honors, had occupied Clarksville. Buell hurried forward a division of his troops under Major-General William Nelson, and by Grant's orders these occupied Nashville on the 25th. On May 1 Halleck ordered Grant to proceed farther into Tennessee upon a railroad-destroying and telegraph-cutting expedition. Owing to rising waters, Grant did not at once obey the order; he also failed to report to Halleck. His chief reported to Washington that Grant had become insubordinate, probably because of a sense of importance he had acquired from the popular acclaim of his capture of Fort Donelson. McClellan, with Stanton's

approval, answered: "Do not hesitate to arrest him at once, if the service requires it, and place C. F. Smith [who led the second division at the storming of Fort Donelson] in command." Halleck at once ordered Grant to remain at Fort Henry, and he gave the command of the proposed expedition into Tennessee to Smith. Grant, giving an explanation of his seeming insubordination, obeyed. Later, he asked to be relieved from duty; not only did Halleck refuse this request, but, because convinced that Grant had been guilty of only a technical violation of military discipline, he reinstated him in his old command on March 13.

While Grant was justifying Halleck's objection to a frontal attack on Johnston at Bowling Green by cutting in behind, Brigadier-General Samuel R. Curtis, another subordinate of the commander of the Western Department, had rendered the Confederate general Price's position at Springfield, Mo., untenable, and caused him to retreat fighting into Arkansas. On February 18, in announcing the victory of Fort Donelson to his troops, General Curtis congratulated them on their own heroic achievement :

You have moved in the most inclement weather, over the worst of roads, making extraordinary long marches, subsisting mainly on meat without salt, and for the past six days you have been under the fire of the fleeing enemy. You have driven him out of Missouri, restored the Union flag to the virgin soil of Arkansas, and triumphed in two contests.

The Confederate commander of the Trans-Mississippi district south of Price's, Major-General Earl Van Dorn, marching north, joined Price and McCulloch's detachments and, assum-

ing command of the combined forces, attacked Curtis on March 6 at Pea Ridge, Ark., and flanked him during the night. Curtis re-formed his line and resisted the Confederate attack throughout the next day, killing General McCulloch and other Confederate officers. On the 8th Curtis took the offensive and so completely routed the enemy that their scattered portions were never again united.

Upon the evacuation of Columbus, the Confederates occupied and fortified Island No. 10 in a bend in the Mississippi River, on the line between Kentucky and Tennessee, and New Madrid, Mo., a few miles to the north and down the river. Halleck sent General Pope against New Madrid, who, on March 3, cut off the enemy's reënforcements and supplies by erecting batteries on the river below. On the 13th the Confederates evacuated the town, going up the river to Island No. 10. Thereupon Flag-Officer Foote was summoned from Cairo with nine gunboats to reduce the place. Two of his vessels ran safely by the enemy's batteries at night to act as protection in transporting Pope's soldiers to the Tennessee shore, where Island No. 10 might be attacked. To serve as transports four steamboats and six coal barges were brought to New Madrid with great engineering skill, partly by bayou and partly overland, across the chord of the arc of the river in which the island lies.

The Confederates did not wait to be attacked, but on April 7 began a retreat southward through Tennessee, leaving a small garrison to surrender to Foote. Pope intercepted the fugitives, and took 6,000 prisoners.

The railroad-wrecking expedition under General C. F. Smith had established a base for its operations at Pittsburg Landing, on the west bank of the Tennessee River, within striking distance of Corinth, Miss., an important railroad town. Grant, resuming his command on March 15, assembled five divisions of his forces at this point. By March 23 Generals Beauregard and A. S. Johnston had united their armies at Corinth. On Saturday, April 5, they stole a march on Grant, encamping that night two miles from Pittsburg Landing. At five o'clock next morning they began the attack by driving in the Federal pickets. Although taken by surprise, the nearest Federal division under Generals Sherman and B. M. Prentiss quickly formed in battle near Shiloh Church and stubbornly opposed the Confederate advance. But, although reënforced by the other divisions, they were slowly pressed backward upon the left and right, the center under Prentiss, reënforced by General W. H. L. Wallace's division, standing firm by Grant's orders. The battle continued all day, and, by five o'clock in the afternoon, the Union center, commanded by Prentiss alone—for Wallace had been mortally wounded—was captured. But the Confederate troops were somewhat demoralized by the loss of General Johnston, who had been killed two hours before, and, worn out by the gallant resistance of the center, which they called "the Hornet's Nest," they hesitated to press on in their course. This was against the Federal left, which had fallen back to the river, where it was protected by a line of artillery on a crest at right angles to the river, and by the gunboats which commanded the hol-

low between the armies. The Federal line shortened the right, closing up the central gap. Its position was stronger than before, and, since the forces were fairly equal, 40,000 attacking Confederates to 33,000 defending Federals, and the losses were the same, about 10,000 on each side, Beauregard, now in sole command of the Confederates, realized that he would have a still harder contest on the morrow if he would drive the Federals into the river.

Grant had been absent on Saturday at Savannah, nine miles down the river on the eastern bank, awaiting reënforcements from Buell, which arrived on that day. He landed at the battlefield early Sunday morning, April 6. Grasping the situation he summoned to his aid his sixth division under General Lew. Wallace, stationed at Crump's Landing six miles down the river on the western bank, and Buell's forces at Savannah. The arrival of these at nightfall and on the next morning swelled the effective Federal forces to nearly 50,000 men, and justified Buell and Grant taking the offensive in the morning. This they did, driving back the disheartened and demoralized Confederates to Corinth.

While the Federal army was forcing its way down the Mississippi, the Federal navy was coming up the river from its mouth in a progress of even more glorious conquest. In September, 1861, Ship Island, midway between Mobile and New Orleans, had been occupied by the Federal Government, and, on November 15, a council, consisting of the President, General McClellan, Secretary Welles, his assistant secretary, Fox, and Commander David D. Porter, determined upon an expedition from Ship Island as a base

against New Orleans. The expedition was placed in command of Captain David G. Farragut, a Southerner, who had proved his loyalty to the Government he had served for almost half a century by leaving his home at Norfolk and coming North at the outbreak of hostilities.

Early in February Farragut sailed from Hampton Roads for Ship Island in the steam-sloop *Hartford*, which he made his flagship. After him followed Porter with a mortar flotilla, and General Butler with 6,000 soldiers. On April 18 Porter's flotilla appeared before Forts Jackson and St. Philip, the defenses of New Orleans on either side of the river below the city. For five days Porter bombarded these forts, especially Fort Jackson, furiously. Upon the fifth Farragut sent in his ships, two gunboats having previously cut away by night a barrier of rafts and hulks stretched across the river. He ran the gauntlet in two divisions of respectively eight and nine ships, pouring in broadsides upon the forts as they passed them and receiving a hail of metal in return, by which all the ships were more or less riddled. Three of the gunboats were so injured that they returned to the mortar flotilla.

The *Hartford* was set burning by a fire-raft, but the flames were quickly extinguished. Beyond the forts the fleet encountered the Confederate gunboat flotilla, including an ineffective ram called the *Manassas*, and destroyed them all.

The few Confederate forces in New Orleans destroyed their war material and evacuated the city before Farragut arrived, on April 25. For several days the Mayor of the city temporized about surrendering it. During this period a Union flag, that had been hoisted over the Mint

by Farragut's order, was hauled down and trampled upon by citizens, one of whom was hanged by General Butler some weeks later for the act. Finally Farragut sent marines, who replaced the Rebel flags on the public buildings with Union ones and took forcible possession of the city.

Already, on the 28th, Fort Jackson, in which there was a mutiny, and Fort St. Philip capitulated, leaving the way clear for Butler's troops to enter the city. On May 1 Farragut turned its possession over to him. Of Butler's strong and effective military administration of New Orleans, in which he fed the hungry of the city, cleaned its streets, prevented the entrance of yellow fever, and sternly punished and repressed insult to his Government as represented by the Union flag and the persons of Union soldiers, there is not space here to tell in detail, or to present a justification. Suffice it to say that Lincoln heartily approved of this administration. On December 12, 1862, the President sent a message to Congress with a present of three swords, formerly the property of General David E. Twiggs of Mexican War fame, which had been forwarded to him by General Butler, and recommended that, if Congress should dispose of them in compliment of military service, General Butler be entitled to the first consideration. This recommendation was, of course, adopted.

Farragut proceeded up the Mississippi and, by May 20, when he arrived before Vicksburg, he had captured all the important places on the river between New Orleans and that city. It was evident that the Confederates designed to concentrate all their available strength to hold

Vicksburg, the "Gibraltar of the West." Toward it Beauregard fell back with his 50,000 men from Corinth on May 29, when Halleck, who assumed command of the Federal forces after the battle of Pittsburg Landing, had made Corinth untenable by a careful and leisurely siege. On June 6 the Federal gunboats engaged in a spectacular contest with the Confederate flotilla before Memphis, and won a signal victory, sinking four of the enemy's gunboats and pursuing and capturing three of the four that remained. The Confederate strength in the West was now confined and concentrated in central Mississippi.

Halleck's departure to Washington, to become General-in-Chief of the Union armies, left two generals in command of the Western armies at the front, Grant at the head of the Army of the Tennessee and Buell at the head of the Army of the Cumberland. Grant held his line from Memphis to Corinth, but because of the scantiness of his forces, detachments having been sent to strengthen Buell, and the new levies going all to McClellan, was unable to take the offensive. This the enemy did about the middle of September, General Price attacking and capturing Iuka, twenty miles southeast of Corinth, in a movement designed to join his forces with Van Dorn's, near Ripley, thirty miles southwest of Corinth. Grant sent Generals Rosecrans and E. O. C. Ord to recapture the town and prevent the junction of the Confederate forces. Owing to lack of concert between the Union detachments, Rosecrans bore the brunt of the battle alone, and, on September 19 was repulsed, the enemy successfully withdrawing to Ripley. Van Dorn took command of the united forces, and, on October

3, attacked Corinth, intending to break his way through the Union line at this point to join General Braxton Bragg in Kentucky. Rosecrans, in command of Corinth, beat the enemy back, and Ord, coming to Rosecrans' aid from Bolivar, Tenn., hastened Van Dorn's retreat. General Rosecrans was promoted to the command of the Army of the Cumberland for his victory, replacing Buell, whose delay in going to the aid of the loyal East Tennesseans had lost him the confidence of the President.

General Buell had spent a large portion of the summer in preparing to attack Chattanooga, the gateway from the South into East Tennessee. It was the enemy, however, that took the offensive. General Braxton Bragg, in charge of the forces against Buell, late in August sent General Kirby Smith with a detachment through Cumberland Gap into eastern Kentucky, where, on the 29th, he defeated a smaller Union force under General William Nelson. Marching northward, he occupied Lexington and Frankfort, the state capital, where he established a Confederate State Government. He even threatened Cincinnati, causing a hasty muster for the defense of that place of Ohio farmers, who flocked into the city with their shotguns and rifles, from which they received the name of "Squirrel-hunters."

Bragg set out for Louisville through central Tennessee. Buell, believing that his objective point was Nashville, massed his forces at Murfreesboro, thirty-five miles to the southeast, to intercept him. But Bragg slipped by, and so secured a considerable start in the race for Louisville. However, Bragg lingered on the way to capture a Union garrison at Munfordville, Ky.,

thus enabling Buell and Thomas to overtake him. Lacking supplies, Bragg feared to risk battle, and turned aside from the road to Louisville to Bardstown, in order to be near Kirby Smith at Lexington, whom he had furnished with extra supplies and equipment for the Kentucky volunteers they expected to enroll—an anticipation which utterly failed of fulfilment.

Arriving at Louisville, General Buell found an order awaiting him, which directed him to turn over his command to General Thomas. Thomas earnestly protested to the Government against the order, and it was withdrawn. Buell, with Thomas as his second in command, then advanced against the enemy. On October 8 they came upon Bragg at Perryville, near Harrodsburg, where he had ordered Smith to join him with his forces. Chiefly by the gallantry of Brigadier-General Philip H. Sheridan the battle was won for the Union forces. Following hard after the retreating enemy, Buell drove him into East Tennessee, where he desisted from pursuit and returned to Nashville. For his failure to follow Bragg the President severely reprimanded him in a telegram sent through Halleck, on the 19th.

The capture of East Tennessee should be the main object of your campaign. You say it is the heart of the enemy's resources; make it the heart of yours. Your army can live there if the enemy's can. You must in a great measure live upon the country, paying for your supplies where proper, and levying contributions where necessary. I am directed by the President to say to you that your army must enter East Tennessee this fall, and that it ought to move there while the roads are passable. Once between the enemy and Nashville, there will be no serious difficulty in reopen-

ing your communications with that place. He does not understand why we cannot march as the enemy marches, live as he lives, and fight as he fights, unless we admit the inferiority of our troops and of our generals. Once hold the valley of the upper Tennessee, and the operations of guerrillas in that State and Kentucky will soon cease.

To this General Buell shrewdly replied: "Instead of imitating the enemy's plan [cutting loose from communications and marching with insufficient supplies], I should say that his failure had been in a measure due to his peculiar method." Finding Buell incorrigible, the Government, on October 24, ordered him to turn over his command to General Rosecrans, the victor of Corinth. Rosecrans began to accumulate supplies at Nashville, as if to go into winter quarters. General Bragg thereupon went into winter quarters at Murfreesboro, about thirty miles southeast of Nashville, on the road to Chattanooga, sending half of his cavalry, the one arm of service in which he was greatly superior to Rosecrans, some against Grant and some to Kentucky. Hearing of this, Rosecrans marched against him, arriving before Murfreesboro on December 30. Here they found Bragg's army intrenched north of the town to the east and west of a stream called Stone or Stone's River. Major-Generals A. McD. McCook, George M. Thomas, and Thomas L. Crittenden commanded respectively the right, center, and left of the Federal line. These were opposed respectively by Lieutenant-General William J. Hardee, Lieutenant-General Leonidas Polk, and Major-General John C. Breckinridge, with Major-General John P. McCown commanding the reserves.

Rosecrans's plan of battle and Bragg's were identical: Holding firm on the right and turning upon the center as a pivot, to bend back and flank the enemy's right, thus getting to his rear and on the road to his headquarters. Bragg was more successful in his plan at the beginning than Rosecrans. By the use of McCown's reserves, he overlapped McCook and crushed his extreme right, pressed back his center, but was held by his left under Sheridan. Rosecrans was forced to desist from his attack on the Confederate right under Breckinridge, and, holding him engaged sufficiently to prevent him reënforcing the Confederate left, he diverted Thomas's forces to the defense of the Federal right. The winter's day came to a close with the lines of battle at right angles to those of the morning. Rosecrans drew in his left toward the center during the night, observing which on the morrow Bragg telegraphed to Richmond that the enemy had yielded his strong point and was falling back. "We occupy the whole field, and shall follow. . . . God has granted us a happy New Year." All of the second day Rosecrans held the defensive in his compact formation; then, on January 2, he sent Crittenden forward again to occupy his old position. Breckinridge assailed him impetuously, and was driven back in rout, losing 2,000 men in forty minutes. On the 3d Crittenden would have captured Murfreesboro had not the continuing rain made the ground impassable for artillery. Bragg, repulsed in his attempt to turn the Federal right, therefore prepared to retreat, doing so at midnight of the 3d. Rosecrans occupied Murfreesboro on the 4th, but refrained from pursuit owing to the heavy condition of the

roads. Rosecrans had won Kentucky and Western Tennessee for the Union, and he and his troops well deserved the congratulations sent by the President on the 5th: "Please tender to all, and accept for yourself, the nation's gratitude for your and their skill, endurance, and dauntless courage."

Rosecrans was not magnanimous enough to receive this praise as the highest reward of service, but clamored for military honors at the expense of his fellow generals, in particular, Grant, whose commission as major-general of volunteers ante-dated his. Rosecrans asked that his commission should date from December, 1861, which would give him precedence over the captor of Fort Donelson. But the President, disgusted with his mean and selfish ambition, put back the date only to March 2, 1862, and wrote him a letter in which he said :

Now as to your request that your commission should date from December, 1861. Of course you expected to gain something by this; but you should remember that precisely so much as you should gain by it others would lose by it. If the thing you sought had been exclusively ours, we would have given it cheerfully; but, being the right of other men, we having a merely arbitrary power over it, the taking it from them and giving it to you became a more delicate matter and more deserving of consideration. Truth to speak, I do not appreciate this matter of rank on paper as you officers do. The world will not forget that you fought the battle of Stone River, and it will never care a fig whether you rank General Grant on paper or he so ranks you.

In the meantime General Grant was attending quietly to his duty, working in close connection with Halleck, between whom and himself there

now existed the utmost harmony. On November 11 the General-in-Chief telegraphed him: "You have command of all troops sent to your department, and have permission to fight the enemy where you please." Grant, therefore, set out to capture Vicksburg, which was under Lieutenant-General John C. Pemberton, with whom the Confederate Government had replaced Van Dorn after the latter's defeat at Corinth. In the course of a month Grant extended the conquest of Mississippi as far south as Grenada, causing the Confederate Government to place General Joseph E. Johnston in command and against him. Grant then ordered Sherman to lead a coöperating expedition against Vicksburg by the Mississippi River. Sherman started on the 20th of December. Then the superiority of the enemy in cavalry made itself felt: Lieutenant-General Nathan B. Forrest, the most brilliant cavalry leader of the western Confederates, broke Grant's lines of communication with the North, and General Van Dorn, in a similar cavalry raid, captured on December 20 his supplies at Holly Springs, thereby effectually checking Grant's advance. Sherman arrived at Milliken's Bend, twenty miles above Vicksburg, on December 25. Cut off from communication with his chief, he was ignorant of his movements. Nevertheless, after two days' reconnaissance, he ordered General Frank P. Blair, Jr., and Colonel John F. De Courcey to charge with their brigades upon the enemy's strong works at Chickasaw Bluffs, several miles up the Yazoo from its mouth, and north of Vicksburg. They were beaten back with the loss of one man in three. Sherman retired to Milliken's Bend, where he

found General McClelland waiting with orders from Washington through Grant to supersede him. Sherman, smarting under the degradation, asked McClelland for a chance to redeem his ill-fortune by attacking an important fort forty miles up the Arkansas River, called by the Confederates Fort Hindman, and by the Federals Arkansas Post. McClelland thought so well of the proposition that he led the expedition himself. With the aid of Porter's flotilla he captured the fort on January 11, 1863.

The President had been influenced by political considerations to give the command to McClelland, who was a Democrat, and a former member of Congress. Grant was incensed that a civilian soldier had been forced upon him, taking the place of his favorite subordinate, Sherman, a West Pointer, and he resented the success of McClelland in a manner that would have been harsh even if the expedition had ended in failure. McClelland replied with natural indignation, in an insolent and insubordinate tone. Halleck, who had already been in controversy with McClelland, gave Grant a loose rein in the matter, with the result that McClelland eventually was relieved from the command. On January 22 the President wrote a conciliatory and at the same time reproving letter to the man whose ambitions he himself had unwisely and unadvisedly attempted to further.

I have too many family controversies, so to speak, already on my hands to voluntarily, or so long as I can avoid it, take up another. You are now doing well—well for the country and well for yourself—much better than you could possibly be if engaged in open war with General Halleck. Allow me to beg that, for

your sake, for my sake, and for the country's sake, you give your whole attention to the better work.

Your success upon the Arkansas was both brilliant and valuable, and is fully appreciated by the country and government.

It was on the 29th of January, 1863, that Grant had taken personal charge of the operations against Vicksburg, which ended in the capture of that stronghold. Upon that day he arrived at Young's Point, the headquarters of the Union army on the west bank of the Mississippi, opposite the mouth of the Yazoo River. His forces were 50,000 soldiers, and a fleet of gunboats under Admiral Porter, carrying 280 guns. The problem presented was to reach the high grounds behind Vicksburg, the only point from which the place could be successfully reduced. To gain this position it was necessary for the troops to get below the town and cross over to the east bank of the river. Grant wasted several months in constructing a canal across the loop of the river, which bent to the east at Vicksburg, and, upon the failure of this engineering work owing to floods, in trying to divert the course of the river itself through Lake Providence into the Red River, an enterprise which was also unsuccessful. Then General Grant determined to take the bull by the horns and run the Vicksburg batteries with the gunboats and transports, marching his forces across the peninsula on the west bank. The passage of the batteries was successfully accomplished on the night of April 16. Ordering Sherman to make a feigned attack on Haines's Bluff to hold Pemberton's forces in Vicksburg, on the 30th of the month Grant crossed the river with his main army, and on the

following day defeated a force under Brigadier-General J. S. Bowen, near Port Gibson. On May 3 he entered Grand Gulf, which had been evacuated by the enemy. By this time B. H. Grierson, whom Grant had sent through Mississippi upon a destructive cavalry raid, had joined Banks's army at Baton Rouge. The President expected that Grant would proceed south and assist Banks and Farragut in the reduction of Port Hudson, a Confederate stronghold, twenty miles north of Baton Rouge, and thus effect a junction of all the Federal forces on the Lower Mississippi, and clear the river for supplies from New Orleans, in the campaign against Vicksburg. But Grant feared more a union of the Confederate forces than he desired an increase of his own. General Joseph E. Johnston was moving from Jackson, fifty miles east of Vicksburg, to reënforce Pemberton. Grant determined to prevent this junction at any cost. He ordered Sherman, whose demonstration against Pemberton had successfully accomplished its object, to join him at Grand Gulf; when Sherman did so on the 6th, Grant cut loose from his supplies and moved rapidly against Johnston. On the 12th he met him at Raymond marching westward, and defeated him and dispersed his troops. On the 14th he captured Jackson. Then he marched swiftly toward Vicksburg. On the 16th he attacked Pemberton in a strong position at Champion's Hill, and completely routed him. The enemy made a stand at Big Black River, but was driven across it on the 17th with heavy loss. On the 18th Pemberton was completely invested in Vicksburg and so cut off from all supplies. For six weeks Grant bombarded the city. By this

time Pemberton's stores were exhausted, and, realizing the hopelessness of his situation, he capitulated to Grant's terms of "unconditional surrender." The victor was generous, however; he paroled all the prisoners, supplied them with rations, and allowed each officer to retain his side arms, and, if mounted, his horse. On the Fourth of July the garrison, over 30,000 strong, marched out through the Union troops, who, by Grant's orders, refrained from offensive conduct and remarks. On July 9 Port Hudson, the last remaining Confederate stronghold on the Mississippi, surrendered to Banks, and once again, to use the language of Lincoln, "the Father of Waters went unvexed to the sea."

Upon the same day that Meade refrained from crushing the broken ranks of Lee at Gettysburg, Grant received the surrender of Pemberton at Vicksburg. This was a victory complete and satisfying to Lincoln. When the news of it arrived in Washington, citizens of the capital gathered at the White House to serenade the President. He responded on the theme of notable Fourth's of July. Referring to the important events that had occurred in our country's history upon the anniversary of the Declaration of Independence, he concluded the list with the recent victories which enforced the principles of that declaration, although not forbearing to hint at the "trying want of success" that accompanied the eastern triumph.

In the presence of the supreme military genius exhibited by Grant, the President humbly acknowledged his former presumption in criticising his plan of campaign. On the 13th of the month he wrote him the following letter :

I do not remember that you and I ever met personally. I write this now as a grateful acknowledgment for the almost inestimable service you have done the country. I wish to say a word further. When you first reached the vicinity of Vicksburg, I thought you should do what you finally did—march the troops across the neck, run the batteries with the transports, and thus go below; and I never had any faith, except a general hope that you knew better than I, that the Yazoo Pass expedition and the like could succeed. When you got below and took Port Gibson, Grand Gulf, and vicinity, I thought you should go down the river and join General Banks, and when you turned northward, east of the Big Black, I feared it was a mistake. I now wish to make the personal acknowledgment that you were right and I was wrong.

Rosecrans, on the plea that he did not wish to increase the forces of the enemy against Grant before Vicksburg by attacking Bragg, and so causing him to join Johnston, remained inactive until near the close of the Vicksburg campaign, save for cavalry raids, which, on the suggestion of the President, he had made in order to counter the bold forays of the Confederate horse. Of these expeditions on either side the most spectacular was the raid by the Confederate general, John H. Morgan, through Kentucky and southern Indiana and Ohio, in July, 1863. After terrifying the entire Middle West for thirty days, he was defeated and captured while trying to recross the Ohio River. Incarcerated in the Ohio penitentiary in retaliation for the refusal of the Confederate Government to exchange Colonel A. D. Streight, a Union cavalryman who had been captured while on a raid, Morgan contrived to escape and return to the South, where he was received with acclaim by the people, and with rebuke by his commander for disobeying orders

in extending his raid beyond Kentucky, and so putting himself beyond recall in the hour of the main army's need.

Beginning June 24, in nine days, during which there occurred a succession of violent storms, Rosecrans executed a series of rapid and brilliant movements which culminated in expelling Bragg from Tennessee. The Confederate general withdrew to Chattanooga. Rosecrans was slow to follow him up and attack him. Although the bridges and railroad tracks were repaired by July 18, he delayed his movement against Chattanooga almost a month longer, complaining to Washington of lack of horses and supplies, and of the disaffection of the Administration towards him. Accordingly, on August 10, the President wrote him a very frank letter, telling exactly the feeling he had toward him, and criticising his past and present inaction, the former directly, and the latter indirectly in the rhetorical figure of interrogation of which Lincoln was a master.

I think you must have inferred more than General Halleck has intended, as to any dissatisfaction of mine with you. I am sure you, as a reasonable man, would not have been wounded could you have heard all my words and seen all my thoughts in regard to you. I have not abated in my kind feeling for you and confidence in you. I have seen most of your dispatches to General Halleck—probably all of them. After Grant invested Vicksburg I was very anxious lest Johnston should overwhelm him from the outside, and when it appeared certain that part of Bragg's force had gone and was going to Johnston, it did seem to me it was exactly the proper time for you to attack Bragg with what force he had left. In all kindness let me say it so seems to me yet. Finding from your dispatches to General Halleck that your judgment was different, and being very anxious for Grant, I, on one occasion, told

General Halleck I thought he should direct you to decide at once to immediately attack Bragg or to stand on the defensive and send part of your force to Grant. He replied he had already so directed in substance. Soon after, dispatches from Grant abated my anxiety for him, and in proportion abated my anxiety about any movement of yours. When afterward, however, I saw a dispatch of yours arguing that the right time for you to attack Bragg was not before, but would be after, the fall of Vicksburg, it impressed me very strangely, and I think I so stated to the Secretary of War and General Halleck. It seemed no other than the proposition that you could better fight Bragg when Johnston should be at liberty to return and assist him than you could before he could so return to his assistance.

Since Grant has been entirely relieved by the fall of Vicksburg, by which Johnston is also relieved, it has seemed to me that your chance for a stroke has been considerably diminished, and I have not been pressing you directly or indirectly. True, I am very anxious for East Tennessee to be occupied by us; but I see and appreciate the difficulties you mention. The question occurs, Can the thing be done at all? Does preparation advance at all? Do you not consume supplies as fast as you get them forward? Have you more animals to-day than you had at the battle of Stone's River? And yet have not more been furnished you since then than your entire present stock? I ask the same questions as to your mounted force.

Do not misunderstand: I am not casting blame upon you; I rather think by great exertion you can get to East Tennessee; but a very important question is, Can you stay there? I make no order in the case—that I leave to General Halleck and yourself.

And now be assured once more that I think of you in all kindness and confidence, and that I am not watching you with an evil eye.

Rosecrans shortly after this, with that remarkable energy of which he was capable when once he had entered upon a movement, plunged into a campaign which was none the less brilliant because the most bloodless stroke of the war; yet,

although thus employed, his contentious mind sought out and seized upon an opening in Lincoln's letter into which he could force the wedge of controversy. The President, however, refused to be drawn into dispute, as his answer of August 31 indicates :

When I wrote you before, I did not intend, nor do I now, to engage in an argument with you on military questions. You had informed me you were impressed through General Halleck that I was dissatisfied with you : and I could not bluntly deny that I was, without unjustly implicating him. I therefore concluded to tell you the plain truth, being satisfied the matter would thus appear much smaller than it would if seen by mere glimpses. I repeat that my appreciation of you has not abated. I can never forget whilst I remember anything that about the end of last year, and beginning of this, you gave us a hard-earned victory, which, had there been a defeat instead, the nation could scarcely have lived over.

Neither can I forget the check you so opportunely gave to a dangerous sentiment which was spreading in the North.

On August 14 Rosecrans began his long deferred movement. He deceived Bragg into thinking that the attack was to come from the north by making a demonstration from that direction, under cover of which he crossed the Tennessee river to the south and west of Chattanooga with his main army, and by September 6 had occupied the northwestern slope of Lookout Mountain, threatening Bragg's line of communications. Thereupon the Confederate commander evacuated the city. On the 9th it was occupied by Rosecrans's troops. Bragg, however, had not retreated. Joined by Buckner's forces, which had retreated from Knoxville before the ap-

proach of Burnside from the north, and by a detachment of Johnston's army, he concentrated his troops in a valley to the east of the parallel ranges of Lookout Mountain and Missionary Ridge, and opposite to the Union center under Thomas. There he prepared to take the Union army in detail as its three corps came stringing along, a day's march apart, in pursuit of an enemy whom they supposed to be in full flight. Thomas's corps arrived first, pouring through a gap in Lookout Mountain. But the division commander, General T. C. Hindman, whom Bragg ordered to begin the attack, through sheer perversity delayed doing so until Thomas, realizing his danger, had withdrawn into the mountain passes behind him, thereby incurring the censure of Rosecrans for undue caution. Bragg then ordered General Polk to attack Crittenden's corps, which, his cavalry informed him, was marching hard after Bragg up the valley. But while Polk was awaiting Crittenden in a place of strong defense, Crittenden, realizing his isolation, had withdrawn from his advanced position. Thus Bragg's plan completely miscarried. Rosecrans, learning the situation, set to work to concentrate his army along the road from Chattanooga, heading south to Lafayette. But McCook, commander of the right wing, had been sent far to the south to intercept the enemy's retreat, and he was four days in effecting the desired junction with the Union center.

The two armies now faced each other along Chickamauga Creek. The battle began on the 19th. Bragg attempted to turn the Union left, but this was thwarted by Rosecrans shifting Thomas's corps to the rear of Crittenden's. That

night Longstreet arrived from Virginia, and Bragg, dividing his army in two, gave him command of the left division and Polk command of the right. Polk made a furious assault on the 20th, chiefly against Thomas. But the Union general stood firm. Longstreet's attack was delayed, and came upon the Union right, which had been weakened to support the left, with the crushing force of an unexpected blow, sweeping back such brave and capable generals as McCook and Sheridan. Rosecrans thought the day was lost, and rode to Chattanooga to prepare for retreat.

Then Thomas, having withstood the attack upon him, came to the rescue. He threw his troops in a line across the valley, which his soldiers, with desperate valor, clubbing their muskets when ammunition was lacking, held the rest of the afternoon, thus earning for their commander the sobriquet of "Rock of Chickamauga." At night Thomas, whom Rosecrans had placed in chief command, withdrew the army in good order to Rossville beyond Missionary Ridge.

Rosecrans had already notified Washington of the disaster. The President, with remarkable calm, wrote to General Halleck on the 21st, recommending that "means to the utmost of our ability" be furnished Rosecrans to hold Chattanooga, and that he be not pushed beyond this.

If he can only maintain this position, without more, this rebellion can only eke out a short and feeble existence, as an animal sometimes may with a thorn in its vitals.

At the same time he sent an encouraging mes-

sage to Rosecrans, assuring him of the confidence of the Administration and promising him utmost support, a promise which he set about fulfilling by urging forward the slowly moving Burnside at Knoxville, getting him reënforcements from Sherman, and sending him two small army corps, Howard's and Slocum's, under general command of Hooker. He further encouraged him by transmitting Bragg's report of his heavy losses, especially in officers, which appeared in the Richmond papers.

Bragg laid siege to Chattanooga, cutting off all communications save over the mountains to the north. On October 4 the President suggested to Rosecrans as the "best move of counteracting" this raid on his communications, to make frequent demonstrations against the enemy. "I understand," said he, "the main body of the enemy is very near you, so near that you could 'board at home,' so to speak, and menace or attack him any day." In reply to Rosecrans's suggestion that he offer a general amnesty to the Rebels, to give moral strength to the Union cause and weaken the enemy, the President wrote: "I intend doing something like what you suggest whenever the case shall appear ripe enough to have it accepted in the true understanding rather than as a confession of weakness and fear."

Studying the situation, the President came to a conclusion regarding the purpose of the enemy, which proved to be a remarkably accurate forecast. On October 12 he wrote to Rosecrans: "I now think the enemy will not attack Chattanooga, and I think you will have to look out for his making a concentrated drive at Burnside. You and Burnside now have him by the throat;

and he must break your hold or perish." Despite this encouragement, Rosecrans became more and more despondent. Already poorly supplied with food, he feared that the Confederates would break his communications with Burnside, and starve him out. Charles A. Dana, assistant secretary of war, was with the army, and he reported that there were indications that Rosecrans was contemplating a retreat. In order to prevent this disastrous movement, Secretary Stanton met General Grant by appointment at Louisville, and gave him command of the Military Division of the Mississippi, including all the armies in the West north of Banks's department. Grant had the option of either retaining Rosecrans as the head of the Army of the Cumberland, or replacing him with Thomas. He chose Thomas, and at once telegraphed him instructions to hold Chattanooga, to which Thomas replied : "We will hold the town till we starve."

By an energetic movement entirely unexpected by the enemy, Grant crossed the river and occupied Lookout Valley. On October 29 Longstreet made a night attack upon Hooker's division in the valley, and was driven back.

Bragg then ordered Longstreet to make the movement against Burnside which Mr. Lincoln had anticipated, and which, indeed, had been suggested by the Confederate President in a visit to the besieging army before Chattanooga. It was not until November 15 that Longstreet was ready to begin this movement. On this date Sherman, who had succeeded Grant in command of the Army of the Tennessee, arrived in Chattanooga, slightly in advance of his forces. Grant had heretofore been held back by the wise insub-

ordination of Thomas from an attack on Bragg's strong position on the north end of Missionary Ridge, which was intended to retain Longstreet from attacking Burnside. Now he set in motion a general attack on Lookout Mountain. This took place on November 24, and proved to be one of the most gallant and successful actions in the war. The soldiers of Hooker's division, to quote from their general's report, "passed directly under the muzzles of the enemy's guns on the summit, climbing over ledges and boulders, up hill and down, furiously driving the enemy from his camp and from position after position."

Bragg now concentrated all his forces on Missionary Ridge. Here, on the 25th, the daring of the charge on Lookout Mountain was outdone by Thomas's soldiers. They were ordered to take the rifle pits, half-way up the mountains, and halt there. They took the pits, and, finding them commanded by batteries higher up, of their own volition continued the charge up the slope. On reaching the summit of the Ridge, they dispersed the Confederates there, turning their own batteries upon them as they fled down the farther side of the mountain. General Sheridan, who was in the van of the charge, pressed the pursuit even by moonlight, and stormed a second ridge, where the retreating enemy had made a stand.

In the meantime Longstreet was besieging Knoxville so closely that little news escaped from Burnside. General John G. Foster was sent with a relieving force to replace Burnside, but was able to get only within hearing distance of Knoxville. As recorded by F. B. Carpenter, the President, upon hearing from Foster that "fir-

ing was heard in the direction of Knoxville," remembered that he was "glad of it," explaining the reason of his gratification by telling a story :

It reminds me of Mistress Sallie Ward, a neighbor of mine, who had a very large family. Occasionally one of her numerous progeny would be heard crying in some out-of-the-way place, upon which Mrs. Ward would exclaim, "There's one of my children that isn't dead yet."

Upon the retreat of Bragg from Chattanooga, Grant sent Sherman with his own and Howard's corps to the rescue of Burnside. Longstreet, hearing of Bragg's defeat, made a desperate attempt on November 29 to storm Burnside's fortifications, but was beaten back with heavy loss. On December 3 he began a retreat toward the fertile valley of the Holston River, where he passed the winter. Foster arrived at Knoxville on December 10, and assumed command on the following day. Sherman returned with his forces to Chattanooga.

CHAPTER X

GENERAL GRANT

[In order that this study of Lincoln's character as revealed in his most significant acts and utterances might not swell to the dimensions of a history of the Civil War as well as a biography of the President, the account of the close of the war has been greatly abbreviated. In this Grant was the dominant figure, and the reader is, therefore, referred to any biography of this general for the details of his final campaign.]

ON March 2, 1864, chiefly through the exertions of Grant's friend, Elihu B. Washburne, Congressman from Illinois, a bill was passed reviving the grade of Lieutenant-General, and investing the holder with the command of all the Federal armies. To this position the President promptly appointed Grant.

At request of the President, Grant came on to Washington on March 9, and Lincoln handed him the commission, it being the third one that ever was issued, and made to its recipient a speech, as follows :

The expression of the nation's approbation of what you have already done, and its reliance on you for what remains to do in the existing great struggle, is now presented with this commission, constituting you Lieutenant-General of the Army of the United States.

With this high honor devolves on you an additional responsibility. As the country herein trusts you, so,

under God, it will sustain you. I scarcely need add, that with what I here speak for the country goes my own hearty personal concurrence.

Grant, with eyes riveted on the floor, responded:

MR. PRESIDENT:—I accept this commission, with gratitude for the high honor conferred.

With the aid of the noble armies that have fought on so many fields for our common country, it will be my earnest endeavor not to disappoint your expectations.

I feel the full weight of the responsibility now devolving on me, and I know that if they are met, it will be due to those armies; and above all, to the favor of that Providence which leads both nations and men.

The Lieutenant-General then visited the Army of the Potomac and returned to Washington, where Mrs. Lincoln prepared an elegant dinner in his honor, inviting the leaders in politics and fashion to meet him. After concluding his business with the War Department, Mr. Lincoln said he *must* stay to the dinner. The General said: "I *can't* do it—I must leave by the first train, to keep my appointment with Sherman." "We can't let you go," said the President; "one train later will answer your purpose." "I can't do it," said the Lieutenant-General impatiently; "I already have had too much of the show business;" and the state dinner was eaten without its principal guest. After consulting at length with Sherman, who had taken his place as commander of the military division of Mississippi, Grant returned to Washington, but in order to finish his talk with Sherman the latter accompanied him as far as Cincinnati. On March 17 Grant announced that his headquarters would be with the

Army of the Potomac. It was evident that the day of employing the Army of the Potomac solely for dress parades had passed, and that the stern business of the war had begun. At this time the aggregate of the army was nearly 1,000,000, with about 30,000 more on detached service. On March 28 the Lieutenant-General took up his quarters at Culpeper Court House, on April 4 he issued instructions for a plan of campaign to Sherman, and on the 9th to Meade, commanding the Army of the Potomac.

The President heartily indorsed these plans, as is indicated in a letter of April 30:

Executive Mansion, Washington, April 30, 1864.
Lieutenant-General Grant:

Not expecting to see you again before the spring campaign opens, I wish to express in this way my entire satisfaction with what you have done up to this time, so far as I understand it. The particulars of your plans I neither know nor seek to know. You are vigilant and self-reliant; and, pleased with this, I wish not to obtrude any constraints or restraints upon you. While I am very anxious that any great disaster or capture of our men in great numbers shall be avoided, I know these points are less likely to escape your attention than they would be mine. If there is anything wanting which is within my power to give, do not fail to let me know it. And now, with a brave army and a just cause, may God sustain you.

The 5th of May had been designated as the time when the campaign was to be opened simultaneously by Meade in the East and by Sherman in the West; and at midnight on May 3-4 the Army of the Potomac crossed the Rapidan, and was entirely across by the night of the 4th, and the forces were engaged early on the morning of the 5th, the day fixed. Sherman took the

field and commenced his campaign on the 5th likewise ; the former receiving the appellation of the " Wilderness" campaign and the latter being designated as the " Atlantic" campaign. In Georgia, Johnson, the Rebel general, adopted the Fabian policy of retreating and drawing his adversary away from his base of supplies, and when November came, Sherman's army held Atlanta, with his adversary in his rear. He left him there, however, confronted by Thomas at Nashville and, cutting loose from his base, marched unresisted to Savannah, where he arrived on December 21. On January 19 succeeding, he marched north, and on the 26th of April, 1865, he received the surrender of Johnston's army.

The policy and results of Grant's campaign were different: his aim and object was not to occupy or fight for territory, but to destroy Lee's army; for he reasoned that, as long as the army remained intact, so long would the war continue. So on May 11, at night, the Lieutenant-General summarized the result thus:

We have now ended the sixth day of very hard fighting. The result up to this time is very much in our favor. But our losses have been heavy as well as those of the enemy. We have lost to this time, eleven general officers killed, wounded, and missing, and probably twenty thousand men. I think the loss of the enemy must be greater—we having taken over four thousand prisoners in battle, whilst he has taken from us but few, except a few stragglers. I am now sending back to Bell Plain all my wagons for a fresh supply of provisions and ammunition, and purpose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer.

The arrival of reënforcements here will be very encouraging to the men, and I hope they will be sent as fast as possible, and in as great numbers. My object in having them sent to Bell Plain was to use them

as an escort to our supply trains. If it is more convenient to send them out by train to march from the railroad to Bell Plain or Fredericksburg, send them so. I am satisfied the enemy are very shaky, and are only kept up to the mark by the greatest exertions on the part of their officers, and by keeping them intrenched in every position they take. Up to this time, there is no indication of any portion of Lee's army being detached for the defense of Richmond.

On the 12th he sent the following dispatch:

The eighth day of the battle closes, leaving between three and four thousand prisoners in our hands for the day's work, including two general officers and over thirty pieces of artillery. The enemy are obstinate and seem to have found the last ditch. We have lost no organizations, not even that of a company, whilst we have destroyed and captured one division (Johnson's), one brigade (Dale's), and one regiment entire from the enemy.

During that awful week the President suffered intense agony of mind, at the fearful loss of life in the Wilderness. The carnage was simply horrible and with no prospect of immediate abatement, for the tenacity of the opposing commanders was as enduring as life itself.

Carpenter relates in his interesting and valuable "Six Months in the White House" that during that week the President scarcely slept at all; that he met him "pacing a narrow hallway, clad in an old faded wrapper, with a pair of slippers, run down at the heel, great rings under his eyes"—an image of grief and misery. Losses from May 5 to June 12 were 6,586 killed; 26,047 wounded; 6,626 missing—a frightful list!

By the middle of June the army had reached and invested Petersburg, which was understood, on both sides, to be the key to Richmond.

The President now was convinced that Grant was a man of his own inflexible temper, resolved to crush the enemy and so end the war. Rendered distrustful of the War Department in this respect by his repeated sad experiences, the President sent a cipher telegram to the Lieutenant-General, which is perhaps the most cynical thing he ever penned :

I have seen your dispatch in which you say, "I want Sheridan put in command of all the troops in the field, with instructions to put himself south of the enemy, and follow him to the death. Wherever the enemy goes, let our troops go also." This, I think, is exactly right as to how our forces should move; but please look over the dispatches you may have received from here, ever since you made that order, and discover, if you can, that there is any idea in the head of anyone here of "putting our army south of the enemy," or of following him to the "death," in any direction. I repeat to you, it will neither be done nor attempted, unless you watch it every day and hour, and force it.

A. LINCOLN.

Two weeks later he sent a characteristic telegram of encouragement :

August 17, 1864. 10.30 A.M.

I have seen your dispatch expressing your unwillingness to break your hold where you are. Neither am I willing. Hold on with a bulldog grip, and chew and choke as much as possible.

After remaining in a state of siege all the summer, fall, and winter, with some episodes, such as the unsuccessful springing of a mine, and occasional raids, the Rebels were forced to evacuate Petersburg on the morning of April 3, and Grant's army took immediate possession; while, at the same time, Weitzel's command occupied Richmond, it having also been evacuated on the

night of the 2d by the Army and Government, the latter leaving by the (only) Danville road. The pursuit of Lee and his army and the surrender at Appomattox are the most familiar episodes in our American history. On the night of March 3 the President sent the following dispatch to Grant:

The President directs me to say that he wishes you to have no conference with General Lee unless it be for capitulation of General Lee's army, or on some minor or purely military matter. He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any political questions. Such questions the President holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military conferences or conventions. Meanwhile you are to press to the utmost your military advantages.

EDWIN M. STANTON, Secretary of War.

Yet the Lieutenant-General did, by the terms of the agreement, absolve everybody surrendered, including Lee, from the consequences of their treason, which was a highly important and significant act, but it was overlooked at the time as it was in harmony with the policy of the Administration. Lee being thereafter indicted by the judicial authorities, the Administration of Andrew Johnson was desirous to press the indictment; but Grant promptly notified the Administration that he should resign if it was pressed; and the prosecution was abandoned.

The surrender came at Appomattox upon the 9th of April, two days after Lincoln, from the army headquarters at City Point, had telegraphed to Grant:

General Sheridan says, "If the thing is pressed I think that Lee will surrender." Let the *thing* be pressed.

When Grant was riding to camp after the surrender he heard the firing of salutes. He gave orders at once to cease such manifestations of exultation, saying: "The war is over; the Rebels are again our countrymen, and the best sign of rejoicing after the victory will be to abstain from all demonstrations in the field."

The number of Grant's captures during the campaign beginning with the battle of the Wilderness was 66,512. The Union losses for the same period were 12,663 killed, 49,559 wounded, and 20,498 missing—a total of 82,720.

CHAPTER XI

EMANCIPATION

SECRETARY WELLES said, in an article appearing in the *Galaxy*, October, 1877:

Emancipation had constituted no part of the policy of the President at the time of his inauguration, and, when finally decreed, he connected with it, as an essential and indispensable part of his policy, a plan of deportation of the colored population. Long before he yielded to emancipation, and in the belief that it was necessary to rid the country of the African race, he had schemes for their migration more advanced than those of the colonizationists. From a conviction that the white and black races could not abide together on terms of social and political equality, he thought they could not peaceably occupy the same territory—that one must dominate the other. Opposed to the whole system of enslavement, but believing the Africans were mentally an inferior race, he believed that any attempt to make them and the whites one people would tend to the degradation of the whites without materially elevating the blacks, but that separation would promote the happiness and welfare of each. . . . The two (deportation and emancipation) were, in his mind, indispensably and indissolubly connected. Colonization in fact had precedence with him, . . . he wished it distinctly understood that deportation was in his mind inseparably connected with this measure, that he considered the two to be parts of one system, and that they must be carried forward together. . . . There was not a member of the Cabinet who did not coincide with the President as to the desirableness of relieving the country of a conflict or of an amalgamation of the two races, one or both of which results lay in the future, were they to occupy the same territory. . . .

They would increase in numbers, have leaders of their own, or of a mixed race of exceptional ability and ambition, and also white demagogues to excite and mislead them, until, if they remained with us, a war more terrible than that in which we were now engaged might be expected. . . . Colonization he believed to be the only remedy.

In Lincoln's first annual message on December 2, 1861, he asked Congress to provide means for colonizing negroes who had been confiscated by Union troops as contraband of war under the act of August 6. "If a new law upon the same subject [confiscation of slaves] shall be proposed, its propriety will be duly considered. The Union must be preserved; and hence all indispensable means must be employed. We should not be in haste to determine that radical and extreme measures, which may reach the loyal as well as the disloyal, are indispensable."

From the debates upon resolutions that were offered in Congress, and referred to the appropriate committees, it developed that the President could go no farther than he had done in the disposition of slaves belonging to Rebel masters, and receive legislative backing. The principle was generally asserted that slaves should be freed whenever and wherever this would tend to weaken the rebellion. Indeed, the orders issued by McClellan and Halleck prohibiting fugitive slaves from coming within the army lines were severely censured.

One year of warfare had accomplished the occupation of the border States, including West Virginia, but had made no impression upon the seceding States. In order that the occupied territory might be permanently attached to the free

States in interest, with no case of a triumph of Southern arms, the President now bent his energies to secure the abolition of slavery in this section. In his Annual Message he had proposed to Congress the passage of a joint resolution offering pecuniary aid to any State which should adopt gradual and compensated emancipation. On March 6 he sent a special message to Congress on the subject, presenting the feasibility of the proposition from a financial point of view.

Any member of Congress, with the census tables and treasury reports before him, can readily see for himself how very soon the current expenditures of this war would purchase, at fair valuation, all the slaves in any named State. Such a proposition on the part of the General Government sets up no claim of a right by Federal authority to interfere with slavery within State limits, referring, as it does, the absolute control of the subject in each case to the State and its people immediately interested. It is proposed as a matter of perfectly free choice with them. . . .

The proposition now made, though an offer only, I hope it may be esteemed no offense to ask whether the pecuniary consideration tendered would not be of more value to the States and private persons concerned than are the institution and property in it, in the present aspect of affairs?

While it is true that the adoption of the proposed resolution would be merely initiatory, and not within itself a practical measure, it is recommended in the hope that it would soon lead to important practical results. In full view of my great responsibility to my God and to my country, I earnestly beg the attention of Congress and the people to the subject.

In private letters, one to Henry J. Raymond of the *New York Times* on March 9, and another to James A. McDougall on March 14, the President presented statistics which very conclusively supported his general statement. To

Raymond, whose paper had objected to the expense involved in the proposition, he wrote:

Have you noticed the facts that less than one-half day's cost of this war would pay for all the slaves in Delaware at \$400 per head—that eighty-seven days' cost of this war would pay for all in Delaware, Maryland, District of Columbia, Kentucky, and Missouri at the same price? Were those States to take the step, do you doubt that it would shorten the war more than eighty-seven days, and thus be an actual saving of expense?

Please look at these things and consider whether there should not be another article in the *Times*.

On March 10 the President invited Congressmen from the border States to the Executive Mansion to discuss the proposed measure.

They were very distrustful of the President's ultimate intentions in regard to slavery; indeed, one of them put to him the pointed query: "Do you look to any policy beyond the acceptance or rejection of this scheme?" To this he replied very directly, as reported by one of the Representatives present, John W. Cresfield of Maryland, that he should lament the refusal of the slave States to accept the offer but he had no designs beyond their refusal of it, and that he should occupy that house for three years, and as long as he remained there Maryland had nothing to fear, either for her institutions or her interests, on the points referred to.

Reciting the resolution he had presented to Congress in his special message of March 6, he continued:

The resolution, in the language above quoted, was adopted by large majorities in both branches of Congress, and now stands an authentic, definite, and solemn proposal of the nation to the States and people most

immediately interested in the subject-matter. To the people of those States I now earnestly appeal. I do not argue—I beseech you to make arguments for yourselves. You cannot, if you would, be blind to the signs of the times. I beg of you a calm and enlarged consideration of them, ranging, if it may be, far above personal and partisan politics. This proposal makes common cause for a common object, casting no reproaches upon any. It acts not the Pharisee. The change it contemplates would come gently as the dews of heaven, not rending or wrecking anything. Will you not embrace it? So much good has not been done, by one effort, in all past time, as in the providence of God it is now your high privilege to do. May the vast future not have to lament that you have neglected it.

A resolution embodying the President's recommendation was introduced in the House on March 10, and in the Senate on March 24. In the debates which ensued it was weakly supported by the anti-slavery Representatives and Senators who were ready for a more radical measure, and vehemently opposed by the pro-slavery legislators, who declared it to be an unconstitutional interference with a State institution. The resolution passed both legislative chambers, and it was signed by the President on April 10. While no slave State took advantage of its provisions, the fact that any or all might have done so destroyed the force of the objection to the ultimate Emancipation Proclamation that the North was unwilling to share the cost of abolishing a system which, however evil, had grown up with the legal sanction of the national government.

President Lincoln stood loyally by his resolution. On May 9, 1862, General David Hunter, of the Department of the South, in a proclama-

tion placing the States of the department under martial law, declared that, since slavery and martial law are incompatible in a free country, the persons in these States—Georgia, Florida, and South Carolina—heretofore held as slaves were declared forever free. Upon this order on May 16 the President wrote the indorsement, "No commanding general shall do such a thing upon my responsibility without consulting me." On the 19th he issued a general proclamation, repudiating and annulling Hunter's proclamation. In this he said:

I further make known that, whether it be competent for me, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, to declare the slaves of any State or States free, and whether, at any time, in any case, it shall have become a necessity indispensable to the maintenance of the Government to exercise such supposed power, are questions which, under my responsibility, I reserve to myself, and which I cannot feel justified in leaving to the decision of commanders in the field. These are totally different questions from those of police regulations in armies and camps.

In the one portion of the Union over which the Federal Government had complete and unquestioned jurisdiction, the District of Columbia, compensated emancipation which also provided for colonizing the freedmen was adopted by Congress, the bill being signed by the President on the 16th of April. In 1849, when he was a member of Congress, Mr. Lincoln had introduced a bill abolishing slavery in the District. The present act was therefore especially gratifying to him as the first fruit of his long and continuous battle for the cause of emancipation—the earnest of complete triumph that was shortly to be consummated.

By midsummer the drift of sentiment in the country toward emancipation of the slaves had developed into a strong current which the opposition to the Administration, beginning to center about General McClellan, was vainly trying to stem. On July 17 Congress passed an "Act to suppress insurrection, to punish treason and rebellion, to seize and confiscate the property of rebels," etc., which by proclaiming the forfeiture of slaves of Rebels to the Government, was virtually an emancipation proclamation. This act the President approved, although before he was informed of its passage he had prepared a draft of a message to Congress ably criticising the constitutionality of some of its provisions. Undoubtedly, in giving his approval he had in mind to issue shortly his broad and thoroughly constitutional Emancipation Proclamation which should cure all defects in the act. Indeed, it may be said that Congress was "forcing his hand," rather as his partner than antagonist.

The President, by Seward's advice, had been waiting for a Union victory before he issued the Preliminary Emancipation Proclamation which had been agreed upon in Cabinet councils.

Mr. F. B. Carpenter, the artist who lived at the White House in 1864 while engaged in painting his noted picture, "The First Reading of the Emancipation Proclamation before the Cabinet," has recorded Lincoln's own account of these early deliberations upon the momentous state paper. Said the President:

It had got to be midsummer, 1862. Things had gone on from bad to worse, until I felt that we had reached the end of our rope on the plan of operations we had been pursuing; that we had about played our last card,

and must change our tactics, or lose the game! I now determined upon the adoption of the emancipation policy; and, without consultation with, or the knowledge of the Cabinet, I prepared the original draft of the proclamation, and, after much anxious thought, called a Cabinet meeting upon the subject. This was the last of July, or the first part of the month of August, 1862. This Cabinet meeting took place, I think, upon a Saturday. All were present, excepting Mr. Blair, the Postmaster-General, who was absent at the opening of the discussion, but came in subsequently. I said to the Cabinet that I had resolved upon this step, and had not called them together to ask their advice, but to lay the subject-matter of a proclamation before them; suggestions as to which would be in order, after they had heard it read. Various suggestions were offered. Secretary Chase wished the language stronger in reference to the arming of the blacks. Mr. Blair, after he came in, deprecated the policy, on the ground that it would cost the Administration the fall elections. Nothing, however, was offered that I had not already fully anticipated and settled in my own mind, until Secretary Seward spoke. He said in substance: "Mr. President, I approve of the proclamation, but I question the expediency of its issue at this juncture. The depression of the public mind, consequent upon our repeated reverses, is so great that I fear the effect of so important a step. It may be viewed as the last measure of an exhausted government, a cry for help; the government stretching forth its hands to Ethiopia, instead of Ethiopia stretching forth her hands to the government." His idea was that it would be considered our last *shriek*, on the retreat. "Now," continued Mr. Seward, "while I approve the measure, I suggest, sir, that you postpone its issue, until you can give it to the country supported by military success, instead of issuing it, as would be the case now, upon the greatest disasters of the war!" The wisdom of the view of the Secretary of State struck me with very great force. It was an aspect of the case that, in all my thought upon the subject, I had entirely overlooked. The result was that I put the draft of the proclamation aside, as you do your sketch for a picture, waiting for a victory. From time to time I added or changed a line, touching it up here and there, anxiously watching the progress

of events. Well, the next news we had was of Pope's disaster, at Bull Run. Things looked darker than ever. Finally, came the week of the battle of Antietam. I determined to wait no longer. The news came, I think, on Wednesday, that the advantage was on our side. I was then staying at the Soldiers' Home (three miles out of Washington). Here I finished writing the second draft of the preliminary proclamation; came up on Saturday; called the Cabinet together to hear it, and it was published the following Monday.

After the President had determined to issue the Proclamation, he set himself to forestall the objections which he knew the document would call forth, such as: that it was intended to establish negro equality; that it proved the insincerity of the declared purpose of the Administration to save the Union by showing this to have been from the beginning to free the slave, etc. On August 14, addressing a deputation of negroes on the subject of colonization, he said, in regard to the vexed question of race equality:

Why should the people of your race leave the country? It is because you and we are different races. We have between us a broader physical difference than exists between any other two races. Whether this is right or wrong I need not discuss; but this physical difference is a great disadvantage to us both. Your race suffer greatly, many of them, by living among us, while ours suffer from your presence. This affords a reason why we should be separated. Your race is suffering, in my judgment, the greatest wrong inflicted on any people. But even when you cease to be slaves, you are yet far remote from being placed on an equality with the white race. You are cut off from many of the advantages which the other race enjoys. The aspiration of men is to enjoy equality with the best when free, but on this broad continent not a single man of your race is made the equal of a single man of ours. Go where you are treated the best, and the ban is still upon you. I do not propose to discuss this,—but to

present it as a fact with which we have to deal. I cannot alter it if I would. . . . I believe in its general evil effects on the white race. See our present condition—white men cutting one another's throats—none knowing how far it will extend. . . . But for your race among us there could not be war, although many men engaged on either side do not care for you one way or the other. . . . It is better for us both, therefore, to be separated.

In regard to the paramount purpose of the war, the President, on August 22, refuted the assumption in an open letter of Horace Greeley, in the *Tribune* of the 20th, that slavery, rather than the salvation of the Union, was the real issue. He said:

As to the policy I "seem to be pursuing," as you say, I have not meant to leave anyone in doubt.

I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Constitution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be "the Union as it was." If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or to destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing all the slaves, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that. What I do about slavery and the colored race, I do because I believe it helps to save the Union; and what I forbear, I forbear because I do not believe it would help to save the Union. I shall do less whenever I shall believe what I am doing hurts the cause, and I shall do more whenever I shall believe doing more will help the cause. I shall try to correct errors when shown to be errors, and I shall adopt new views so fast as they shall appear to be true views.

I have here stated my purpose according to my

view of official duty; and I intend no modification of my oft-expressed personal wish that all men everywhere could be free.

But the most astute of the President's preparatory statements was his reply, on September 13, to a committee from the religious denominations of Chicago asking him to issue a proclamation of emancipation. In this he reviewed the arguments for the proclamation as if he were an opponent of them, and so, by admitting their cogency, he put himself, when ultimately he did issue the proclamation, in the politically advantageous position of being forced to do so. Also, by bringing expediency as a consideration to the fore, he prepared the country for an indefinite postponement of emancipation, which would be the case if there was delay in achieving the victory upon which its promulgation depended. The President said:

The subject presented in the memorial is one upon which I have thought much for weeks past, and I may even say for months. I am approached with the most opposite opinions and advice, and that by religious men who are equally certain that they represent the divine will. I am sure that either the one or the other class is mistaken in that belief and perhaps in some respects both. I hope it will not be irreverent for me to say that if it is probable that God would reveal his will to others on a point so connected with my duty, it might be supposed he would reveal it directly to me; for, unless I am more deceived in myself than I often am, it is my earnest desire to know the will of Providence in this matter. And if I can learn what it is, I will do it. These are not, however, the days of miracles, and I suppose it will be granted that I am not to expect a direct revelation. I must study the plain physical facts of the case, ascertain what is possible, and learn what appears to be wise and right. . . .

What good would a proclamation of emancipation from me do, especially as we are now situated? I do not want to issue a document that the whole world will see must necessarily be inoperative, like the Pope's bull against the comet! Would my word free the slaves, when I cannot even enforce the Constitution in the rebel States? Is there a single court, or magistrate, or individual that would be influenced by it there? And what reason is there to think it would have any greater effect upon the slaves than the late law of Congress, which I approved, and which offers protection and freedom to the slaves of rebel masters who come within our lines? Yet I cannot learn that that law has caused a single slave to come over to us. And suppose they could be induced by a proclamation of freedom from me to throw themselves upon us, what should we do with them? How can we feed and care for such a multitude? General Butler wrote me a few days since that he was issuing more rations to the slaves who have rushed to him than to all the white troops under his command. They eat, and that is all; though it is true General Butler is feeding the whites also by the thousand; for it nearly amounts to a famine there. If, now, the pressure of the war should call off our forces from New Orleans to defend some other point, what is to prevent the masters from reducing the blacks to slavery again; for I am told that whenever the rebels take any black prisoners, free or slave, they immediately auction them off! They did so with those they took from a boat that was aground in the Tennessee River a few days ago. And then I am very ungenerously attacked for it! For instance, when, after the late battles at and near Bull Run, an expedition went out from Washington under a flag of truce to bury the dead and bring in the wounded, and the rebels seized the blacks who went along to help, and sent them into slavery, Horace Greeley said in his paper that the Government would probably do nothing about it. What could I do?

Now, then, tell me, if you please, what possible result of good would follow the issuing of such a proclamation as you desire? Understand, I raise no objections against it on legal or constitutional grounds, for, as commander-in-chief of the army and navy, in time of war I suppose I have a right to take any measure which may best subdue the enemy; nor do I urge objections of

a moral nature, in view of possible consequences of insurrection and massacre at the South. I view this matter as a practical war measure, to be decided on according to the advantages or disadvantages it may offer to the suppression of the rebellion.

The committee at this point replied to the President's objection that the measure was inexpedient, by contending that it would secure at once the sympathy, heretofore in suspense, of England and France, and, indeed, of the whole civilized world; further, that, as slavery was clearly the root of the rebellion, it must be eradicated if the war was to be decisively ended. The President said:

I admit that slavery is at the root of the rebellion, or at least its *sine quâ non*. The ambition of politicians may have instigated them to act, but they would have been impotent without slavery as their instrument. I will also concede that emancipation would help us in Europe, and convince them that we are incited by something more than ambition. I grant, further, that it would help somewhat at the North, though not so much, I fear, as you and those you represent imagine. Still, some additional strength would be added in that way to the war, and then, unquestionably, it would weaken the rebels by drawing off their laborers, which is of great importance; but I am not so sure we could do much with the blacks. If we were to arm them, I fear that in a few weeks the arms would be in the hands of the rebels; and, indeed, thus far, we have not had arms enough to equip our white troops. I will mention another thing, though it meet only your scorn and contempt. There are fifty thousand bayonets in the Union army from the Border Slave States. It would be a serious matter if, in consequence of a proclamation such as you desire, they should go over to the rebels. I do not think they all would—not so many, indeed, as a year ago, or as six months ago—not so many to-day as yesterday. Every day increases their Union feeling. They are also getting their pride en-

listed, and want to beat the rebels. Let me say one thing more: I think you should admit that we already have an important principle to rally and unite the people, in the fact that constitutional government is at stake. This is a fundamental idea, going down about as deep as anything.

In dismissing the committee the President said assuringly:

Do not misunderstand me because I have mentioned these objections. They indicate the difficulties that have thus far prevented my action in some such way as you desire. I have not decided against a proclamation of liberty to the slaves, but hold the matter under advisement. And I can assure you that the subject is on my mind, by day and night, more than any other. Whatever shall appear to be God's will, I will do. I trust that in the freedom with which I have canvassed your views I have not in any respect injured your feelings.

Already the President had laid the event in the hands of God by vowing to issue the proclamation if Lee were driven back over the Potomac. This result of the battle of Antietam was not at once apparent. As Lincoln said to George S. Boutwell: "The battle of Antietam was fought Wednesday, and until Saturday I could not find out whether we had gained a victory or lost a battle. It was then too late to issue the proclamation that day; and . . . I fixed it up a little Sunday, and Monday [September 22] I let them have it."

Secretary Chase recorded in his diary the President's address to his ministers upon this, the most momentous occasion in the nation's history.

All the members of the Cabinet were in attendance. There was some general talk, and the President mentioned that Artemus Ward had sent him his book.

Proposed to read a chapter which he thought very funny. Read it, and seemed to enjoy it very much; the heads also (except Stanton), of course. The chapter was "High-handed Outrage at Utica." The President then took a graver tone, and said, "Gentlemen: I have, as you are aware, thought a great deal about the relation of this war to slavery; and you all remember that, several weeks ago, I read to you an order I had prepared on this subject, which, on account of objections made by some of you, was not issued. Ever since then my mind has been much occupied with this subject, and I have thought, all along, that the time for acting on it might probably come. I think the time has come now. I wish it was a better time. I wish that we were in a better condition. The action of the army against the rebels has not been quite what I should have best liked. But they have been driven out of Maryland, and Pennsylvania is no longer in danger of invasion. When the rebel army was at Frederick, I determined, as soon as it should be driven out of Maryland, to issue a proclamation of emancipation, such as I thought most likely to be useful. I said nothing to anyone, but I made the promise to myself and [hesitating a little] to my Maker. The rebel army is now driven out, and I am going to fulfil that promise. I have got you together to hear what I have written down. I do not wish your advice about the main matter, for that I have determined for myself. This I say without intending anything but respect for any one of you. But I already know the views of each on this question. They have been heretofore expressed, and I have considered them as thoroughly and carefully as I can. What I have written is that which my reflections have determined me to say. If there is anything in the expressions I use, or in any minor matter, which any one of you thinks had best be changed, I shall be glad to receive the suggestions. One other observation I will make. I know very well that many others might, in this matter as in others, do better than I can; and if I was satisfied that the public confidence was more fully possessed by any one of them than by me, and knew of any constitutional way in which he could be put in my place, he should have it. I would gladly yield it to him. But, though I believe that I have not so much of the confidence of the people as I had some time

since, I do not know that, all things considered, any other person has more; and however this may be, there is no way in which I can have any other man put where I am. I am here; I must do the best I can, and bear the responsibility of taking the course which I feel I ought to take."

In accordance with the request of Mr. Lincoln Secretary Seward suggested a few minor changes in the document, which were indorsed by his colleagues and accepted by the President. The proclamation then received the unqualified approval of the entire Cabinet except Postmaster-General Blair, who, while personally in favor of it, expressed apprehension of its evil effect on the border States and the army, which contained many opponents of abolition. He asked leave to file a paper which he had prepared on the subject, with the proclamation. This the President readily granted. Secretary Blair, however, changed his mind over night, and next morning withdrew his objections. The proclamation was published in the newspapers of the 23d. As the President said in response to a serenade from approving Washington citizens at the White House that evening: "It [was] now for the country and the world to pass judgment, and, may be, take action upon it." The proclamation, after solemnly affirming that the purpose of the war was, and should continue to be, the restoration of the Union, and promising measures of compensated emancipation to those slave States which should adhere or return to the Union, and of colonization to the freedmen, declared that on January 1, 1863, "all persons held as slaves within any State, or designated part of a State, the people whereof shall then be

in rebellion against the United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free."

The country quickly gave its approval of the proclamation in the most official way possible at the time. When Confederate invasion of Pennsylvania was imminent, Governor Andrew G. Curtin of that State had invited the governors of the Northern States to meet at Altoona on September 24 to consult on emergency measures for the common defense. Before this date arrived the defeat of Lee had removed the original purpose of the convocation, and the governors, after spending a day or so at Altoona in a helpful exchange of information upon military methods employed by their several States, proceeded to Washington and presented a written address to the President, pledging their support in suppressing the rebellion, with the recommendation that an army of 100,000 men be held in reserve at home ready for such emergencies as that which had recently occurred. To this was added an indorsement of the new proclamation. All the governors of the loyal States, those who were present, and the absentees to whom it was shortly sent, signed that portion relating to the suppression of rebellion, and all but the governors of New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri signed the indorsement of the Emancipation Proclamation.

The measure was acclaimed by the newspapers in general and by men of prominence all over the country. Nevertheless the President deplored the absence of material results. On September 28 he wrote to Vice-President Hamlin in reply to his congratulation upon the Proclamation:

It is six days old, and while commendation in newspapers and by distinguished individuals is all that a vain man could wish, the stocks have declined, and troops come forward more slowly than ever. This, looked soberly in the face, is not very satisfactory. We have fewer troops in the field at the end of the six days than we had at the beginning—the attrition among the old outnumbering the addition by the new. The North responds to the proclamation sufficiently in breath; but breath alone kills no rebels.

In the fall elections to Congress the ranks of the opposition to the President's policy were greatly increased.

Abroad, however, the Proclamation secured immediately and enduringly the sympathy of the common people and their representative statesmen for the Northern cause, and so sounded the knell of Southern expectations of foreign aid and intervention.

On January 1, 1863, none of the States, or portions of States, in rebellion having laid down their arms, the emancipation of the slaves therein was formally proclaimed, as declared in the Preliminary Proclamation.

Mr. Lincoln's temperamental despondency, that in practical affairs inclined him toward pessimism, in spiritual matters led him into fatalism. From the time of the Proclamation onward he believed himself to be but a "humble instrument in the hands of our Heavenly Father," as he remarked in a reply, late in September, to an address by a Friend, Mrs. Eliza P. Gurney. He continued:

I have desired that all my words and acts may be according to His will, and that it might be so, I have sought His aid; but if, after endeavoring to do my best in the light which He affords me, I find my efforts fail, I must believe that for some purpose, unknown to

me, He wills it otherwise. If I had had my way, this war would never have been commenced. If I had been allowed my way, this war would have been ended before this; but we find it still continues, and we must believe that He permits it for some wise purpose of His own, mysterious and unknown to us, and, though with our limited understandings we may not be able to comprehend it, yet we cannot but believe that He who made the world still governs it.

In the same strain he wrote, a day or so later, the following meditation on the Divine Will:

The will of God prevails. In great contests each party claims to act in accordance with the will of God. Both may be, and one must be, wrong. God cannot be for and against the same thing at the same time. In the present civil war it is quite possible that God's purpose is something different from the purpose of either party; and yet the human instrumentalities, working just as they do, are of the best adaptation to effect his purpose. I am almost ready to say that this is probably true; that God wills this contest, and wills that it shall not end yet. By his mere great power on the minds of the now contestants, he could have either saved or destroyed the Union without a human contest. Yet the contest began.

CHAPTER XII

OTHER PROBLEMS OF THE WAR

THE President's fear that the Emancipation Proclamation would alienate many supporters of the Administration was verified in the succeeding election. Horatio Seymour, a Democrat of the extremely conservative type, was elected Governor of New York, and many Republican Congressmen were replaced by Democrats, especially in the Middle West. And yet Lincoln was afflicted by the recriminations of the radicals of his party, who blamed him for losing the confidence of the country by his feeble conduct of the war. To one such fault-finder, General Carl Schurz, he replied in a spirited letter in which he did not refrain from thrusting by keen innuendo at the weak points in his critic's armor, for the righteous ire of the President was roused by strictures upon brother officers from one who had failed to exhibit any marked military ability in the disastrous second battle of Bull Run :

November 24, 1862.

I have just received and read your letter of the 20th. The purport of it is that we lost the late elections and the Administration is failing because the war is unsuccessful, and that I must not flatter myself that I am not justly to blame for it. I certainly know that if the war fails, the Administration fails, and that I will be blamed for it, whether I deserve it or not. And

I ought to be blamed if I could do better. You think I could do better; therefore, you blame me already. I think I could not do better; therefore I blame you for blaming me. I understand you now to be willing to accept the help of men who are not Republicans, provided they have "heart in it." Agreed. I want no others. But who is to be the judge of hearts, or of "heart in it"? If I must discard my own judgment and take yours, I must also take that of others; and by the time I should reject all I should be advised to reject, I should have none left, Republicans or others—not even yourself. For be assured, my dear sir, there are men who have "heart in it" that think you are performing your part as poorly as you think I am performing mine. I certainly have been dissatisfied with the slowness of Buell and McClellan; but before I relieved them I had great fears I should not find successors to them who would do better; and I am sorry to add that I have seen little since to relieve those fears.

The President sent his second Annual Message to Congress on December 1, 1862. In it he first reviewed foreign relations, ascribing the continued recognition abroad of the Confederate States as belligerents to the injury of commercial interests caused by the Federal blockade. He showed, however, that in England there was arising a "respect for the authority of the United States, and the rights of their moral and loyal citizens," this being indicated in a treaty between this country and Great Britain for the suppression of the slave trade, signed on April 7. Upon his favorite project of colonization the President was forced to report that no countries were willing to accept the freedmen as citizens except Liberia and Hayti, and to these the freedmen were unwilling to migrate.

Of the country's finances, as conducted by the wonder-working Secretary of the Treasury, the

President made a wholly encouraging report. He said:

The vast expenditures incident to the military and naval operations required for the suppression of the rebellion have hitherto been met with a promptitude and certainty unusual in similar circumstances, and the public credit has been fully maintained.

Of the success of the issue of "greenbacks" as legal tender by Act of February 25, 1862, the President reported:

The suspension of specie payments by the banks, soon after the commencement of your last session, made large issues of United States notes unavoidable. In no other way could the payment of the troops, and the satisfaction of other just demands, be so economically or so well provided for. The judicious legislation of Congress, securing the receivability of these notes for loans and internal duties, and making them a legal tender for other debts, has made them a universal currency, and has satisfied, partially at least, and for the time, the long-felt want of a uniform circulating medium, saving thereby to the people immense sums in discounts and exchanges.

A National Bank Act had been drawn up under the direction of Secretary Chase. The President earnestly advocated its passage:

A return to specie payments, however, at the earliest period compatible with due regard to all interests concerned, should ever be kept in view. Fluctuations in the value of currency are always injurious, and to reduce these fluctuations to the lowest possible point will always be a leading purpose in wise legislation. Convertibility—prompt and certain convertibility—into coin is generally acknowledged to be the best and surest safeguard against them; and it is extremely doubtful whether a circulation of United States notes, payable in coin, and sufficiently large for the wants

of the people, can be permanently, usefully, and safely maintained.

Is there, then, any other mode in which the necessary provision for the public wants can be made, and the great advantages of a safe and uniform currency secured?

I know of none which promises so certain results, and is at the same time so unobjectionable, as the organization of banking associations under a general act of Congress well guarded in its provisions. To such associations the Government might furnish circulating notes, on the security of United States bonds deposited in the treasury. These notes, prepared under the supervision of proper officers, being uniform in appearance and security, and convertible always into coin, would at once protect labor against the evils of a vicious currency, and facilitate commerce by cheap and safe exchanges.

A moderate reservation from the interest on the bonds would compensate the United States for the preparation and distribution of the notes and a general supervision of the system, and would lighten the burden of that part of the public debt employed as securities. The public credit, moreover, would be greatly improved and the negotiation of new loans greatly facilitated by the steady market demand for government bonds which the adoption of the proposed system would create.

It is an additional recommendation of the measure, of considerable weight in my judgment, that it would reconcile, as far as possible, all existing interests, by the opportunity offered to existing institutions to reorganize under the act, substituting only the secured uniform national circulation for the local and various circulation, secured and unsecured, now issued by them.

The President reported the successful establishment and operation of the Department of Agriculture, created by the Act of Congress of May 15. He then came to the "central act of his administration,"—to employ his own phrase, uttered on a subsequent occasion,—the Emancipation Proclamation. He confined the rest of his message to the first provision of the Proclamation,

that of "compensated emancipation," so earnestly did he desire to do justice to the loyal border States, and so convinced was he that it provided a means for the amicable restoration of the Union.

Our national strife springs . . . not from the land we inhabit, not from our national homestead. There is no possible severing of this but would multiply, and not mitigate, evils among us. In all its adaptations and aptitudes it demands union and abhors separation. In fact, it would ere long force reunion, however much of blood and treasure the separation might have cost.

Our strife pertains to ourselves—to the passing generations of men; and it can without convulsion be hushed forever with the passing of one generation.

The President therefore proposed amendments to the Constitution which would provide compensation in United States bonds to those States or loyal individuals which should free the slaves under their control at any time before January 1, 1900, and which would authorize Congress to colonize freedmen abroad. The articles he discussed at length, advocating them as embodying a plan of mutual concession between loyal and honest slaveholders and loyal and honest Abolitionists.

Doubtless some of those who are to pay, and not to receive, will object. Yet the measure is both just and economical. In a certain sense the liberation of slaves is the destruction of property—property acquired by descent or by purchase, the same as any other property. It is no less true for having been often said, that the people of the South are not more responsible than are the people of the North; and when it is remembered how unhesitatingly we all use cotton and sugar and share the profits of dealing in them, it may not be quite safe to say that the South has been more responsible than the North for its continuance. If, then, for a

common object this property is to be sacrificed, is it not just that it be done at a common charge?

Of the economic advantage of this plan the President said, prophesying a population at the end of the century of 100,000,000:

The proposed emancipation would shorten the war, perpetuate peace, insure this increase of population, and proportionately the wealth of the country. With these, we should pay all the emancipation would cost, together with our other debt, easier than we should pay our other debt without it.

On the subject of the competition of the freedmen with white laborers the President remarked at length, presenting very sound economic arguments as to the advantages of freeing the negroes and retaining them in the country, and very unsound arguments as to the advantages of deporting them. Mr. Lincoln's economic propositions were strangely opposed to his economic principles. While he was continually uttering the sound aphorism that "Labor was prior to, and independent of capital" (he used this expression in his Agricultural Address at Milwaukee, September 30, 1859, and repeated and elaborated it in his First Annual Message), he did not fully realize that this independence was due to the fact that labor created its own wage, but, on the contrary, he acted upon what is known as the "wage fund" theory (so named by John Stuart Mill who, shortly after Mr. Lincoln's death, discarded it as erroneous), namely, that capital bought labor exactly as it did commodities, and therefore the amount and rate of wages were entirely and continuously dependent upon the labor supply in the

market. Said Mr. Lincoln in the present message:

With deportation [of negroes] even to a limited extent, enhanced wages to white labor is mathematically certain. Labor is like any other commodity in the market—increase the demand for it, and you increase the price of it. Reduce the supply of black labor by colonizing the black laborer out of the country, and by precisely so much you increase the demand for, and wages of, white labor.

Nowhere is the fact more clearly recognized to-day than in the South that, had its black labor been deported after the war, the revival of industry in that region, with its consequent increase in both amount and rate of returns to capital and labor, would have been far slower and less vigorous than actually occurred.

The President supplemented that portion of his Annual Message relating to the finances by a special message of January 17, 1863, giving his approval to an additional issue of \$100,000,000 in United States notes, for payment of the army and navy, of which there was immediate and urgent need, as the pay of the soldiers and sailors was greatly in arrears. With his superficial economic mind, he omitted to discuss the vital danger of an increase of currency, the impairment of real value of debts, and, confounding nominal with real prices, he wasted his apprehensions upon the injury wrought by "increase in the cost of living" to labor—whose wages, if he had stopped to consider, must rise in the same ratio as prices of commodities.

While giving this approval, however, I think it my duty to express my sincere regret that it has been

found necessary to authorize so large an additional issue of United States notes, when this circulation, and that of the suspended banks together, have become already so redundant as to increase prices beyond real values, thereby augmenting the cost of living, to the injury of labor, and the cost of supplies—to the injury of the whole country. It seems very plain that continued issues of United States notes, without any check to the issues of suspended banks, and without adequate provision for the raising of money by loans, and for funding the issues, so as to keep them within due limits, must soon produce disastrous consequences; and this matter appears to me so important that I feel bound to avail myself of this occasion to ask the special attention of Congress to it.

As a commentary upon that portion of the Annual Message relating to the selfish interests of the commercial classes abroad as causing the continued recognition of the Confederate States as belligerents, it will be interesting to note two letters written by the President shortly after the Message, to the workingmen of England who were loyal to the cause of the Union in spite of the distress wrought among them through the cutting off by the blockade of the supply of raw cotton to the mills of Europe.

On January 19, 1863, he wrote a letter to the cotton-spinners of Manchester who had sent him an address in support of the Union. After giving them an account of his stewardship in the cause of free labor and civilization, he said:

I know and deeply deplore the sufferings which the workingmen at Manchester, and in all Europe, are called to endure in this crisis. It has been often and studiously represented that the attempt to overthrow this government, which was built upon the foundation of human rights, and to substitute for it one which should rest exclusively on the basis of human slavery, was likely to obtain the favor of Europe. Through the

action of our disloyal citizens, the workingmen of Europe have been subjected to severe trials, for the purpose of forcing their sanction to that attempt. Under the circumstances, I cannot but regard your decisive utterances upon the question as an instance of sublime Christian heroism which has not been surpassed in any age or in any country. It is indeed an energetic and reinspiring assurance of the inherent power of truth, and of the ultimate and universal triumph of justice, humanity, and freedom. I do not doubt that the sentiments you have expressed will be sustained by your great nation; and, on the other hand, I have no hesitation in assuring you that they will excite admiration, esteem, and the most reciprocal feelings of friendship among the American people. I hail this interchange of sentiment, therefore, as an augury that whatever else may happen, whatever misfortune may befall your country or my own, the peace and friendship which now exist between the two nations will be, as it shall be my desire to make them, perpetual.

On February 2, upon receiving a similar address from the "Workingmen of London," he replied with a letter in the same vein.

Congress followed the recommendations of the President's Message to pass Legal Tender and National Bank Acts, but failed to legislate upon the subject of compensated emancipation; the Senators and Representatives from the border States holding that Congress under the Constitution had no authority to appropriate public money for such a purpose.

In other respects, Congress loyally upheld the hands of the President. It ratified his suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus* in the cases of persons suspected of treason, and broadly authorized him to suspend the writ in the future "at such times, and in such places, and with regard to such persons, as in his judgment the public safety may require." An act was passed to enroll and draft

in the national service the militia of the whole country, each State contributing its quota in the ratio of its population. On December 31, 1862, Congress authorized the President to admit West Virginia into the Union, upon its making certain changes in its proposed constitution. These changes having been made, the President admitted it by proclamation on April 20, 1863. Two Congressmen, chosen in New Orleans at an election ordered by the military governor of the State, Brigadier-General G. F. Shepley, were seated after a thorough discussion of the constitutionality of their election.

So earnest was the President in his desire for the ending of the war by the restoration of the Union, that he was ready to eliminate all partisan advantages and personal ambitions to attain the object. Henry Winter Davis of Maryland, who was a leader of the radical faction in Congress which was becoming more and more hostile to the Administration, asked him in March for his opinion on the Speakership of the new House of Representatives. Lincoln replied on the 18th:

The supporters of the war should send no man to Congress who will not pledge himself to go into caucus with the unconditional supporters of the war, and to abide the action of such caucus and vote for the person therein nominated for Speaker. Let the friends of the government first save the government, and then administer it to their own liking.

In accordance with this principle, Lincoln also made overtures to the conservatives, hoping to commit them to a vigorous enforcement of the war. As has been stated already (p. 164), he was willing to support McClellan's aspirations for

the Presidency if the deposed commander of the Army of the Potomac would openly speak for the prosecution of the war. In a similar self-sacrificing spirit he subjected himself to a rebuff from Horatio Seymour, Governor of New York, and probably the leading member of the Democratic party. He wrote him on March 23:

You and I are substantially strangers, and I write this chiefly that we may become better acquainted. I, for the time being, am at the head of a nation that is in great peril, and you are at the head of the greatest State of that nation. As to maintaining the nation's life and integrity, I assume and believe there cannot be a difference of purpose between you and me. If we should differ as to the means, it is important that such difference should be as small as possible; that it should not be enhanced by unjust suspicions on one side or the other. In the performance of my duty the coöperation of your State, as that of others, is needed—in fact, is indispensable. This alone is a sufficient reason why I should wish to be at a good understanding with you. Please write me at least as long a letter as this, of course saying in it just what you think fit.

Governor Seymour responded but coldly to this warm invitation.

Davis shortly became the President's bitterest antagonist in his own party, and Seymour his most troublesome adversary in the ranks of the opposition, while McClellan opposed him for the Presidency in 1864. That Lincoln had left nothing undone which could win their favor and friendship, to a lesser man might have been a matter for regret; to him, if he thought upon it at all, it undoubtedly brought the consolation of duty performed.

During this period the President applied himself to the subject of negro enlistment in the army.

His old fear that the former slaves would make inefficient soldiers had been outweighed by consideration of the great moral force of the policy. To Governor Andrew Johnson of Tennessee, who was contemplating the raising in his State of a negro military force, he wrote on March 26:

In my opinion the country now needs no specific thing so much as some man of your ability and position to go to this work. When I speak of your position, I mean that of an eminent citizen of a slave State and himself a slaveholder. The colored population is the great available and yet unavailed of force for restoring the Union. The bare sight of fifty thousand armed and drilled black soldiers upon the banks of the Mississippi would end the rebellion at once; and who doubts that we can present that sight if we but take hold in earnest? If you have been thinking of it, please do not dismiss the thought.

Although from the beginning of the war the Confederate Government had been urged by various of its soldiers and statesmen to arm the negroes, such action by the North evoked dire threats of reprisal. White officers of colored troops were to be treated as outlaws, and shot when captured. This was a challenge which the Abolitionists were eager to accept. To them the war now assumed the character of a holy crusade. Many of them offered the Government their services as officers of negro regiments.

A letter of the President to General Banks at New Orleans is a record of such devotion. It is dated March 29, 1863.

Hon. Daniel Ullman, with a commission of a brigadier-general and two or three hundred other gentlemen as officers, goes to your department and reports to you, for the purpose of raising a colored brigade. To now

avail ourselves of this element of force is very important, if not indispensable. I therefore will thank you to help General Ullman forward with his undertaking as much and as rapidly as you can; and also to carry the general object beyond his particular organization if you find it practicable. The necessity of this is palpable if, as I understand, you are now unable to effect anything with your present force; and which force is soon to be greatly diminished by the expiration of terms of service, as well as by ordinary causes. I shall be very glad if you will take hold of the matter in earnest.

General David Hunter had already organized negro troops in his department. From the beginning the experiment was an unqualified success. It was a pleasure to the President that he could now write a letter of congratulation to the Abolitionist general whom less than a year before he had been compelled to reprimand for his premature act of emancipation.

I am glad to see the accounts of your colored force at Jacksonville, Fla. I see the enemy are driving at them fiercely, as is to be expected. It is important to the enemy that such a force shall not take shape and grow and thrive in the South, and in precisely the same proportion it is important to us that it shall. Hence the utmost caution and vigilance is necessary on our part. The enemy will make extra efforts to destroy them, and we should do the same to preserve and increase them.

In all their subsequent battles the negro soldiers acquitted themselves with such valor that in the war reports the sentence, "the colored troops fought bravely," became a stock expression.

On the occasion of their soldierly conduct at the assault of Port Hudson late in May, 1863, George Henry Boker wrote a poem called "The Black Regiment," in which he extolled their pa-

triotism, and pleaded for their recognition as comrades by the white soldiers.

“Freedom!” their battle cry,—
 “Freedom! or leave to die!”
 Ah! and they meant the word,
 Not as with us ’tis heard,
 Not a mere party shout;
 They gave their spirits out,
 Hundreds on hundreds fell;
 Oh, to the living few,
 Soldiers, be just and true,
 Hail them as comrades tried;
 Fight with them side by side;
 Never, in field or tent,
 Scorn the black regiment!

On June 1, through Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts, the President made a tentative offer to General Frémont to place him in command of all the negro troops to be raised. The offer was not accepted. Had it been, Frémont at the close of the war would have commanded an army of almost 200,000 men, second in number only to Grant's.

The threat of the Confederates to remand captured negro soldiers to slavery evoked an “Order of Retaliation” from the President, issued July 3:

It is the duty of every government to give protection to its citizens of whatever class, color, or condition, and especially to those who are duly organized as soldiers in the public service. The law of nations, and the usages and customs of war, as carried on by civilized powers, permit no distinction as to color in the treatment of prisoners of war as public enemies. To sell or enslave any captured person on account of his color, and for no offense against the laws of war, is a relapse

into barbarism and a crime against the civilization of the age.

The Government of the United States will give the same protection to all its soldiers, and if the enemy shall sell or enslave anyone because of his color, the offense shall be punished by retaliation upon the enemy's prisoners in our possession.

It is therefore ordered that for every soldier of the United States killed in violation of the laws of war, a rebel soldier shall be executed; and for everyone enslaved by the enemy or sold into slavery, a rebel soldier shall be placed at hard labor on the public works, and continued at such labor until the other shall be released and receive the treatment due to a prisoner of war.

Either the threat of the Confederates was an idle one, or Lincoln's order deterred them from putting it into execution, for with but one important exception they gave negroes captured in battle the same treatment that was accorded white prisoners. At the storming of Fort Pillow, Tennessee, on April 12, 1863, the Confederate General Forrest massacred at least three hundred of the garrison, mostly negroes and their white officers, after these had thrown down their arms.

A rumor of this fiendish act came to the President just before he delivered an address at a Sanitary Fair in Baltimore on April 18, 1864, and in his speech he solemnly promised that, if the charge against Forrest proved upon investigation to be true, retribution would be surely executed. He said:

There seems to be some anxiety in the public mind whether the Government is doing its duty to the colored soldier, and to the service, at this point. At the beginning of the war, and for some time, the use of colored troops was not contemplated; and how the change of purpose was wrought I will not now take

time to explain. Upon a clear conviction of duty I resolved to turn that element of strength to account; and I am responsible for it to the American people, to the Christian world, to history, and in my final account to God. Having determined to use the negro as a soldier, there is no way but to give him all the protection given to any other soldier. . . . If after all that has been said it shall turn out that there has been no massacre at Fort Pillow, it will be almost safe to say there has been none, and will be none, elsewhere. If there has been the massacre of three hundred there, or even the tenth part of three hundred, it will be conclusively proved; and being so proved, the retribution shall as surely come. It will be matter of grave consideration in what exact course to apply the retribution; but in the supposed case it must come.

A Congressional investigation proved that the rumor was true, and had not been exaggerated. Yet the brutality revealed was so monstrous that the tender-hearted President refrained, in spite of his promise, from a retribution which, to be effective, would have to be coextensive with the offense, and, because visited in cold blood upon innocent prisoners, even more brutal than the massacre, which was perpetrated in the blood-lust of conquest.

Accordingly, the public interest being concentrated at the time on the bloody campaign of Grant in Virginia, the Fort Pillow incident was allowed by the Government to pass without action upon it.

Toward the end of the war, when the collapse of the Rebellion was in plain sight, the Confederate Government debated the question of arming the slaves; the measure failed by one vote. Mr. Lincoln expressed his sentiments upon this unique phase of the conflict begun in defense of slavery in a speech on the occasion of a presentation of a

captured Rebel flag to Governor Morton of Indiana.

While I have often said that all men ought to be free, yet would I allow those colored persons to be slaves who want to be, and next to them those white people who argue in favor of making other people slaves. I am in favor of giving an appointment to such white men to try it on for these slaves. I will say one thing in regard to the negro being employed to fight for them. I do know he cannot fight and stay at home and make bread too. And as one is about as important as the other to them, I don't care which they do. I am rather in favor of having them try them as soldiers. They lack one vote of doing that, and I wish I could send my vote over the river so that I might cast it in favor of allowing the negro to fight. But they cannot fight and work both. We now see the bottom of the enemy's resources.

CHAPTER XIII

NORTHERN RESISTANCE TO MILITARY AUTHORITY

THE bloodiest episode of the War, outside of the actual operations in the field, was the resistance to the enforcement of the draft ordered by act of Congress. Of course this was not a very popular law anywhere, but it was carried into effect generally with no trouble and even when it was troublesome it was not serious, except in New York City. Here the resistance to the draft almost engendered a counter-revolution. On Saturday, July 11, the draft commenced and proceeded quietly, the sullen crowds which gathered in the streets confining their opposition to suppressed rage and portentous scowls and mutterings. On Sunday, however, the opposition began to become coherent and gather to a big black ominous cloud, and when the draft was resumed on the next day, an unrelenting mob broke into the room, destroyed the wheel which contained the names, and set fire to the building. The firemen appeared, but the rioters refused to let them do anything, and they were obliged to look on and see the entire block needlessly sacrificed. The Superintendent of Police attempted to enforce order, and was seized by the insensate mob, and barely escaped with his life. Of course, the Rebel emissaries were active, inciting to new and increased outrages; and thieves, pickpockets, bur-

glars, and criminals of all sorts flocked into the city from other places, and plied their foul vocations, while the dangerous elements of all classes and both sexes exerted the most untiring efforts to promote the cause of disorder, riot, and rapine. Unfortunately, the militia had gone to Pennsylvania to aid the troops at the battle of Gettysburg, and the police were powerless to cope with a mob which now numbered thousands of the worst enemies of society, and the riot went madly on for the space of four days until the troops could be restored to the city. The draft was forgotten and the mob was fatally bent on mischief of any sort, crime of every name, outrage of every degree. The weakest and the most powerful alike were targets for the violence of the mad mob. Leading citizens were assaulted, and their houses pillaged. The mob had an especial antipathy to negroes, and although the blacks were unoffending, yet any one caught on the streets was instantly strung up to the first lamp-post. There was a negro orphan asylum on Fifth Avenue which afforded a home for about 750 colored orphans; this was set afire by the brutal mob, the poor orphans were driven off and beaten, and the building and contents were destroyed, after being pillaged.

The only consistency in the acts of this mad mob was to steal all they could, kill every negro they could see, and attack every policeman they could discover; they aimed at no other specific result, but simply did all the mischief they dared; they did indeed intend to destroy the buildings in which the loyal newspapers, especially the *Tribune*, were printed, but the riot was quelled just before it attained those results. Governor Seymour

made a speech to the rioters from the steps of the City Hall; and on Tuesday issued a proclamation, neither of which produced any effect. Both the Governor and the police did the best they could, but they could not control so fearful, desperate, and bloody-minded a mob; naught but the force of regiments could suppress them. The riot was not quelled till the serried ranks of infantry, with lines of glistening steel, gave notice to the rioters that henceforth they could not longer murder, pillage, and burn with impunity; but that the contest henceforth would be with organized force. This issue the rioters were eager to decline and did, in fact, decline.

The Army of the Potomac was weakened both by the withdrawal of troops and the impairment of the army's *morale* on account of this riot, and the Rebel army was strengthened correspondingly. Lee was thereby emboldened to weaken his army in the East by sending Longstreet to the support of Bragg, who was confronted by Rosecrans in Middle Tennessee.

Meanwhile the draft had not been enforced in New York City and on August 3 Governor Seymour appealed to the President to suspend the draft until the courts could adjudge the constitutionality of the law, which was in doubt, and for other reasons. To this letter the President made the following reply:

I do not object to abide a decision of the United States Supreme Court, or of the Judges thereof, on the constitutionality of the draft law. In fact, I should be willing to facilitate the obtaining of it. But I cannot consent to lose the time while it is being obtained. We are contending with an enemy who, as I understand, drives every able-bodied man he can reach into his

ranks, very much as a butcher drives bullocks into a slaughter-pen. No time is wasted, no argument is used. This produces an army which will soon turn upon our now victorious soldiers already in the field, if they shall not be sustained by recruits as they should be. It produces an army with a rapidity not to be matched on our side, if we first waste time to reëxperiment with the volunteer system, already deemed by Congress, and palpably, in fact, so far exhausted as to be inadequate; and then more time to obtain a Court decision as to whether a law is constitutional which requires a part of those not now in the service to go to the aid of those who are already in it; and still more time to determine with absolute certainty that we get those who are to go in the precisely legal proportion to those who are not to go. My purpose is to be in my action just and constitutional, and yet practical, in performing the important duty with which I am charged, of maintaining the unity and the free principles of our common country.

The draft was resumed on August 19, and as the thugs found they would be confronted by men with guns and the animus to shoot, instead of by helpless negroes and children, they concluded that discretion was the better part of valor, and did nothing unseemly; and the draft was concluded in an orderly fashion. I recollect in November, 1864, paying some of the very men drafted at this time: they were members of the 68th New York Infantry, and were guarding blockhouses between Bridgeport (Ala.) and Chattanooga. They looked sullen and discontented, but had no scruples about drawing their pay.

A less tragic, yet far more important, development of Northern resistance to military authority occurred in Ohio during the summer and fall of 1863. General Burnside in his new department had little chance to repeat his military blunders, but his well-meaning stupidity soon caused

him to involve the Administration in a political complication which it required all the finesse of the President to bring to a successful conclusion. Clement L. Vallandigham, an extreme States-rights Democrat, who as a member of the preceding Congress had in a speech in the House of Representatives eloquently denounced the war, declaring the purpose of the Administration to be to "change our present democratical form of government into an imperial despotism," repeated these sentiments in Democratic meetings throughout Ohio, and, in particular, assailed General Burnside for an edict he had issued known as "General Order No. 38," forbidding acts committed for the benefit of the enemy, and stating that persons committing such offenses would be tried as spies or traitors, or sent over into the lines of their friends. On May 4 General Burnside arrested Mr. Vallandigham at his home in Dayton, and brought him to headquarters at Cincinnati for trial by court-martial. His counsel, Senator Pugh, applied for a writ of *habeas corpus*, which the judge refused, on the ground that the action of General Burnside was in the interest of public safety. Mr. Vallandigham was tried on the 6th, found guilty, and sentenced to imprisonment in a Federal fortress. General Burnside designated Fort Warren in Boston Harbor as the place of incarceration. The President, however, modified this sentence into the alternative presented by Order No. 38, and sent the prisoner over into the Confederate lines. From the South he ran through the blockade, finally arriving in Canada.

The opponents of the war, being sadly in need of a concrete example of the tyranny against

which they were inveighing, seized upon the case as fulfilling every desired specification. In Vallandigham himself, an eloquent fanatic, they possessed an ideal hero and martyr of the cause. Public meetings were held all over the country to denounce the Administration for its despotic act. General Burnside, fearing that he had been unwise in bringing this storm of criticism upon the Government, offered his resignation. In reply the President telegraphed him on May 29 as follows:

When I shall wish to supersede you I will let you know. All the cabinet regretted the necessity of arresting, for instance, Vallandigham, some perhaps doubting there was a real necessity for it; but, being done, all were for seeing you through with it.

The brunt of seeing Burnside through, however, fell on the President, and ably did he fulfil the difficult task. Opposed to him were some of the shrewdest constitutional lawyers in the country. At their instigation meetings in denunciation of Vallandigham's arrest were held in various parts of the country. The President chose to reply to the resolutions passed by a meeting at Albany, N. Y., on May 19. To this Governor Seymour had sent an address, in which he said: "If this proceeding is approved by the Government, and sanctioned by the people, it is not merely a step toward revolution—it is revolution; it will not only lead to military despotism—it establishes military despotism." The resolutions closed with a denunciation of "the blow struck at a citizen of Ohio" as "aimed at every citizen of the North," and "against the spirit of our laws and Constitution." They earnestly called on

the President "to reverse the action of the military tribunal which has passed a cruel and unusual punishment upon the party arrested, prohibited in terms by the Constitution," and to restore him to liberty.

The President took his time in preparing a reply, with the result that the letter, when it was finished on June 12, proved to be one of his notable papers, comparable for its cogent argument to his Cooper Union address.

He began by analyzing the resolutions of the meeting and showing that their movers and himself had a common purpose, the maintenance of the nation, differing only in the choice of measures for effecting that object. "The meeting, by their resolutions, assert and argue that certain military arrests . . . for which I am ultimately responsible, are unconstitutional. I think they are not." He then argued that these arrests were not made for "treason," as charged, but on "totally different grounds," i. e., for purely military reasons. He narrated the manner in which the enemy with which the country was in open war had, under cover of "liberty of speech," "liberty of the press," and "*habeas corpus*," kept a corps of spies in the North, which had aided the secessionist cause in a thousand ways. "Yet," said the President, "thoroughly imbued with a reverence for the guaranteed rights of individuals, I was slow to adopt the strong measures which by degrees I had been forced to regard as being within the exceptions of the Constitution, and as indispensable to the public safety." But the evil had to be dealt with, and by more effective means than afforded by the civil courts, on whose juries sympathizers with the accused were apt to sit,

“more ready to hang the panel than to hang the traitor.” And again, said Lincoln, there are crimes against the country which may be so conducted as to evade the cognizance of a civil court, such as dissuading a man from volunteering or inducing a soldier to desert. These are cases clearly coming under that clause of the Constitution which permits suspension of the writ of *habeas corpus* “when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, public safety may require it.”

The President then proceeded to draw a distinction between civil and military law. He said:

The former is directed at the small percentage of ordinary and continuous perpetration of crime, while the latter is directed at sudden and extensive uprisings against the Government, which, at most, will succeed or fail in no great length of time. In the latter case arrests are made not so much for what has been done, as for what probably would be done. The latter is more for the preventive and less for the vindictive than the former. In such cases the purposes of men are much more easily understood than in cases of ordinary crime. The man who stands by and says nothing when the peril of his Government is discussed cannot be misunderstood. If not hindered, he is sure to help the enemy; much more if he talks ambiguously—talks for his country with “buts,” and “ifs,” and “ands.”

The President showed how greatly the country had suffered through deferring arrests for treason, by citing the cases of Breckinridge, Lee, Joseph E. Johnston, and other commanders in the Confederate service who had all been within the power of the Government after the outbreak of the war, and who were well known to be traitors at the time. Said the President:

In view of these and similar cases, I think the time not unlikely to come when I shall be blamed for having made too few arrests rather than too many.

Mr. Lincoln then examined the contention of the committee that even during a war military arrests were unconstitutional outside of the region of hostilities. To this the President replied:

Inasmuch, however, as the Constitution itself makes no such distinction, I am unable to believe that there is any such constitutional distinction. I concede that the class of arrests complained of can be constitutional only when, in cases of rebellion or invasion, the public safety may require them; and I insist that in such cases they are constitutional wherever the public safety does require them, as well in places to which they may prevent the rebellion extending, as in those where it may be already prevailing; as well where they may restrain mischievous interference with the raising and supplying of armies to suppress the rebellion, as where the rebellion may actually be; as well where they may restrain the enticing men out of the army, as where they would prevent mutiny in the army. . . .

Mr. Vallandigham's arrest was made because he was laboring, with some effect, to prevent the raising of troops, to encourage desertions from the army, and to leave the rebellion without an adequate military force to suppress it. He was not arrested because he was damaging the political prospects of the Administration or the personal interests of the commanding general, but because he was damaging the army, upon the existence and vigor of which the life of the nation depends. He was warring upon the military, and this gave the military constitutional jurisdiction to lay hands upon him. If Mr. Vallandigham was not damaging the military power of the country, then his arrest was made on mistake of fact, which I would be glad to correct on reasonably satisfactory evidence.

With an argument appealing even more to the hearts than the heads of his critics, Mr. Lincoln continued:

I understand the meeting whose resolutions I am considering to be in favor of suppressing the rebellion by military force—by armies. Long experience has

shown that armies cannot be maintained unless desertion shall be punished by the severe penalty of death. The case requires, and the law and the Constitution sanction, this punishment. Must I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert? . . . I think that, in such a case, to silence the agitator and save the boy is not only constitutional, but a great mercy.

In fine, said the President:

I can no more be persuaded that the Government can constitutionally take no strong measures in time of rebellion, because it can be shown that the same could not be lawfully taken in time of peace, than I can be persuaded that a particular drug is not good medicine for a sick man because it can be shown to not be good food for a well one. Nor am I able to appreciate the danger apprehended by the meeting, that the American people will by means of military arrests during the rebellion lose the right of public discussion, the liberty of speech and the press, the law of evidence, trial by jury, and *habeas corpus* throughout the indefinite peaceful future which I trust lies before them, any more than I am able to believe that a man could contract so strong an appetite for emetics during temporary illness as to persist in feeding upon them during the remainder of his healthful life.

The President gently rebuked the memorialists for introducing partisan politics into the affair by designating themselves as "Democrats" rather than "American citizens." Nevertheless he accepted the challenge, and showed that Andrew Jackson, the idol of the Democratic party, had made a military arrest of the author of a denunciatory newspaper article, and refused the service upon himself of a writ of *habeas corpus*, being fined for so doing; thirty years later, after a full discussion of the constitutional aspects of

the case, a Democratic Congress refunded him principal and interest of the fine.

At the conclusion of his letter the President stated that he had been pained when he learned of Mr. Vallandigham's arrest, and he promised to release him with pleasure when he felt assured that the public safety would not suffer by it.

On June 11 the Ohio Democratic Convention nominated Vallandigham for Governor of the State upon a platform which protested against the Emancipation Proclamation, military arrests in loyal States, and in particular, the banishment of Vallandigham. A committee presented these resolutions to the President, and on June 29 he replied to them in the tenor of his letter to the Albany meeting, elaborating the constitutional argument, and closing with the following proposition :

Your nominee for Governor . . . is known . . . to declare against the use of an army to suppress the rebellion. Your own attitude, therefore, encourages desertion, resistance to the draft, and the like, because it teaches those who incline to desert and to escape the draft to believe it is your purpose to protect them, and to hope that you will become strong enough to do so. . . .

I cannot say I think you desire this effect to follow your attitude; but I assure you that both friends and enemies of the Union look upon it in this light. It is a substantial hope, and, by consequence, a real strength to the enemy. If it is a false hope, and one which you would willingly dispel, I will make the way exceedingly easy. I send you duplicates of this letter, in order that you, or a majority, may, if you choose, indorse your names upon one of them, and return it thus indorsed to me, with the understanding that those signing are thereby committed to the following propositions, and to nothing else:—

1. That there is now rebellion in the United States, the object and tendency of which is to destroy the National Union; and that, in your opinion, an army and navy are constitutional means for suppressing that rebellion.

2. That no one of you will do anything which, in his own judgment, will tend to hinder the increase, or favor the decrease, or lessen the efficiency of the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress that rebellion; and,—

3. That each of you will, in his sphere, do all he can to have the officers, soldiers, and seamen of the army and navy, while engaged in the effort to suppress the rebellion, paid, fed, clad, and otherwise well provided for and supported.

And with the further understanding that upon receiving the letter and names thus indorsed, I will cause them to be published, which publication shall be, within itself, a revocation of the order in relation to Mr. Vallandigham.

The committee, put upon the defensive by this clever device of the President, took the only attitude which was possible short of capitulation, and rejected the proposition as an insult to their loyalty. They went into the campaign foredoomed to defeat. The Republican party determined to "make treason odious" by piling up an enormous majority of votes against him. They nominated John Brough, a "War Democrat," to make the issue as clear as possible. By a State law the soldiers in the field were permitted to vote, and they, as well as the citizens at home, cast their ballots under conditions which would be far from satisfactory to a ballot reformer of the present day. Brough won the election with over 100,000 votes to spare. Soon after his defeat, Vallandigham returned openly to Ohio, evidently daring the Government to arrest him again. The President, however, realizing that Vallan-

digham's power to injure the draft was broken, ignored his presence in the country. Undoubtedly he would have taken a similar course from the beginning, had not Burnside's action in arresting Vallandigham forced him to carry out an autocratic policy. For Lincoln did not approve of supplying martyrs to the opposition, and, therefore, when forced to do so, he contrived to make them as unheroic, and even ridiculous, as possible. Brilliant orator though he was, Clement L. Vallandigham's connection with his party became a positive detriment to it, and he soon retired from politics to devote himself to law, in the practice of which he met his death in a strange and tragic fashion. In defending a man accused of murder he shot himself, as he was illustrating the manner in which his client might have discharged his pistol by accident while drawing it from his pocket.

The political campaign of 1863 in other States as well as in Ohio was waged along the lines laid down by the President, with the result of sweeping gubernatorial victories for the Administration.

The President not only sounded the keynote of the campaign, and formulated the Administration's platform, but wrote, as it were, the campaign text-book of his party, reviewing the acts of the Administration and supporting its policies so completely and cogently that nothing essential could be added. All this he did in an address which he sent to a mass-meeting of "unconditional Union men," at Springfield, Ill., and which was there read on September 3 amid the greatest enthusiasm.

After tendering the nation's gratitude to those "noble men whom no partisan malice or partisan

hope can make false to the nation's life," the President plunged at once into a justification of his course.

There are those who are dissatisfied with me. To such I would say: You desire peace, and you blame me that we do not have it. But how can we attain it? There are but three conceivable ways: First, to suppress the rebellion by force of arms. This I am trying to do. Are you for it? If you are, so far we are agreed. If you are not for it, a second way is to give up the Union. I am against this. Are you for it? If you are, you should say so plainly. If you are not for force, nor yet for dissolution, there only remains some imaginable compromise. I do not believe any compromise embracing the maintenance of the Union is now possible. All I learn leads to a directly opposite belief. The strength of the rebellion is its military, its army. That army dominates all the country and all the people within its range. Any offer of terms made by any man or men within that range, in opposition to that army, is simply nothing for the present, because such man or men have no power whatever to enforce their side of a compromise, if one were made with them.

To illustrate. Suppose refugees from the South and peace men of the North get together in convention and frame and proclaim a compromise embracing a restoration of the Union. In what way can that compromise be used to keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania? Meade's army can keep Lee's army out of Pennsylvania, and, I think, can ultimately drive it out of existence. But no paper compromise to which the controllers of Lee's army are not agreed can at all affect that army. In an effort at such compromise we should waste time which the enemy would improve to our disadvantage; and that would be all. A compromise, to be effective, must be made either with those who control the rebel army, or with the people first liberated from the domination of that army by the success of our own army. Now, allow me to assure you that no word or intimation from that rebel army, or from any of the men controlling it, in relation to any peace compromise, has ever come to my knowledge or

belief. All charges and insinuations to the contrary are deceptive and groundless. And I promise you that if any such proposition shall hereafter come, it shall not be rejected and kept a secret from you. I freely acknowledge myself the servant of the people, according to the bond of service—the United States Constitution—and that, as such, I am responsible to them.

But to be plain. You are dissatisfied with me about the negro. Quite likely there is a difference of opinion between you and myself upon that subject. I certainly wish that all men could be free, while I suppose you do not. Yet, I have neither adopted nor proposed any measure which is not consistent with even your view, provided you are for the Union. I suggested compensated emancipation, to which you replied you wished not to be taxed to buy negroes. But I had not asked you to be taxed to buy negroes, except in such way as to save you from greater taxation to save the Union exclusively by other means.

You dislike the emancipation proclamation, and perhaps would have it retracted. You say it is unconstitutional. I think differently. I think the Constitution invests its commander-in-chief with the law of war in time of war. The most that can be said—if so much—is that slaves are property. Is there—has there ever been—any question that by the law of war, property, both of enemies and friends, may be taken when needed? And is it not needed whenever taking it helps us, or hurts the enemy? Armies, the world over, destroy enemies' property when they cannot use it; and even destroy their own to keep it from the enemy. Civilized belligerents do all in their power to help themselves or hurt the enemy, except a few things regarded as barbarous or cruel. Among the exceptions are the massacre of vanquished foes and non-combatants, male and female.

But the Proclamation, as law, either is valid or is not valid. If it is not valid it needs no retraction. If it is valid it cannot be retracted, any more than the dead can be brought to life. Some of you profess to think its retraction would operate favorably for the Union. Why better *after* the retraction than *before* the issue? There was more than a year and a half of trial to suppress the Rebellion before the Proclamation was issued, the last one hundred days of which

passed under an explicit notice that it was coming, unless averted by those in revolt returning to their allegiance. The war has certainly progressed as favorably for us since the issue of the Proclamation as before.

I know as fully as one can know the opinions of others that some of the commanders of our armies in the field, who have given us our most important victories, believe the Emancipation policy and the use of colored troops constitute the heaviest blows yet dealt to the Rebellion, and that at least one of those important successes could not have been achieved when it was but for the aid of black soldiers.

Among the commanders who hold these views are some who have never had any affinity with what is called "Abolitionism," or with "Republican party politics," but who hold them purely as military opinions. I submit their opinions as entitled to some weight against the objections often urged that emancipation and arming the blacks are unwise as military measures, and were not adopted as such in good faith.

You say that you will not fight to free negroes. Some of them seem willing to fight for you; but no matter. Fight you, then, exclusively, to save the Union. I issued the Proclamation on purpose to aid you in saving the Union. Whenever you shall have conquered all resistance to the Union, if I shall urge you to continue fighting, it will be an apt time then for you to declare you will not fight to free negroes. I thought that in your struggle for the Union, to whatever extent the negroes should cease helping the enemy, to that extent it weakened the enemy in his resistance to you. Do you think differently? I thought that whatever negroes can be got to do as soldiers, leaves just so much less for white soldiers to do in saving the Union. Does it appear otherwise to you? But negroes, like other people, act upon motives. Why should they do anything for us if we will do nothing for them? If they stake their lives for us they must be prompted by the strongest motive, even the promise of freedom. And the promise, being made, must be kept.

The letter closed with a glowing exordium, such as those which, in the days of the fight for

free territory, had roused his auditors to a frenzy of enthusiasm. In classic phrase it pictured the soldiers and sailors of the Union marching on to certain victory. It paid tribute to the courage of the negro troops, and with Cromwellian ire contrasted their patriotism with the hypocritical pretensions of the "malignants" of the peace party. Yet its oratorical fervor was restrained from soaring into bombast by a ballast of common-sense, and its tense feeling was relieved by a touch of grotesque humor, to which, as President even more than as citizen, Lincoln was wont to give loose in his most serious moments. Virtually his "last stump-speech," it was unquestionably his most characteristic and best one.

The signs look better. The Father of Waters again goes unvexed to the sea. Thanks to the great Northwest for it; nor yet wholly to them. Three hundred miles up they met New England, Empire, Keystone, and Jersey, hewing their way right and left. The sunny South, too, in more colors than one, also lent a helping hand. On the spot, their part of the history was jotted down in black and white. The job was a great national one, and let none be slighted who bore an honorable part in it. And while those who have cleared the great river may well be proud, even that is not all. It is hard to say that anything has been more bravely and well done than at Antietam, Murfreesboro, Gettysburg, and on many fields of less note. Nor must Uncle Sam's web-feet be forgotten. At all the watery margins they have been present. Not only on the deep sea, the broad bay, and the rapid river, but also up the narrow, muddy bayou, and wherever the ground was a little damp, they have been and made their tracks. Thanks to all: for the great republic—for the principle it lives by and keeps alive—for man's vast future—thanks to all.

Peace does not appear so distant as it did. I hope it will come soon, and come to stay, and so come as to be worth the keeping in all future time. It will then

have been proved that among free men there can be no successful appeal from the ballot to the bullet, and that they who take such appeal are sure to lose their case and pay the cost. And then there will be some black men who can remember that with silent tongue, and clenched teeth, and steady eye, and well-poised bayonet, they have helped mankind on to this great consummation, while I fear there will be some white ones unable to forget that with malignant heart and deceitful speech they strove to hinder it.

Still, let us not be over-sanguine of a speedy final triumph. Let us be quite sober. Let us diligently apply the means, never doubting that a just God, in his own good time, will give us the rightful result.

That reference in the address to offers of compromise made by representatives of the Confederacy was evoked by various propositions made for self-advertisement by irresponsible parties such as Fernando Wood, a Democratic politician of New York, who boldly confessed his sympathy with the South and virtually offered himself as a mediator. To him Lincoln had replied (on December 12, 1862):

Understanding your phrase, "The Southern States would send representatives to the next Congress," to be substantially the same as that "the people of the Southern States would cease resistance, and would re-inaugurate, submit to, and maintain the national authority within the limits of such States, under the Constitution of the United States," I say that in such case the war would cease on the part of the United States, and that if, within a reasonable time, "a full and general amnesty" were necessary to such end, it would not be withheld. I do not think it would be proper now for me to communicate this formally or informally to the people of the Southern States. My belief is that they already know it; and when they choose, if ever, they can communicate with me unequivocally. Nor do I think it proper now to suspend military operations to try any experiment of negotiation.

It is true, however, that a no less responsible party than Alexander H. Stephens, Vice-President of the Confederacy, had presented to the Navy Department on July 4, 1863, a request that he be permitted to come to Washington bearing "a communication in writing from Jefferson Davis, Commander-in-Chief of the land and naval forces of the Confederate States, to Abraham Lincoln, Commander-in-Chief of the land and naval forces of the United States," but there was no statement of the nature of the communication. As the request studiously avoided recognition of the President in other than the military capacity of that office, Mr. Lincoln very wisely and properly ordered the Secretary of the Navy to reply:

The request of A. H. Stephens is inadmissible. The customary agents and channels are adequate for all needful communication and conference between the United States forces and the insurgents.

CHAPTER XIV

THE SECOND ELECTION AND INAUGURATION—RE-CONSTRUCTION

It could not, in the nature of things, be expected that Mr. Lincoln's policy would be indorsed by all members of his own party. His efforts were conscientiously directed toward the preservation of the Union, and not to the enforcement of any partisan or sectional policy; the radicals were dissatisfied with his conservative policy in reference to slavery and to his retention of McClellan; likewise to his fraternity with the Blairs, and his pandering to the border slave States; and there were many personal grievances inherent in the distribution of so much official patronage. The net result was, the organization of a faction within his own party to secure the retirement of Mr. Lincoln at the end of his first term, and a change of dynasty. The great leaders in this movement were Salmon P. Chase and Benjamin F. Wade of Ohio, H. Winter Davis of Maryland, and Samuel C. Pomeroy of Kansas. Chase had been generally regarded as the candidate whom they should rally the opposition to, but not meeting with the support he deemed necessary for any show of success, he retired from the contest early. About May 1 a call for a convention was issued; and still another call by some Germans of St.

Louis ; and yet another by some radical Abolitionists, all centering in this same movement.

Chase, however, soon realized the hopelessness of his Presidential aspiration, and retired from the contest. The malcontents then picked upon Frémont as their candidate, and called a convention to nominate him at Cleveland on May 31.

On that day about one hundred and fifty persons assembled at the Weddell House in Cleveland, professing to hail from fifteen different States and the District of Columbia. As no conventions had been held, however, the gathering could assume no higher significance than that of a mass-meeting of one hundred and fifty recusant, disgruntled politicians, who did not approve of Mr. Lincoln's administration, and would have liked to put someone else in his place. As a rule, they were distinguished men and disappointed politicians, many of them "cranks," whose ruling idea was, that the rebellion should be crushed forthwith, and the property of the Rebels confiscated. But none of the great leaders were there : Chase, Wade, Davis, and Pomeroy, who had started the movement, were conspicuous by their absence. The one hundred and fifty were generally strangers to public life, and to each other, and the only external manifestation presented was of a lot of small political philosophers, wandering aimlessly through the hotel exchange, trying to find out what they had come there for. As they had come there on their own hook, and had no credentials, and represented nobody but themselves, so also, to make matters harmonious, no hall had been provided, nor had any other arrangement been made for the purposed meeting. The ridiculousness of the whole affair was palp-

able, and it is probable that the majority of the crowd would have slunk away and got quietly out of town, had it not been that it would have added to the grotesqueness of the situation. Finally, someone started a fifty-cent subscription and engaged a hall, borrowed a pen and bottle of ink, cabbaged a dozen sheets of hotel notepaper, and gathered the "delegates" together in the front part of the hall. They opened proceedings by electing the greatest man there, John Cochrane of New York, to be chairman. In the afternoon resolutions were adopted. Then the luckless and troublesome Frémont was nominated for President by acclamation, and the chairman as Vice-President, after which the "convention" adjourned. The platform was a string of generalities, some of which no one could object to. The "party" acquiesced in the suppression of the rebellion; favored the right of *habeas corpus*, right of asylum, the Monroe Doctrine, an amendment of the Constitution to debar the reestablishment of slavery, one term of the Presidency, election of President by direct vote of the people, confiscation of the land of Rebels, and its distribution among soldiers and actual settlers.

Frémont, visionary as usual, seems to have thought he was going to be elected. He accepted the nomination in a splenetic letter, abusing the Administration for infidelity to the principles upon which it came into being, and for "its disregard of constitutionaal rights, its violation of personal liberty and the liberty of the press, and, as a crowning shame, its abandonment of the right of asylum, dear to all free nations abroad." What was meant by the last sentence is a deep mystery. He concurred in the platform except the plank

about confiscation; agreed tentatively to withdraw from the canvass if Lincoln would; and rising to the mock solemnity of the occasion, loftily exclaimed: "If Mr. Lincoln be renominated, as I believe it would be fatal to the country to indorse a policy and renew a power which has cost us the lives of thousands of men and needlessly put the country on the road to bankruptcy, there will remain no alternative but to organize against him every element of conscientious opposition, with the view to prevent the misfortune of his election." And so certain was he of election, that, with no well-defined basis of support, he resigned his position in the army.

It is astonishing how the Presidential maggot, working in a man's brain, addles his good sense. That Frémont should refer to national bankruptcy showed imbecility of the supreme type, inasmuch as his course in Missouri, had it been adopted by the Government generally, would have made the country bankrupt in ninety days.

On the same day that Frémont wrote his letter of acceptance, a meeting was held in New York, ostensibly to thank General Grant for his success in his campaign toward Richmond, but really to launch him as a candidate for the Presidency. Mr. Lincoln was invited to attend, and in reply he wrote a letter which completely nullified the Presidential part of it. His letter read thus:

It is impossible for me to attend. I approve, nevertheless, of whatever may tend to strengthen and sustain General Grant and the noble armies now under his direction. My previous high estimate of General Grant has been maintained and heightened by what has occurred in the remarkable campaign he is now conducting, while the magnitude and difficulty of the task

before him does not prove less than I expected. He and his brave soldiers are now in the midst of their great trial, and I trust that at your meeting you will so shape your good words that they may turn to men and guns, moving to his and their support.

At the convention which met in Baltimore on the 8th day of June Mr. Lincoln received every vote for President, except the Missouri vote, which, under instructions, was cast for General Grant, in honor of his having once lived there.

The President accepted the nomination in a brief speech, and thereafter in an equally brief letter. Andrew Johnson of Tennessee was nominated as Vice-President.

The Democratic Convention met at Chicago on August 29. Governor Seymour of New York presided, and Mr. Vallandigham of Ohio drafted the only plank of the platform which received any attention during the campaign. This was a declaration that the war was a failure, and that a convention of the States, or some other peaceable means, be arranged to restore peace "on the basis of the Federal Union of the States."

General McClellan of New Jersey was nominated for President, and George H. Pendleton of Ohio, an extreme peace man, for Vice-President.

On the day after the convention adjourned came the news of the fall of Atlanta, and Lincoln's victory, which he himself had previously doubted, was assured.

Frémont realized the disloyal attitude in which he appeared before the country, and withdrew his candidacy in favor of Lincoln. General McClellan tried to stem the set, of the tide toward Lincoln by repudiating the "peace" plank of his plat-

form. The President greatly increased his popularity by a number of cheering speeches he made to troops returning from the front through Washington, and in response to serenades of citizens of Maryland (on the occasion of the State's adoption of a new constitution without slavery) and of Pennsylvania.

His tender solicitude for the wounded soldiers, as shown by his speaking at sanitary fairs in neighboring cities, as well as consoling letters to the bereaved relatives of those killed in battle and the pardons he gave to soldiers condemned to die for such offenses as sleeping at their posts, endeared him more and more to the people, until the term "Father Abraham" became fastened upon him in loving regard, untinged with its original comic suggestion. F. B. Carpenter, the artist, whose reminiscences of Lincoln in his book "Six Months in the White House" cover this period, has so completely presented this side of the President's character, that it would be superfluous to give such anecdotes here. One letter of condolence is so beautiful in language, as well as tender in sympathy, that lovers of Lincoln rightly look for it in every book about him that is published, and hence it is reproduced here. It was to Mrs. Bixby of Boston, who had lost five sons in the war, and whose sixth was lying severely wounded in the hospital.

DEAR MADAM:—I have been shown in the files of the War Department a statement of the Adjutant-General of Massachusetts, that you are the mother of five sons who have died gloriously on the field of battle. I feel how weak and fruitless must be any words of mine which should attempt to beguile you from the grief of a loss so overwhelming. But I cannot refrain from

tendering to you the consolation that may be found in the thanks of the Republic they died to save. I pray that our Heavenly Father may assuage the anguish of your bereavement, and leave you only the cherished memory of the loved and lost, and the solemn pride that must be yours to have laid so costly a sacrifice upon the altar of freedom.

Yours, very sincerely and respectfully,

ABRAHAM LINCOLN.

Space is wanting here to present examples of the many proclamations of days of fasting and prayer, as well as of thanksgiving, all of which are permeated with a devout sense of the immanence of the Divine Will, guiding the destinies of the nation through such humble means as himself. It was a feeling general at the time not only with church people, but many who, like himself, were not communicants in any particular religious denomination. The motto upon some of our coins, "In God We Trust" was placed upon them at this time, and therefore has an historic as well as a religious significance which should cause it to be retained to the end of the nation's history, whatever views may be adopted by the Executive in particular, or the Government in general, about the separation of church and state.

The good people of the country, breaking over party lines, cast an overwhelming vote for Lincoln and Johnson, and this ticket received the electoral votes of every Northern State but New Jersey, and also of the former slave States: Arkansas, Louisiana, Tennessee, and West Virginia.

The President delivered the last Annual Message to Congress of his first term (and, as it

proved, the last one of his life) on December 6, 1864.

After reporting on the favorable condition of the various departments, the Foreign, the Treasury, the Navy, etc., he commented upon the results of the late election as proving the almost unanimous sentiment of the nation to be in favor of prosecuting the war for the Union. He therefore promised that there should be no steps backward, saying in conclusion:

In presenting the abandonment of armed resistance to the national authority on the part of the insurgents as the only indispensable condition to ending the war on the part of the Government, I retract nothing heretofore said as to slavery. I repeat the declaration made a year ago, that while I remain in my present position I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emancipation Proclamation. Nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that proclamation or by any of the acts of Congress.

If the people should, by whatever mode or means, make it an executive duty to reënslave such persons, another, and not I, must be their instrument to perform it.

In stating a single condition of peace, I mean simply to say, that the war will cease on the part of the Government whenever it shall have ceased on the part of those who began it.

On January 31 Congress passed the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution, prohibiting slavery throughout the entire country, and before his death the President had the gratification of learning that his own State of Illinois was the first to ratify it.

A numerous assemblage was convened in front of the Capitol on March 4, 1865, to witness the second inauguration of the great President. The

morning was very stormy, however, and the committee of arrangements began to take measures to have the ceremonies performed in the Senate Chambers, which would have proved a great disappointment to the congregated masses. A providential interference however took place, which brought a complete change in the space of sixty seconds; at 11.40 the rain ceased, the clouds parted, revealing the brilliancy of a deep azure sky; and at the moment when Chief-Justice Chase arose to administer the oath, the glorious sunlight fell through a rift in the clouds upon the head of the newly consecrated President, and a brilliant silver cloud floated near the earth just above the President, as if the benison of Heaven rested upon him. His Inaugural Address is an English classic, and for both its style and substance will live as long as English literature.

After reviewing the situation at the time of his First Inaugural Address, when the country was divided into two hostile parties over the question of slavery, the President said:

Neither party expected for the war the magnitude or the duration which it has already attained. Neither anticipated that the cause of the conflict might cease [with the conflict], or even before the conflict itself should cease. Each looked for an easier triumph, and a result less fundamental and astounding.

Both read the same Bible and pray to the same God, and each invokes His aid against the other. It may seem strange that any men should dare to ask a just God's assistance in wringing their bread from the sweat of other men's faces, but let us judge not, that we be not judged. The prayers of both could not be answered. That of neither has been answered fully. The Almighty has His own purposes. "Woe unto the world because of offenses, for it must needs be that offenses come, but woe to that man by whom the

offense cometh." If we shall suppose that American slavery is one of those offenses which, in the providence of God, must needs come, but which having continued through His appointed time, He now wills to remove, and that He gives to both North and South this terrible war as the woe due to those by whom the offense came, shall we discern therein any departure from those Divine attributes which the believers in a living God always ascribe to him? Fondly do we hope, fervently do we pray, that this mighty scourge of war may speedily pass away. Yet if God wills that it continue until all the wealth piled by the bondsman's two hundred and fifty years of unrequited toil shall be sunk, and until every drop of blood drawn with the lash shall be paid by another drawn with the sword, as was said three thousand years ago, so still it must be said, "The judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether."

With malice towards none, with charity for all, with firmness in the right as God gives us to see the right, let us finish the work we are in: to bind up the nation's wounds, to care for him who shall have borne the battle, and for his widow and his orphan—to do all which may achieve and cherish a just and a lasting peace among ourselves and with all nations.

Following this speech, so full of revelation to the people of the greatness of the heart and mind of the man they had chosen for their President, came the address of the Vice-President, which shocked those present exceedingly by its proof that they had elected a demagogue to the second highest place in their gift, and as a possible successor to the great Lincoln. To speak plainly, Andrew Johnson was drunk. While his friends claimed that he was ordinarily an abstainer, and therefore was peculiarly susceptible to the effect of the liquor he had taken to fortify himself for the memorable occasion, he is not to be excused for the sentiments he expressed when in this deplorable condition. *In vino veritas* is a

wise saying, and the words of Johnson drunk were afterward proved to be in accord with the nature of the man by the acts of Johnson sober. He showed himself in every way to be the most vulgar type of demagogue.

Andrew Johnson was literally and from choice one of the common people, preferring the society of the uncultured classes to that of the *élite* of the nation. When he was about to be inaugurated as Governor of Tennessee upon his first election to the office, elaborate preparations for the ceremony were made by the people of Nashville. A procession was formed of the militia, civic societies, and other organizations in uniform and regalia, and an elegant barouche, drawn by four horses gayly caparisoned with flags and pompons was driven to the St. Cloud Hotel, where the outgoing Governor waited on the newly-elected Governor to escort him to the Capitol. But, to the consternation of everybody, as Johnson stepped out of the hotel, he rejected the proffered escort, saying: "I guess I'll go up with the people"; and, letting the procession go without him, plodded along on foot, surrounded by *hoi polloi*, feeling consciously proud as if he had performed an heroic feat.

While he was a Senator at Washington he lodged at the St. Charles, a fourth-rate hotel, where he received few callers. On account of his humble origin and his pronounced Union sentiments, Southern Senators ignored him socially, and his quality did not assure associates from the Northern States; so when the Southern States began to secede, he was the most nearly isolated of all the Senators.

In February, 1861, Joseph Lane, a Senator

from Oregon (and who had been associated with Breckinridge on the Presidential ticket) read in the Senate an elaborate speech in favor of secession, to which Johnson made a most scathing reply in which he abused Lane unmercifully, not only politically but personally. This speech made Johnson immensely popular at the North, and especially with the Administration, and after the secession governor (Harris) fled from Tennessee, the President made Johnson a Brigadier-General of Volunteers and assigned him to duty as Military Governor of Tennessee, which office he held until he was elected Vice-President.

At the time of his Vice-Presidential inauguration Johnson was stopping at the Kirkwood, one of the inferior hotels of Washington. In his inaugural address he made an even more demagogic display of his sentiments than he had done at Nashville. The Associated Press dispatch thus narrated the occurrence:

“The Vice-President (Johnson) followed, referring to his elevation from the ranks as an illustration of American privilege, and proceeded at length upon the subject of the subordination of Presidents and Secretaries to the will of the people. When the oath of office was administered,” continues the account, “the Vice-President took the Bible in his hand, and, elevating it before the audience, exclaimed: ‘I kiss this book before my nation of the United States.’” The dispatch concluded with the statement that: “The address of Vice-President Johnson is very severely censured on all hands. His friends allege he must have been laboring under a very severe indisposition.”

Here is the speech *verbatim* as taken from the

“Year Book”: “I’m a-goin’ for to tell you—here to-day; yes, I’m a-goin’ for to tell you all, that I am a plebeian! I glory in it; I am a plebeian! The people—yes, the people of the United States have made me what I am; and I am a-goin’ for to tell you here to-day—yes, to-day, in this place—that the people are everything. We owe all to them. If it be not too presumptuous, I will tell the foreign ministers a-sittin’ there, that I am one of the people. I will say to Senators and others before me—I will say to the Supreme Court, which sits before me—that you all get your power and place from the people. And, Mr. Chase,” he said, suddenly addressing the Chief Justice by name, “your position depends upon the people.” Turning to the other side of the house where sat Mr. Seward and the other Cabinet officers, he severally addressed them as he had addressed Mr. Chase: “And I will say to you, Mr. Secretary Seward, and to you Mr. Secretary Stanton, and to you, Mr. Secretary——” here he hesitated for a name, and bent down and asked Mr. Hamlin if he knew who was Secretary of the Navy. Having been informed, he continued in the same loud tone—“And you, Mr. Secretary Welles, you, all of you, derive your power from the people.”

It is impossible to attempt to describe the feelings of this august assemblage. I well recollect that Sumner refused to talk about it at all, saying that it was too terrible an event, and should be relegated to oblivion as soon as possible. Lincoln, charitable and magnanimous as ever, said: “Don’t you fear for Andy; he’s all right.”

The editor of the *New York Independent*, however, came out with this statement: “Truth com-

pels me to write that he [Johnson] indulged in a vile harangue, in presence of the assembled thousands, including the representatives of all the foreign governments; and the source of his inspiration was, not patriotism, but—whisky." The same paper in a scathing editorial demanded his resignation; but, as we have said, the sentiment of the nation was in favor of covering the sad event with the mantle of oblivion.

At the Inauguration Ball that evening Johnson made himself very conspicuous, paying marked attention to Mrs. Lincoln (as the report says), although he had not fully recovered from his "indisposition."

Mrs. Lincoln, as reported in Herndon's "Life of Lincoln," makes the following statement: "He [Lincoln] greatly disliked Andrew Johnson. Once the latter, when we were in company, followed us around not a little. It displeased Mr. Lincoln so much he abruptly turned and asked, loud enough to be heard by others, 'Why is this man forever following me?' At another time, when we were down to City Point, Johnson, still following us, was drunk. Mr. Lincoln, in desperation, exclaimed: 'For God's sake don't ask Johnson to dine with us!' Sumner, who was along, joined in the request."

At the death of Hannibal Hamlin on July 4, 1891, a sharp controversy arose between Colonel A. K. McClure, the veteran editor of the *Philadelphia Times*, and John G. Nicolay, Mr. Lincoln's private secretary, as to whom Mr. Lincoln desired to be associated with him on the ticket in the Presidential contest of 1864.

This controversy commenced by the assertion of Colonel McClure in his paper of July 6, 1891, that

Mr. Lincoln "gravely urged" upon him to come as a delegate at large to the convention to support Johnson for Vice-President, and that he supported Johnson in accordance with such request, against Hamlin, his personal choice. The next day Mr. Nicolay stated in the public press that the "statement" that Lincoln opposed the nomination of Mr. Hamlin was "entirely erroneous"; that Lincoln had confidentially expressed to Nicolay his personal preference for Hamlin. This was an indiscreet way of contradicting a man of McClure's standing and well-known relation to Lincoln, in his lifetime. The editor promptly replied with a very caustic article in which he affirmed his previous statement with emphasis and circumstances, and corroborated his view as to Lincoln's sentiments by the testimony of Charles A. Dana, who was Assistant Secretary of War under Lincoln, and who shared the President's confidence to a considerable extent.

To this Nicolay replied, and, in maintaining his position, unnecessarily made an issue of veracity between himself and McClure, which was not only an unwise but an unjust thing to do. Colonel McClure might have erred in his inferences, but a man of his intellectual and moral character could not mistake as to his facts, and he stated as a *fact*, apprehensible to his senses, that Lincoln urged him to drop Hamlin and support Johnson.

Meanwhile Judge Pettit of Pennsylvania stated that, on the morning of the sitting of the convention, Mr. Lincoln told him that his preference was for Johnson; and Colonel Lamon said that he heard Lincoln urge Swett to support Johnson, and that Lincoln even wrote a letter inferentially in favor of Johnson (which, however,

was not used). The Secretary of the Navy, Mr. Welles, also intimated that Lincoln did not want Hamlin, but says that he was "careful to avoid the expression of any opinion." However, the Secretary intimated that the President's choice was Johnson. And one of Nicolay's strong points is that Lincoln himself sent him word at Baltimore that he would not express any preference.

Now, a further fact tending to corroborate McClure is that Mr. Lincoln sent General Cameron to General Butler, asking the latter to become a candidate. This Lincoln would not have done had he been, as Nicolay claims, in favor of Hamlin, for if he wanted Butler as against Hamlin, it is plain that he did not want Hamlin, i. e., it is not at all probable that Hamlin was his *second* choice. Governor Stone of Iowa stated that Lincoln wanted Dickinson, Dix, Johnson, or some other War Democrat, thus attesting that the President did not want Hamlin. Thurlow Weed says, *ex cathedra*, that Lincoln did not want Johnson, but wanted Dickinson, thus also attesting, from his standpoint, that Lincoln did not want Hamlin. Swett was working for Holt at Baltimore, which indicates that Mr. Lincoln did not want Hamlin, for Swett was nearer to Lincoln in the way of knowing his preference in that respect than anybody in the nation.

In favor of the position that Lincoln did want Hamlin, I know of but three authorities, viz., Mr. Nicolay, Burton C. Cook, and Mr. Hamlin himself, all of whom, however, are very strong authorities. Mr. Nicolay said that Mr. Lincoln confidentially expressed to him his preference for Hamlin. I think this cannot be literally true:

there is nothing in either written or unwritten history to show that the President ever said anything of confidence or consequence to Mr. Nicolay. Their relative positions warranted confidences, but somehow these seem never to have passed from the principal to his subordinate.

Mr. Cook was an astute and secretive man, a veteran and cautious politician. He went to Lincoln to ascertain whom the latter wanted as Vice-President, so that the powerful Illinois delegation could execute his desire, and he said "That he had a preference I positively know. After my interview with him, I was as positive that *Hannibal Hamlin was his favorite* as I am that I am alive to-day."

Shortly before his death Hamlin said: "Lincoln evidently changed his position [from desiring him]; that is all I can say. If we shall ever meet again, I may say something more to you. I will write no more." This means that at one time Lincoln either was, or pretended to be, for Hamlin.

That Mr. Lincoln preferred some War Democrat to Hamlin at a certain time is apparent from his sending Cameron to Butler; from Thurlow Weed's statement; from Governor Stone's statement; from Colonel McClure's statement; from Judge Pettit's statement; from General Butler's statement; from Swett's actions at Baltimore; from Lamon's statement; and from Mr. Dana's statement. That Lincoln preferred Hamlin is attested (so far as I know) only by Cook and Nicolay. Hamlin does not testify that Lincoln was for him then; his judgment seems to be that Lincoln had changed. And the same might be said of Nicolay. Lincoln might have been for

Hamlin when he informed Nicolay, and changed afterward. But Cook's testimony complicated matters. He was the chairman of the Illinois delegation at the convention, and had many votes to cast as Lincoln might desire. The argument is that Lincoln wanted Johnson, and yet he deliberately throws away the sure and, peradventure, controlling vote of his own State, and in fact caused it to be cast affirmatively against his earnest desire. Cook cannot be mistaken. He is as sagacious a politician as McClure; he divined what Lincoln meant to make him believe. Lincoln knew that Cook was going to Baltimore to work for Hamlin because, *inter alia*, Lincoln wanted it so.

The two strong opposing features in the contention are the statements of McClure and Cook; to one of whom he represented that he wanted Johnson and to the other Hamlin, doing so at the same time and for the same object. The mystery is deepened by the reflection that Lincoln sent for McClure in order to solicit the vote of Pennsylvania for Johnson, while upon the voluntary offer of Illinois he placed that State in the Hamlin column, a complete neutralization of effort. His reply to Nicolay, "Swett's all right," to which McClure attaches much importance, is, I think, inconsequential. The question was grotesque under the circumstances. The further reply: "Wish not to interfere," etc., which Nicolay lays much stress upon, I think amounts to nothing. In the position in which he stood, he *must* say that, no matter how ardent were his personal feelings.

In looking over the whole field, I think that at first Lincoln expected to be defeated anyway,

and took no anxious thought about his running mate, expecting the ticket to be the old one by force of political inertia. I think that Hamlin and Nicolay saw Lincoln while in this mood; afterward he thought it well to make the best struggle possible, and, while deeming a coalition with the acting War Democrats necessary, he did not settle down on Johnson at first, which may account for Weed's and Stone's opinion; and that the reason of Swett's action and Cook's opinion is that Lincoln feared that, if they came out for Johnson, his hand would appear, for, next to nominating Johnson, it was desirable that Lincoln should not be known in the matter.

On the whole, therefore, I think Lincoln wanted Johnson, and that, for policy's sake, he suffered Swett to dissemble his sentiments at Baltimore, while he dissembled *his* real sentiments to Cook; though I don't think he committed any positive act of deceit with Cook, but allowed him to deceive himself. As to Hamlin, I think that Lincoln's only indirection toward him, if any, was in changing his mind according to the pressure of circumstances, but without advising him of it. But all that Lincoln did, positively or negatively, was for the sake of the sacred cause of the Union.

Worn out by the importunities of office-seekers, the President on March 25 sought refuge in a visit to the headquarters of the Army of the Potomac at City Point. Here he held a consultation with General Grant and General Sherman, the latter coming up from Goldsboro, N. C., to the meeting. On the 2d of April Richmond was occupied by the Federal troops, and on the 3d the President visited the captured capital of

the Confederacy. He went unannounced, and without a military guard, even walking from the wharf to General Weitzel's headquarters, which were in the house occupied only two days before by the Confederate President. The colored people, however, recognized their deliverer, and crowded about him with exclamations of religious fervor. A spectator of the scene described it in the *Atlantic Monthly*:

The walk was long, and the President halted a moment to rest. "May de good Lord bless you, President Linkum!" said an old negro, removing his hat and bowing, with tears of joy rolling down his cheeks. The President removed his own hat, and bowed in silence; but it was a bow which upset the forms, laws, customs, and ceremonies of centuries. It was a death-shock to chivalry and a mortal wound to caste. Recognize a nigger! Faugh! A woman in an adjoining house beheld it, and turned from the scene in unspeakable disgust.

The President returned to Washington on Sunday, April 9, recalled by a carriage accident in which Secretary Seward had broken his right arm and his jaw. Shortly after his arrival the news came of Lee's surrender, and the citizens of Washington, wild with delight, waited on him on Monday afternoon with congratulations. He dismissed them, promising a speech on the next evening.

This, his last public address, he devoted almost entirely to the reinauguration of the national authority—reconstruction, which now faced the Government. He said of the problem:

It is fraught with great difficulty. Unlike a case of war between independent nations, there is no authorized organ for us to treat with—no one man has

authority to give up the rebellion for any other man. We simply must begin with and mold from disorganized and discordant elements. Nor is it a small additional embarrassment that we, the loyal people, differ among ourselves as to the mode, manner, and measure of reconstruction. As a general rule, I abstain from reading the reports of attacks upon myself, wishing not to be provoked by that to which I cannot properly offer an answer. In spite of this precaution, however, it comes to my knowledge that I am much censured for some supposed agency in setting up and seeking to sustain the new State government of Louisiana.

In this I have done just so much as, and no more than, the public knows. In the annual message of December, 1863, and in the accompanying proclamation, I presented a plan of reconstruction, as the phrase goes, which I promised, if adopted by any State, should be acceptable to and sustained by the executive government of the nation. I distinctly stated that this was not the only plan which might possibly be acceptable, and I also distinctly protested that the executive claimed no right to say when or whether members should be admitted to seats in Congress from such States. This plan was in advance submitted to the then Cabinet, and distinctly approved by every member of it. . . . The message went to Congress, and I received many commendations of the plan, written and verbal, and not a single objection to it from any professed emancipationist came to my knowledge until after the news reached Washington that the people of Louisiana had begun to move in accordance with it.

I have been shown a letter on this subject, supposed to be an able one, in which the writer expresses regret that my mind has not seemed to be definitely fixed upon the question whether the seceded States, so called, are in the Union or out of it. It would perhaps add astonishment to his regret were he to learn that since I have found professed Union men endeavoring to answer that question, I have purposely forbore any public expression upon it. As appears to me, that question has not been nor yet is a practically material one, and that any discussion of it, while it thus remains practically immaterial, could have no effect other than the mischievous one of dividing our friends. As yet, what-

ever it may become, that question is bad as the basis of a controversy, and good for nothing at all—a merely pernicious abstraction. We all agree that the seceded States, so called, are out of their proper practical relation with the Union, and that the sole object of the Government, civil and military, in regard to these States, is to again get them into their proper practical relation. I believe that it is not only possible, but in fact easier, to do this without deciding or even considering whether those States have ever been out of the Union than with it. Finding themselves safely at home, it would be utterly immaterial whether they had been abroad. Let us all join in doing the acts necessary to restore the proper practical relations between these States and the Union, and each forever after innocently indulge his own opinion whether, in doing the acts, he brought the States from without into the Union, or only gave them proper assistance, they never having been out of it. The amount of constituency, so to speak, on which the Louisiana government rests, would be more satisfactory to all if it contained fifty thousand, or thirty thousand, or even twenty thousand, instead of twelve thousand, as it does. It is also unsatisfactory to some that the elective franchise is not given to the colored man. I would myself prefer that it were now conferred on the very intelligent, and on those who serve our cause as soldiers. Still, the question is not whether the Louisiana government, as it stands, is quite all that is desirable. The question is, Will it be wiser to take it as it is and help to improve it, or to reject and disperse? Can Louisiana be brought into proper practical relation with the Union sooner by sustaining or by discarding her new State government? Some twelve thousand voters in the heretofore Slave State of Louisiana have sworn allegiance to the Union, assumed to be the rightful political power of the State, held elections, organized a State government, adopted a Free State Constitution, giving the benefit of public schools equally to black and white, and empowering the Legislature to confer the elective franchise upon the colored man. This Legislature has already voted to ratify the Constitutional Amendment recently passed by Congress, abolishing slavery throughout the nation. These twelve thousand persons are thus fully committed to the Union and to perpetuate freedom in

the State—committed to the very things, and nearly all things, the nation wants—and they ask the nation's recognition and its assistance to make good this committal. Now, if we reject and spurn them, we do our utmost to disorganize and disperse them. We, in fact, say to the white man: You are worthless or worse; we will neither help you nor be helped by you. To the blacks we say: This cup of liberty which these, your old masters, held to your lips, we will dash from you, and leave you to the chances of gathering the spilled and scattered contents in some vague and undefined when, where, and how. If this course, discouraging and paralyzing both white and black, has any tendency to bring Louisiana into proper practical relations with the Union, I have so far been unable to perceive it. If, on the contrary, we recognize and sustain the new government of Louisiana, the converse of all this is made true. We encourage the hearts and nerve the arms of twelve thousand to adhere to their work, and argue for it, and proselyte for it, and fight for it, and feed it, and grow it, and ripen it to a complete success. The colored man, too, in seeing all united for him, is inspired with vigilance, and energy, and daring to the same end. Grant that he desires the elective franchise, will he not attain it sooner by saving the already advanced steps towards it, than by running backward over them? Concede that the new government of Louisiana is only to what it should be as the egg is to the fowl, we shall sooner have the fowl by hatching the egg than by smashing it. . . .

What has been said of Louisiana will apply generally to other States. And yet so great peculiarities pertain to each State, and such important and sudden changes occur in the same State, and withal so new and unprecedented is the whole case, that no exclusive and inflexible plan can safely be prescribed as to details and collaterals. Such exclusive and inflexible plan would surely become a new entanglement. Important principles may and must be inflexible. In the present situation, as the phrase goes, it may be my duty to make some new announcement to the people of the South. I am considering, and shall not fail to act when satisfied that action will be proper.

CHAPTER XV.

THE END

THE animus of murder existed against Mr. Lincoln from the period of his election. In January, 1861, he showed me several vulgar letters, all having Southern postmarks, containing threats against his life; also some apparently friendly warnings on the same subjects, from the same sources. There were some newspaper articles in the Southern press, having the same animus and intent.

The President not only took no precautions against assassination himself, but allowed none to be taken by others in his behalf. The Secretary of War did indeed, for a time, send an escort with him to and from the Soldiers' Home on the outskirts of Washington where he spent the hot summer nights, but it was ultimately abandoned, being thoroughly distasteful to the President.

Upon one occasion, when remonstrated with on the subject of his indifference to danger, he drew from a pigeon-hole a large package of letters, and said: "Every one of these letters contains a threat of assassination. Were I to give it thought it might make me nervous, but I have concluded that there are opportunities to kill me, every day of my life, if there are persons disposed to do it. It is not possible to avoid ex-

posure to such a fate, and I shall not trouble myself about it."

And so daily he heroically pursued the even tenor of his way, and the prescribed path of duty, with the sword of Damocles suspended above his head. He continued to walk alone, unguarded at all hours of the day or night, between the White House and War Office and elsewhere.

Toward the close of the war the threats of assassination became especially bold and bitter. Of these, the following advertisement appearing in a Selma (Ala.) newspaper is a fair example:

A million dollars wanted to have peace by 1st of March. If the citizens of the Southern Confederacy will furnish me with the cash or good securities for the sum of \$1,000,000, I will cause the lives of Lincoln, Seward, and Andrew Johnson to be taken by the 1st of March next. This will give us peace and satisfy the world that tyrants cannot live in a land of liberty. If this is not accomplished, nothing will be claimed beyond the sum of \$50,000 in advance, which is supposed to be necessary to reach and slaughter the three villains. I will give myself \$1,000 toward the patriotic purpose. Everyone wishing to contribute will address H. Catawba, Ala., December 1, 1864.

This advertisement, it transpired, had been inserted by Colonel George Washington Gayle, a leading lawyer of the city.

Whether the damnable deed was the sequence and *dénouement* of this advertisement has never been ascertained; but the sequel attested that the lives aimed at by the Booth conspiracy were the same as those mentioned in this odious and detestable advertisement.

During that same winter the Rebel agents in Canada were endeavoring to secure someone to *remove* (as it was euphemistically termed) the

President, Vice-President, Secretary of State, Secretary of the Treasury, Secretary of War, and General Grant. When interrogated by an assassin who contemplated undertaking the bloody enterprise, if they wanted Secretary Welles also killed, the reply was, "No! he isn't worth killing." These agents tried to impress the prospective murderer with the idea, that "killing tyrants was no murder," and they reasoned out the conclusion with self-gratulation, that the murder of these officers would produce anarchy, as there was no designated officer to succeed any of them. There is much reason to suppose that this, and not the Selma scheme, was the initial movement which culminated in the diabolical *dénouement* of April 14, 1865, but the chief agent was killed prematurely; the Rebel messenger who communicated between the conclave in Canada and the assassins escaped to Europe; the Rebel agents in Canada disappeared; those who knew much were awed to silence, and conclusive proof, such as was needful for such a crime, could not be had; but this complicity in this dastardly crime has many reasons to fortify it, among which was the approval of the crime by Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the "lost cause."

The conspiracy being formed, it required only an emotional incentive to fire the chief agent to the deed.

This occurred in the last address of Lincoln. On the outskirts of the crowd assembled to hear him was one J. Wilkes Booth, an actor, who had come to Washington the previous Saturday, and was stopping at the National Hotel. With him was a young man named David E. Herold. The

two seemed nervous and uneasy; and were noticeably so, when the tall form of the President appeared and commenced his speech. Finally, Lincoln made use of this expression: . . . "It is also unsatisfactory to some that the election franchise is not given to the colored man. *I would myself prefer that it were now conferred on the very intelligent, and on those who serve our cause as soldiers.*" It was at that juncture, Herold relates, that Booth nudged him, and said in a tone of bitter resentment: "That means *nigger* equality; now, by God! I'll put him through."

Booth was a young man of twenty-six, unstable and erratic in character, and full of vanity, felicitating himself on his personal beauty. He had quit the stage some time before on account of a throat affection (I have seen a playbill announcing his appearance at the Boston Museum in 1862), and was doing a little speculating in petroleum stocks as a business. He occupied much of his time of late in playing "stud poker" and drinking whisky. Although his people were all thoroughly devoted to the cause of the Union, he had fanatically championed the Southern cause. In November, 1864, he left a sealed envelope with the actor John S. Clarke, his brother-in-law, which he withdrew after a time, and deposited again. Neither Clarke nor his wife, Booth's sister, had any idea of the contents of the package, but when ultimately opened it was found to contain some U. S. bonds and oil stocks, also a letter written by Booth, full of vapid, inane, and obscure *rigmarole*. The signature was evidently made at a different time from the body of the letter, and Mr. Clarke is of opinion that

Booth added his signature at the time when he withdrew the package.

General Grant reached Washington on the 13th, and held a long consultation with the President and Secretary of War. Next day was Good Friday and also Cabinet day, and the President laid down, in general terms, his contemplated policy toward the Rebels, which was a general amnesty and obliteration of the past. He held a long conversation with his son, Robert, who, as an aide on Grant's staff, had been at Lee's surrender, and had returned to the White House. He had a lengthened interview with Speaker Colfax, who was about to depart on a tour to the mining regions of California. He also saw several callers on business matters, the last one being Hon. George Ashmun, who had sat in Congress with him, and had also presided over the "wigwam" convention. As there was not time to complete Mr. Ashmun's business, the President agreed to meet him and Judge C. P. Daly early next morning; and, in order to facilitate his entrance, wrote on a card: "Allow Mr. Ashmun and friend to come in at 9 A.M. to-morrow. A. Lincoln." This is the last word he ever wrote.

The enterprising proprietor of Ford's Theater, in virtue of a partial promise he had extracted from Mrs. Lincoln, inserted in all the daily papers of that day, as a news item, the following: "Lieutenant-General Grant, President and Mrs. Lincoln and ladies, will occupy the State box at Ford's Theater to-night, to witness Miss Laura Keane's company in Tom Taylor's 'American Cousin.'"

General Grant, however, preferred to visit his family at Burlington, N. J., and started thither

on the late afternoon train. The President really did not wish to go to the theater, but, in view of the newspaper announcement, deemed it his duty to do so; and Speaker Colfax, though invited, failing to go, the President and Mrs. Lincoln secured the company of Major H. R. Rathbone and Miss Clara W. Harris, the stepson and daughter respectively of Senator Harris of New York. They reached the theater at about nine o'clock, while the play was in progress, and were ushered into the State box, according to programme.

Booth was still at Washington on the 14th, and, seeing the announcement of the engagement at Ford's Theater, visited the theater at about eleven o'clock in the morning, knowing the proprietor and employees well. He found the two private boxes on the left hand of the stage being made into one by removal of the partition, and decorated with the American flag. Little did he then think that that sacred flag was to be the nemesis of his fate! Upon some pretext, not clearly appearing, he induced Spangler, the stage carpenter, to fit a brace to the door which led from the auditorium to the box, so that, when it was in place, the box could not be reached from the auditorium. He then took in the whole situation fully, and, in order not to be baffled by the closing of the door which led from the box itself to the sub-hall, he had the screws carefully removed from the snaplock which secured them. There was a deliberate method in his madness, if indeed, as has been claimed, he was mad. Having thus fitted up his workshop to suit his infernal object, he next repaired to a livery stable and engaged a fleet horse for a horseback ride, to be

used about the middle of the afternoon. Next in the order of his industries, with what object is not clear, he stopped in at the Kirkwood House and called for the Vice-President. The latter was engaged and declined the visit. The assassin then wrote on a card and left it: "I don't want to disturb you; are you at home? J. Wilkes Booth." It should be stated that Vice-President Johnson had remained at Washington since the inauguration attending to department business for his constituents, but was intending to return home on the succeeding day, also that he had no connection with Booth, and that it was part of the conspiracy to assassinate the Vice-President.

At four o'clock P.M. Booth, in a visible state of nervous unrest, called for and rode off on his hired horse, and after a brief formal ride, hid him away in a stable in rear of Ford's Theater, which he had previously engaged for that purpose.

In course of the evening Booth brought the horse to the rear of the theater, and Spangler assumed its charge, employing a boy to hold it. Booth and one or two of his confederates next appeared in front of the theater, and as the hour or half hour and sometimes quarter of the hour would occur, they would dramatically exclaim "nine o'clock," etc.

At nine o'clock one of the conspirators approached the President's servant, who kept guard at the outer door leading toward the private box, having a large official envelope for General Grant, and, asking for the General, retired. He had been sent to spy out the land, in all probability.

Three-quarters of an hour thereafter one of

the conspirators, standing near the audience door, said solemnly: "Nine o'clock and forty-five minutes"; another repeated the expression, and still others till it reached the sidewalk. Ten minutes afterwards the party vociferated, "Nine o'clock and fifty-five minutes"; which was taken up and passed along as the former had been. At ten o'clock the hour was again called, echoed, and repeated; also at 10.10, at which time J. Wilkes Booth appeared, and the conspirator sentinels disappeared suddenly.

At 10.15 the hour of fate had struck and Booth entered the dress circle, and with apparent *nonchalance* sauntered around the outer lobby of the dress circle, reaching the President's servant, who was watching the play several feet away from the door. He showed the servant a card, saying that Mr. Lincoln had sent for him, which quieted the servant, who continued watching the stage. Booth also stood, for two minutes, looking with apparent interest at the performance. He then quietly entered into the vestibule, softly closing the door behind him, and with the accommodating brace fitted by Spangler, secured it from any entrance or interference from the main auditorium. The two doors to the boxes themselves were shut, and the assassin deliberately bored a gimlet hole through one of them, and with his knife reamed out the hole so that he might get a range of vision over the entire box; thus he became master of the situation. Then, drawing a small silver-mounted Derringer pistol and carrying it in his right hand, and taking a long dagger in the left, he swiftly opened the door, and when within four feet, fired directly at the back of the President's head. The aim and

fell purpose were alike unerring; the doomed President's head fell a little forward, his eyes closed, but otherwise his attitude was unchanged. He never was conscious of what had occurred, but passed, in the twinkling of an eye, into the fathomless realms of insensibility and eternity. At this time Mr. Lincoln sat in an armchair nearest the audience, with his wife immediately on his right, her hand resting on his knee. The President was leaning a little on his right arm, his left lightly holding back the curtain so as to afford a wider range of view. Major Rathbone and Miss Harris sat a little to the right, and the whole party were, at the particular moment, intently engrossed with the play. The sole speaker on the stage at the time was Harry Hawk, who played the part of Asa Trenchard; and he had just got off the gag suited to the occasion: "Well, *neow* I'll tell *yeow* one o' Mr. Linkin's stories," when the fatal shot rang out. Those were the last sounds that Mr. Lincoln heard this side of eternity. Major Rathbone, with admirable presence of mind, sprang for the murderer, who, dropping his pistol, struck a vicious blow with the dagger which wounded the Major in the arm and disconcerted him for the moment, during which the miscreant jumped over the railing on to the stage, where he shouted, "*Sic semper tyrannis!*"

In his leap, however, his spur caught in the folds of the American flag, which caused him to fall in such a manner as to fracture the small bone of his leg, below the knee. He arose at once, however—haste was needful—and again shouting in a theatrical style. "The South is avenged!" he started, with the dagger glistening,

toward the rear of the stage, in a rapid gait. Hawk was alone upon the stage, and supposing that the seeming madman was after him, darted behind the flies, where he escaped up a flight of stage stairs. Booth made his way unimpeded to the rear of the theater, and, hastily mounting the horse, galloped off in the darkness, crossed the Anacosta bridge and was temporarily sheltered by the Maryland Rebels, and ultimately shot like a mad dog by one Boston Corbett, a sergeant in the regular army.

Of all persons present in that vast audience there were two who had perfect presence of mind: one was Joseph B. Stewart, a lawyer of herculean build, who was sitting in the *parquette* and who clambered on the stage as rapidly as he could, and pursued the fleeing assassin. Booth, however, had too much the start of him, and when Stewart reached the rear of the theater, he had mounted his horse and was galloping off. The other person with presence of mind was Miss Keene, who was behind the flies waiting for her cue, when, attracted by the firing, she rushed toward the stage just in time to see Booth before he disappeared. Coming immediately to the front she exclaimed, "It's Wilkes Booth," and in a commanding voice ordered the audience to be quiet. Then at once she ran to her dressing-room and procured some water, spirits, etc., returning with which she went hastily to the President's box. Meantime pandemonium reigned supreme. Women went into hysterics, fainted, cried, wrung their hands, tore their hair, and screamed. Men swore, raved, shook their clenched fists, stamped, and shouted. Major Rathbone's arm bled profusely; Mrs. Lincoln

screamed, shrieked, cried, and became hysterical; the news flew; the doorkeepers left their posts, and the public surged in. A boy ran down Pennsylvania Avenue, which was thronged with people, exclaiming, "Man shot at the theater," and the people rushed thither. It is astonishing with what rapidity bad news can travel, and also that its speed is increased in direct ratio to the intensity of its sadness; and so it would seem as if all Washington knew of the awful tragedy within a few moments after its occurrence. Two surgeons appeared on the scene while the excitement raged, and gained access to the victim; one of them felt the President's fluttering pulse and gazed at his closed eyes and impassive face; the other parted the hair and glanced at the wound. Their eyes met in glances which effectually concurred that no basis existed for hope. They quietly exchanged a few words together, and in reply to Mrs. Lincoln's agonizing entreaties, simply shed involuntary tears, and made no answer, which the unerring instinct of a woman interpreted aright. Meanwhile, some one, hurriedly crossing the street, and ringing the bell of Mr. Peterson's house, hastily explained the needs of the moment, and requested the instant use of a lower room, which was readily accorded. Immediately thereafter four brawny men appeared in the fatal box, gently lifted the armchair containing the unconscious form of the martyr, and, the way being forcibly cleared by the police and others, tenderly bore it across the street, and carried it to a little bedroom at the end of the hall. The door was guarded, and none admitted but the friends. Most of the Cabinet officers had reached there as soon as the inanimate form of

the President. The Surgeon-General of the Army had also come, and he was making a thorough examination of the wound. At length, looking into the anxious faces who sought his, he said to Stanton, who had caught him by the arm impulsively, as if to pull the secret from him, "I fear, Mr. Stanton, that there is no hope," and proceeded calmly to wipe his probe. The Secretary of War exclaimed in tones of heartrending anguish, "No! no! General! oh, no!" and burst into a series of convulsive sobs, which shook his burly frame. Senator Sumner sat on the bed, holding one of the dying man's hands and crying bitterly. No such august assembly had ever gathered before about a deathbed. The strong men of the nation were there, men used to battle and conflict, leaders in moral and physical warfare, but it was a necessity, as well as a virtue, to weep, and the walls of that obscure little apartment were resonant with the pent-up grief of strong men, hardened by sorrow and unused to tears.

In an adjacent room the most tender offices of love and sympathy were beneficently and affectionately bestowed upon the stricken one, already doomed to drain the chalice of bereavement and widowhood to the bitter dregs; and when the solemn vigils of that morally black and tempestuous night—the *nox tristis* of this century—had passed, and morning broke, peace came to the most illustrious and deeply deplored political martyr of all time.

A hush fell upon the august assemblage of mourners; it was as if grief had petrified them. The solemn silence was broken by the voice of Secretary Stanton, usually harsh and imperious,

but now pitiful and humble by emotion, tearfully soliloquizing: "There lies the greatest leader of men the world ever saw."

At nine o'clock an undertaker's wagon appeared at the door of the Peterson mansion; the body of the great martyr was placed in it, and guarded and escorted by a company of regular soldiers, it was conveyed to the White House—prepared for burial, embalmed, and placed in a mahogany casket, which, in turn, was placed in a grand catafalque, four feet high, in the center of the Green Room, which had been appropriately draped for the sad occasion, and where a guard of honor had been posted. Soon the rich coffin containing the sacred remains was piled high with rare exotics and domestic flowers, tokens of patriotic love, from the lowly clerk and exalted statesman alike.

Within five minutes of the time when the President was shot a conspirator with Booth, Lewis Payne Powell, generally known as Payne, called at Mr. Seward's residence, pushed aside the servant who answered the bell, ran upstairs to the bedroom where the disabled Secretary was lying, and, admission being refused him by Mr. Seward's son Frederick, the Assistant Secretary of State, beat him on the head with a pistol, fracturing his skull. Hearing the noise, Miss Fannie Seward, who was attending her father within, then opened the door, through which Payne darted; he fell upon Mr. Seward in bed with a bowie-knife and stabbed him three times about the throat before he was seized by an invalid soldier named Robinson, who was attending as nurse. Payne turned upon Robinson, and gave him a number of severe wounds. While the as-

sassin was thus engaged, Mr. Seward contrived to roll off the bed on its farther side; seeing that his victim was out of reach, and hearing Miss Seward at the window crying "Murder!" Payne broke away from Robinson and rushed downstairs. On his way he met another son of the Secretary, Major Augustus Seward, whom he struck with his dagger, and another attendant upon the sick man, Mr. Hanswell, whom he stabbed; gaining the street, he mounted his horse and rode away.

He was apprehended later, and, with Herold, Booth's accomplice, Mrs. Surratt, a tavern-keeper who had harbored Booth, and another conspirator, Atzerodt, was condemned to death and hanged on July 7. Other conspirators were condemned to various terms of imprisonment.

Meetings were held everywhere to give expression to the unusual grief; even the Rebels, in many instances, clothed their hearts in semi-mourning, seeing through the mists of partisan prejudice the kindly spirit, ardent patriotism, and beneficent charity of this Father of his people.

On the succeeding Sabbath every church in the Northern part of the nation held memorial services, and the voice of eulogy filled the land, even extending to parts of the South. At Charlotte, N. C., where Jefferson Davis was stopping in his flight southward, the preacher at a service attended by Mr. Davis severely condemned the act, looking sharply at the Confederate President, "as if," reported Mr. Davis, "he thought I had something to do with it."

Undoubtedly Mr. Davis had nothing to do with the crime, but there is sworn testimony that he

expressed his sympathy with it. According to the evidence of Lewis F. Bates, subsequently superintendent of the Southern Express Company for the State of South Carolina, at whose house in Charlotte, N. C., Davis was stopping, the Confederate President on receiving a telegram from General Breckinridge announcing Lincoln's assassination, coldly remarked: "If it were to be done, it were better it were well done"; and two days later, when Breckinridge was present, in reply to the general's expression of regret for the murder, Mr. Davis said: "Well, General, I don't know; if it were to be done at all, it were better that it were well done, and if the same had been done to Andy Johnson, the beast, and to Secretary Stanton, the job would then be complete."

On Monday, the 17th of April, a Congressional meeting was held, and Senator Sumner moved for a Committee of Arrangements for the funeral, which was appointed, with himself at the head. The following were designated as pall-bearers, viz.: Foster, Morgan, Johnson, Yates, Wade, and Conness, Senators; and Dawes, Cof-froth, Smith, Colfax, Worthington, and Washburne from the House of Representatives; also one member from each State and Territory was selected to form a Committee of Escort. It was one of the most august bodies of men that ever assembled anywhere. Except the Duke of Wellington, no man in all history ever had so eminent a body of pall-bearers. On the ensuing day the White House was opened to all who desired to view the remains which lay in state in the East Room, adorned with huge flower emblems; and fully twenty-five thousand persons availed them-

selves of the privilege, and several thousand more were denied it for want of time.

The succeeding day (Wednesday) the funeral took place in the East Room. It was a most impressive and solemn service. The President of the United States, the entire Cabinet, the Supreme Court Justices, the Lieutenant-General of the Army and a brilliant suite, the Senior Admiral of the Navy and many other naval officers, the Diplomatic Corps, and a large array of Senators and Congressmen, besides many influential citizens, made up an audience of worth and brilliancy rarely convened. Mrs. Lincoln herself was thoroughly prostrated with grief, and unable to leave her bed, and Robert T. Lincoln and little "Tad," the latter inconsolable with grief, were the chief personal mourners. Several of Mrs. Lincoln's relatives were present, but none of Mr. Lincoln's.

The solemn service began by Rev. Dr. Hall, an Episcopal clergyman, reading in an impressive manner the Episcopal Scripture Service for the burial of the dead. The venerable Bishop Simpson of the Methodist Episcopal Church, then offered a fervent prayer, after which Dr. Gurley, pastor of the Presbyterian Church which Mrs. Lincoln attended, preached the funeral discourse from the text in Mark xi., 22: "Have faith in God!" The services were then concluded by prayer by Rev. Dr. Gray, Chaplain of the Senate, a Baptist clergyman.

The remains were immediately transferred to a stately funeral car which had been improvised for the occasion, and, attended by a brilliant and imposing military *cortège* with arms reversed, the solemn procession moved towards the Capitol.

The weather was perfect, and the arrangements were carried out with faultless precision. The wagon way of the wide avenue was kept entirely clear by policemen, but the sidewalks, windows, and roofs along the route were a perfect mass of humanity, solemn, awe-struck, reverential; and as the plaintive dirges from the bands of music with muffled drums floated out on the air, and the precise tread of the veterans animated the sublime scene, tears welled up from the hearts of thousands, attesting the strength of the affection which the benign ruler had inspired in the breasts of the people.

The procession reached the Capitol, and the remains were borne into the rotunda, where Rev. Dr. Gurley read the usual service for the burial of the dead, while the President and Cabinet, relatives, and some members of Congress attended. The casket was placed on the catafalque and a short prayer followed: and the services were at an end.

It was earnestly desired that the body should be buried in the vault beneath the rotunda of the Capitol which had been prepared for the body of Washington, but not used; and this plan, so obviously proper, would probably have been carried out, but for the interference of Senator Yates, Congressman Washburne, and Governor Oglesby, who, animated by considerations of State pride, carried the day in favor of interment at the late home of the martyr. Accordingly, at six o'clock A.M., on the 21st inst., the casket, after having been visited by many thousands of people on the day before, was closed; and an hour later was transferred, in the presence of the President, his Cabinet, the General of the Army and his

staff, and a distinguished assemblage of eminent personages, to a special car which had been fitted up for the purpose. Attended by the guard of honor, the two sons and other relatives, and the Congressional Committee of Escort, it started on its way to the receptacle of final repose.

The first intention, and indeed, desire of the family, was to transfer the casket to Springfield with as little pomp as possible, but in deference to the earnest desire of the people, this simple plan yielded to the adoption of substantially the same route which had been taken by the untried Lincoln of four years previously, *en route* to a martyr's death and immortality. At eight o'clock A.M. on the 21st the solemn procession, consisting of seven coaches and a locomotive, all solemnly draped in black, slowly moved out from the depot, amidst an immense concourse of people, all reverently uncovered.

A methodical programme had been made out in the War Department, adopted by the various railway companies and committees *en route*, which was rigidly adhered to, and carried into effect without a flaw, from inception to close. A low rate of speed was ordered, and a pilot engine preceded the train. At ten o'clock, the train reached Baltimore, the city through which, but four years and two months before, President Lincoln had had to flee in the night to avoid assassination. But how changed! All that earnest affection could do to show respect and reverence to the ashes of the illustrious dead was done; a very large and imposing military escort was at the depot, and a stately funeral car, tastefully draped, was in attendance, to which the remains were transferred. A procession escorted the

body to the Exchange, where it was placed on a raised dais, decorated with funereal flowers. A constant stream of citizens passed in double file for four hours to gaze on the face of the dead, and then not more than a tenth of the people assembled were able to take part in such homage.

The funeral train then proceeded to Harrisburg, the Governor of the State accompanying it. At all way stations crowds assembled to catch a glimpse of the train, and at York, where the train halted for a few moments, six girls, dressed in mourning, obtained permission to enter the funeral car and deposit a beautiful wreath of white flowers upon the casket. Bells tolled, cannon reverberated, and dirges were played by bands at each village. The grief was universal and equal everywhere. At Harrisburg the remains were conveyed to the Capitol, and placed upon a catafalque, bedecked with flowers. The casket was opened, and the citizens were permitted to review the remains till midnight. Philadelphia was the next stopping point. An immense procession escorted the casket from Broad Street station to Independence Hall, where the remains of America's greatest martyr were placed in the chamber where, ninety years before, Liberty was proclaimed to the world. The casket was opened, and from ten o'clock till midnight opportunity was given to the vast crowd to view the remains; and hundreds remained crowded about the hall door so as to have an early opportunity of inspection the ensuing morning. The next day was Sunday, but the doors were opened at six o'clock, and remained so till one o'clock on Monday morning; and all through these nineteen hours a double row of people filed

past the casket which contained all that was mortal of him who, four years before, in that same place, had said, "If this country cannot be saved without giving up that principle [of constitutional liberty], I would rather be assassinated upon this spot than surrender it." Early Monday morning the train, bearing its most precious burden, moved majestically off for New York, attended with the sound of funeral dirges, booming cannon, and suppressed farewells from thousands of uncovered patriots. Throughout the entire journey through New Jersey crowds appeared at every station, every crossroads, at every farmstead. It seemed as if all the inhabitants of that State of Revolutionary memories had assembled along the line of travel, to see at least the train which bore the remains of him they loved. Guns were fired, mourning emblems displayed, bands played, crowds stood silent, and respectfully and reverently uncovered. Reaching Jersey City, where the depot was draped in mourning, the train was greeted by a chorus of seventy singers chanting dirges. Ten stalwart soldiers then bore the casket to the hearse which had been specially provided, and which was drawn by six gray horses heavily draped in black. It was received across the river by a great procession, which, marshaled by General Dix, escorted the remains to the City Hall, where a trained chorus of eight hundred of the best vocalists in the city chanted the "Chorus of the Spirits"; and this sad but beautiful melody together with the sound of tolling bells, booming cannon, and waving flags draped with funereal emblems, made the scene appear like one of weird and fated enchantment. Arrived at the City Hall, the casket was placed under the

dome which was arranged to allow of a subdued light; and, for twenty-four consecutive hours, a stream of people passed rapidly through, while crowds without, as far as the eye could reach in all directions, looked enviously on, knowing that their opportunity would never come. The first line was three-quarters of a mile long, and extended the whole length of Chatham Street, Chatham Square, and into the Bowery. It was estimated that one hundred and fifty thousand persons viewed the remains, while double that number were present who failed to do so. And yet this was at the very spot where, less than two years before, an equal crowd had gathered to resist the draft ordered by him who lay within the coffin.

At twenty minutes before twelve o'clock on the 25th the casket was transferred to the funeral car, and escorted to the Hudson River Railway depot by the finest military cavalcade ever witnessed in New York. It consisted of at least fifteen thousand men in most brilliant uniforms, and accompanied by the finest bands in the nation. The civic procession was equally noteworthy, for the Federal and State dignitaries and representatives of foreign governments, in full costume, were there by hundreds, and all the streets leading to the depot were thronged with people. As the *New York Herald* said: "Such an occasion, such a crowd, and such a day New York may never see again."

The train stopped at Albany, Buffalo, Cleveland, Columbus, and Indianapolis, where similar scenes occurred to those which have been described. As in Pennsylvania and New Jersey, people gathered all along the route to pay honor

to the passing corpse of their beloved "Father Abraham." The New York *Tribune* well said: "A funeral in each house . . . would hardly have added solemnity to the day."

Chicago was reached on the first day of May. The whole city was clad in mourning; the body of the President was placed in the rotunda of the Court House, over the north door of which was the motto: "*The altar of freedom has borne no nobler sacrifice,*" and over the south door of which was the motto, "*Illinois clasps to her bosom her slain, but glorified, son.*"

The last stage of the long, sad journey was now reached on the morning of May 3. The entire city of Springfield was clad in mourning, and the body of him whose living presence had been so familiar in these streets was borne through them to the Representatives' Hall in the State House, being the same hall where, eleven years before, he had uttered his terrible philippic against the repeal of the Missouri Compromise. At ten o'clock A.M. of May 4 the casket was borne to the hearse, and a long and mournful procession wended its way to Oak Ridge Cemetery. The journey of eighteen hundred miles was ended, and Abraham Lincoln was henceforth to be a tender and sacred memory. Rev. Dr. Hall made a fervent prayer; the choir sang a hymn; a Scripture lesson and the dead President's last inaugural were read; and Bishop Matthew Simpson of the Methodist Episcopal Church made an eloquent address. Rev. Mr. Gurley of Washington closed the service with prayer; the vault door opened; and, as the choir sang softly, "Unveil thy Bosom, Faithful Tomb," the casket was placed in the vault, and the body of the great martyr was, like his soul, at rest.







